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French and Australian collaborative research in the humanities and the social 
sciences in the South Pacific has grown and intensified significantly over the past 
two decades, beginning with the international symposium Changing Identities 
in the Pacific at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century held at the Australian 
Embassy in Paris in 1997, followed in 1999 by a major conference, Identity in the 
Pacific, organised by the French Permanent Secretary for the Pacific, Ambassador 
Pierre Garrigue-Guyonnaud and held at the Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Noumea. 
The edited proceedings of this colloquium, generously funded by the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, constituted the first issue of the New Pacific Review/ 
La Nouvelle Revue du Pacifique, published in 2000 in English and French in a 
single volume.
In December 2003 a French-Australian symposium, Pacific Island States Today/ 
L’État des États, was held at The Australian National University in Canberra, 
organised by the Centre for the Contemporary Pacific, Research School of 
Pacific and Asian Studies. This symposium brought together a wide range of 
scholars and whose penetrating presentations covered major issues in both the 
Francophone and Anglophone Pacific.
In August 2004 an international conference, Les Assises de la Recherche Française 
dans le Pacifique/ A Review and Evaluation of French Research in the Pacific 
was held at the Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Noumea, sponsored by the French 
Government and the Government of New Caledonia. 
In April 2006, another French-government sponsored international symposium, 
AGORA (Ateliers Gouvernance et Recherche Appliquée) was held at IRD 
(Institut de Recherche pour le Développement), Noumea, New Caledonia, major 
themes being governance and economic development, again bringing together 
Francophone and Anglophone scholars from France and the Pacific region.
This was followed in October 2009 by two conjoint Francophone/Anglophone 
conferences, held at the IRD Centre in Noumea, Stability, Security and Development 
in Oceania, preceded by AGORA-2, an international conference on Anglophone 
research in the humanities and the social sciences in the Francophone Pacific, 
sponsored by the French Government and the Government of New Caledonia. 
The first of these conferences was sponsored by the French Fonds Pacifique 
and the State, Society and Governance Program at The Australian National 
University. An edited selection of presentations from this symposium constitutes 
the present volume.
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In October 2010 there was another conference held in Noumea, the École 
Plurilingue dans les Communautés du Pacifique / Multilingual Schools in the Pacific 
Communities, co-organised by the University of New Caledonia, The Australian 
National University and CREDO (the Centre for Research and Documentation on 
Oceania). 
In March 2011 the Government of New Caledonia  and the French Government 
sponsored a major international conference Destins des Collectivités politiques 
d’Océanie/ The Future Destiny of French Pacific States, co-organised by Jean-Yves 
Faberon, Viviane Fayaud and Jean-Marc Regnault. This conference was held at 
IRD Noumea. The French edition of the proceedings appeared at the end of 2011 
(Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille), and a selection of the presentations on 
the future of New Caledonia is in preparation for publication in English at The 
Australian National University.
To complete the picture of Franco-Australian collaborative research in the 
humanities and social sciences to date, the French Government Fonds Pacifique 
and The Australian National University are co-sponsoring an international 
symposium Governance, Development and Change in Oceania, to be held in 
Canberra at The Australian National University in 2012.  The proceedings of 
that symposium will complement the present volume. For the 2009 and 2012 
symposia have been designed to maximise Francophone and Anglophone 
interaction and intellectual exchange, the first colloquium being held in New 
Caledonia and the second here in Australia.
It is manifest from the above summary account of collaborative activities, that 
French and Australian mutual understanding and appreciation have undergone 
a period of constant and continuous growth for more than a decade now, 
especially in the fields of governance, social and political change, and economic 
and social development. Most pleasing, perhaps, has been the marked increase 
in Francophone and Anglophone Pacific Islander exchanges, backed up by the 
commitment to collaboration by the metropolitan powers for the development 
of the Pacific region.
Editors’ Note
In the interests of improving accessibility to our Francophone colleagues, an 
abstract in French is provided at the head of each chapter.
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Opening Address to ‘Politics, 
Development and Security in 
Oceania’ International Colloquium, 
Noumea
Mr Philippe Gomès, 
President of the Government of New Caledonia, 2009-2011
In my Inaugural Address on August 31, 2009 I spoke on behalf of the whole 
government which I have the honour to preside, and, among other things, I said 
this:
The sovereignty that we share with the state includes powers regarding 
international and regional relationships. The Noumea Agreement has 
not been fully implemented yet and its potential has not been fully 
tapped in this area. Today we have to speak in the name of this country 
in the Pacific area.
This goes to show that you are most welcome here in Noumea, New Caledonia, 
a land where the word is of the essence. Your word, originating in the Pacific, 
in our neighbour and friend, Australia, carries knowledge of the whole Pacific, 
and it matters to us. We will listen to it carefully and we will share your insight.
I am particularly keen on research, a field that I was intent on taking care of 
personally within my government, for research is a nation’s intelligence and 
future, in other words, the promise of New Caledonia. Research is open-
mindedness, and we can be only happy to see that you, famous ANU Professors, 
have chosen to hold your colloquium here this year. Your field covers the French 
and Francophone Pacific, and you have come to the right place for your study. 
Our word is at your disposal.
Your conference is taking place here at the same time as our French-speaking 
Communities’ Week. I do not see any contradiction or conflict in this; on the 
contrary, I am happy to see these two events happen at the same time.
Your bilingual conference shows that the Pacific is not an Anglophone lake but 
a mare nostrum, as the Latin phrase has it, ‘Our Sea’, where various waves mix 
in a common life, and as a result, we can live together.
Politics, Development and Security in Oceania
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As you know, on October 6, just a few days ago, France and Australia signed in 
Canberra an agreement on higher education degree equivalencies, which allows 
exchanges between our universities, and, obviously, that is of major interest for 
New Caledonia.
There are only 370 Australian students in France as opposed to 3,000 French 
people studying in Australia. Dear Professors, tell your students that we are 
expecting them, that Australians are always welcome in New Caledonia, and 
this goes for students, and not only because we have the same academic year!
Dear Professors, I see that the precise topic of your conference is ‘Stability, 
Security and Development’. This area of Pacific Studies fits perfectly with the 
dynamics of present-day New Caledonia and with the policy of my pluralistic 
and inclusive government. 
Of course, we want our country to develop, but we cannot get development 
by fiat. Development requires an environment which allows our vibrancy to 
thrive. These conditions are, of course, stability and security. You have perfectly 
outlined our common problematics in this region.
Security is external security, and the major powers with which you and we are 
linked unfailingly are the warranty that we most need.
Stability, which includes internal security, is the ideal that we all reach for, 
and in this undertaking we succeed in varying degrees. Because I do not enjoy 
your freedom as researchers, I will refrain from expostulating on such and 
such a neighbouring nation; I will just acknowledge the example of democratic 
stability that Australia shows in her peaceful parliamentary majority changes.
This model is not the one we have in New Caledonia, for we have chosen 
to challenge stability by attempting to disconnect it, at least partly, from 
majoritarian democracy. Our purpose was to constantly seek consensus, and 
that is a tough proposition. In our country the rift between the two major 
political groups is a deep one, and as a result, instability seemed inevitable, 
just as our troubled years have clearly shown; therefore, we resolved to work 
together toward a more balanced development for our country, for its security 
and its peace. I’m proud to tell you on behalf of New Caledonia that, so far, we 
have been successful! New Caledonia has known stability for 20 years now, and 
my government will continue on the same path.
Dear Australian academic friends, your being here today is proof that you have 
comprehended this; your having elected to come to Noumea to discuss stability, 
security and development in the Pacific shows that you have a sense that New 
Caledonia is a relevant place, a place where all these notions flourish today: we 
greatly appreciate your coming here, and I thank you very much for it.
Opening Address to ‘Politics, Development and Security in Oceania’
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I am in no way seeking to show smug optimism and futile complacency. I am 
perfectly aware that nothing is final, including in New Caledonia, and maybe 
especially in New Caledonia, where the fire is still smouldering. I know perfectly 
well that in my country there are too many people who are left behind as far as 
development is concerned, and they are too obvious a danger for its stability 
and security. We probably have not found the way; in any case we have not been 
able to reduce the scope of this problem, and I do not play down its potential 
for an outburst of political and social violence. As a result, I will stay informed 
about your research in this area, about the models that are analysed, and about 
the solutions that are devised and tested. Your proceedings will be not only 
scientifically valuable; they will also be of great interest to the group of men and 
women to whom I belong, the men and women who are in the task of building 
up Oceania day by day. 





1. A Changing Oceania
David Hegarty
Bilan: Politique, Développement et Sécurité en Océanie
La configuration de la puissance dans la grande région Asie-Pacifique 
connaît actuellement des changements très importants avec la montée de 
la Chine comme puissance mondiale. L’influence de cette dernière se fait 
sentir à travers l’augmentation de l’aide et le développement du commerce 
et des relations diplomatiques, surtout avec Fidji. L’unité régionale dans 
le Pacifique connaît quelques tensions, surtout suite au coup d’Etat 
de Fidji de 2006  : L’Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande ainsi que les Etats 
polynésiens et micronésiens sont opposés au régime militaire alors que 
les Etats mélanésiens continuent à reconnaître son chef, le commodore 
Bainimarama. Les indicateurs de développement et de gouvernance des 
pays insulaires sont contrastés mais globalement satisfaisants, la plupart 
se situant dans une assez large plage autour de la moyenne mondiale. Sur 
le plan politique, la région a connu à la fois la stabilité et l’instabilité, mais 
la plupart des petits Etats sont parvenus à « s’en sortir » en cas de crise. 
La professionnalisation croissante des responsables de l’administration 
publique, le développement d’organisations au sein de la société civile 
et leur rôle grandissant dans les politiques publiques et dans leur mise 
en œuvre, ajoutés à la réaction positive des donateurs en faveur des Etats 
insulaires, produisent des résultats plus positifs dans les petits Etats. Le 
besoin d’analyser et de développer les relations entre les Etats insulaires 
anglophones et francophones d’Océanie est toujours présent.
Asia-Pacific: Power Shifts
As the first decade of the 21st century drew to a close – and morphed into the 
second – it had become obvious that in the broad Asia-Pacific region dramatic 
political, strategic and socio-economic change was underway. A ‘power shift’ 
was the description applied by strategic affairs specialist, Professor Hugh White 
of The Australian National University, in which as Asia’s ‘strategic plates shift’ 
a new Asian power balance arises requiring all states to negotiate a relationship 
with China. The productivity revolution that is transforming China, White 
asserts, is ‘reordering the world’. Asia and the region will become more contested 
over the next few decades and the larger powers including Australia will have 
to reassess defence and security risks – as well as the costs of addressing them. 
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Former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans (subsequently head of the 
International Crisis Group), went further and described these changes in the 
Asia-Pacific regional power equation as a ‘tectonic shift’ with repercussions not 
only regionally, but for the global balance as a whole. 
The significance of these developments and their interpretations is contested. 
Michael Wesley (Head of the Lowy Institute for International Affairs) suggests 
this does not mean an inevitable direct Chinese challenge to American primacy 
in the region – nor that China’s neighbours will fall immediately into line with 
Beijing. Wesley’s book – which underlines the importance of adding India to the 
Asia-Pacific equation – analyses the ‘new highways of power’ across Asia. ‘China 
and India have arrived as major shapers of the how the world works, and their 
preferences, enthusiasms and aversions will have a strong effect on the choices 
that other societies face,’ he contends. They will be key shapers of globalisation 
in the 21st century, but they will be acutely sensitive ‘to their dependence on 
the outside world for the oxygen of their development’. Asia will not simply 
settle into an ordered hierarchy under Chinese leadership – forces from outside 
the Indo-Pacific will play decisive roles in the evolving region. 
Other analysts have seen China’s rise as unsettling the established order and 
prompting a reappraisal of the fundamentals of Asia-Pacific security, yet still 
providing room to move and scope for creativity for middle powers such as 
Australia. Former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Kevin Rudd, 
noted a ‘strategic uneasiness’ accompanying China’s rise and suggested the need 
for an Asia-Pacific regional security dialogue arrangement of some kind. The 
US government had little doubt about the significance of China’s rise and of the 
need for the West to ensure there was balance at least in the emerging Asia-
Pacific strategic equation. President Obama’s reference in late 2011 to a ‘pivot to 
Asia’ in American strategic thinking and security posture from the Middle East 
to the Asia Pacific signalled US thinking about that balance. 
The Island Pacific
Within the Pacific Islands region itself these ‘power shifts’ and their geo-
strategic and security implications in the broad Asia-Pacific region have not 
gone unnoticed – nor have they been without some impact. China’s rise to 
international prominence had led also to an increased Chinese official interest 
and presence in the Pacific Islands region. Chinese diplomacy including official 
visits, increased aid to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) and particularly to the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group, commercial investment and migration activity 
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had increased substantially in the past decade. Lowy Institute analysts estimate 
that $200m in Chinese grants and soft loans have been made to the PICs: in 
contrast to USAID allocations of $4m.
A product of a globalising China, this outreach has paralleled China’s expansion 
into Africa and South America (that is, to other developing country regions) in 
search of trade and commercial opportunities and imports of raw materials for 
its industrial expansion. China analyst at The Australian National University, 
Graeme Smith, argues that this expansion is not necessarily state-directed – nor 
is it likely to be state-controlled. An important element in China’s foray into the 
‘developing world’ has been the diminution of its long-standing rivalry with 
Taiwan. 
All the PICs have been impacted to some extent and will continue to be impacted 
as China extends its reach across the Third World in search of markets, materials 
and influence. China’s exports to the region have increased their market share of 
all exports to the PICs from 1.5 per cent in 1998 to an estimated 8.5 per cent in 
2008. Chinese goods now constitute 11 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s imports, 
while Solomon Islands has rapidly increased its exports to China through sales 
of timber. 
The PICs stand to benefit from a greater range of relatively cheap trade-store 
goods and building materials; through educational opportunities on offer 
for PIC university-level students to study in Chinese institutions (Samoa, 
for example, has over 100 undergraduates currently in Chinese academies); 
through construction programs such as the delivery of office buildings to 
Samoa; and from Chinese outbound tourism. For the PICs – and for Papua New 
Guinea in particular – market and trading opportunities have been expanded. 
Interestingly, this enhanced Chinese presence has not meant that PICs have had 
to choose between it and their long-standing regional neighbours, partners and 
donors. China’s rising influence has also had political spin-off, for example, by 
providing the military regime in Fiji with an opportunity to play the ‘China 
card’ to relieve or stymie pressure from Australia and New Zealand for it (Fiji) to 
return to civilian democratic government.
‘Ripple Effect’
In response to China’s increasing interest and activity in the Pacific Islands a 
‘ripple effect’ of sorts has occurred. More attention has been paid to the PICs by 
their ‘traditional’ partners Australia and New Zealand; but also by the United 
States, described by one commentator as ‘an absent-minded ally’ of the Islands. 
Aware of Fiji’s Commodore Bainimarama’s interest in China (and his visits there) 
and also aware that China had not criticised the Bainimarama coup but had in 
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fact increased its aid to Fiji after the coup event, US Secretary for State, Hilary 
Clinton, held talks in 2010 with Fiji’s Foreign Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, 
canvassing a stronger partnership and dialogue with Fiji and proposing to open 
a USAID office in Fiji in 2011. US interest in the Pacific Islands was also iterated 
by Kurt Campbell, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific 
Affairs, at a US Congressional hearing in 2010 at which he also spoke of a desire 
for stronger partnership and dialogue with Fiji. These discussions were not 
couched in the language of ‘threat analysis’, but were mildly cautionary in tone 
and reaffirming of common interests and commitments to liberal democracy, 
peace and security within the region as a whole. Japan was similarly exercised 
that Fiji not be pushed closer to China.
Australia’s Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs, Richard Marles, 
in a September 2011 address, ‘Why the Pacific matters?’, similarly offered 
affirmations of Australia’s commitment and connections to the Islands region – 
a statement addressed to both Pacific and Australian audiences. While Marles 
did not explicitly mention China, Australia’s clear concern was that Fiji not be 
pushed into a Chinese embrace. Marles stated: 
We are the Pacific’s major security partner. We are the Pacific’s major 
economic partner. We are its largest aid donor – around half of the 
world’s development assistance to the Pacific comes from Australia. 
We continue to be connected by a deeply rooted network of personal, 
business, sporting and community ties. Our geography dictates that we 
have a shared destiny.
Earlier the then Australian Foreign Minister, Stephen Smith, had urged China 
not to undermine Australian and regional efforts for Fiji to hold elections. The 
Australian 2020 Summit reported that China had become more visible, more 
focused economically, but seemed not to know what its own aims were in the 
PIC region. China had indeed increased its trade and aid to the Pacific; but 
overt competition with other donors or proselytising on its part had not been 
apparent. Scholars and foreign policy makers in universities and think tanks 
across the Pacific continue to grapple with what China’s rise means for security 
and development in the Islands.
The extent to which China’s global rise will lead to strategic rivalry between 
and among the larger powers in the Asia-Pacific region and which may impact 
the security and well-being of the Pacific Island states remains unclear. Much 
depends on how an intended ‘pivot’ in US strategic and security policy from the 
Middle East to the Asia-Pacific is framed and the extent to which it heightens 
tensions between the larger powers of the region. The potential for such 
rivalry may also be limited by the creation of mechanisms for dialogue and 
accommodation among the region’s larger powers.
1 . A Changing Oceania
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PIC Economies and Polities
Within the ‘Island Pacific’ itself changes were also underway – domestically 
and regionally. Change in the Island Pacific is a product not so much of the geo-
politics of the larger extra-regional powers but is essentially set by: continuing 
concerns within the Island states over the management of economic fragility and 
the generation of broad-based development; the political and social dynamics 
within Island polities that are so often the product of local political cultures and 
generational changes in leadership; and by intra-regional relations between the 
PICs themselves and between the PICs and their aid and development ‘partners’.
The Island groups that constitute the French Pacific Territories – New Caledonia, 
Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia – occupy a somewhat enigmatic 
position in the broad Pacific Islands community. While clearly ‘in and of’ the 
Pacific region, and occupied with their own particular internal dynamics, they 
are not as yet fully or meaningfully engaged with the ‘Anglophone’ Island states 
of the Pacific. 
The global economic crisis that shook economies the world over in 2008-09 
had impacted adversely upon the PICs. Economies weakened significantly as 
tourism, agriculture, and manufacturing industries slowed with the fall in global 
demand. Remittances declined by as much as 20 per cent and the value of the 
region’s public offshore investment funds shrank as international equity prices 
slumped. As a consequence, government revenues contracted and essential 
services, maintenance and infrastructure developments were delayed, and jobs 
were lost. The slowdown across the Islands region was exacerbated by a series 
of wild storms in early 2009 that disrupted communications and the tourist 
industry particularly in Fiji, and by the economic and physical impact of the 
tsunami later that year in Samoa and Tonga.
But the PICs ‘navigated the global storm’ (the title of an Asian Development 
Bank publication) and remained in reasonably good shape economically and 
politically. A briefing paper for the Forum Economic Ministers in mid-2011 
expected the Pacific Islands’ economies to remain on the path to recovery from 
the GFC, though with a slow growth for the Islands’ economies of approximately 
2-3 per cent per annum in the early part of the decade. Were the rapid growth 
rates for Papua New Guinea and Timor Leste to be factored-in, an overall 
regional growth rate of 5-6 per cent per annum was forecast. 
Improved growth figures in the early part of the decade for the PICs’ major 
trading partners – particularly Australia and New Zealand – were expected to 
support the recovery of growth rates in the PICs through an increase in tourism, 
improved remittance flows and infrastructure expenditures. Rising demand for 
food and other soft commodities especially from China may also have a positive 
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impact for those PICs with fisheries and agriculture exports. Timber exporters – 
such as Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea – will also benefit from higher 
prices for timber products in Asia. The expected decline in timber export 
incomes for Solomons, as its loggable forests are depleted, may be compensated 
for by a rise in mining earnings. ADB simulations of long-term growth prospects 
for the non-mining PICs for the next two decades indicated a yearly growth rate 
of 1 per cent to 3 per cent. (World Economic Outlook Update, IMF, 2011) 
Regional officials and international agencies had noted that an important 
economic governance lesson had been learned from the GFC crisis experience in 
that ‘policy-based programs’ helped sustain the political appetite for reforms, 
even during difficult times. In the Cook Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
and Tonga, extensive SOE and infrastructure governance improvements were 
implemented during an economic recession and in election years. Even in 
countries where there were changes in government, commitment to the programs 
has been sustained pointing to enhanced resolve and confidence in domestic 
economic management.
Regionalism: Under Stress
The Pacific Islands Forum remains the predominant regional political 
organisation, but strains within and between the PIC member states have 
become prominent since the coup in Fiji in 2006. Australia and New Zealand 
successfully sought the exclusion of Fiji from the Forum because of the coup, 
but this prompted a reaction from the Melanesian states which embraced the 
Bainimarama regime and strengthened the sub-regional grouping known as the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). That in turn led not so much to a ‘rift’ 
among Forum Island members, but certainly to an increase in the antipathy of 
Polynesian leaders to their western regional counterparts (and perhaps vice-
versa). A new MSG headquarters building in Port Vila had only recently been 
funded by aid from China. 
Doubts subsequently emerged about the effectiveness of the Forum as a regional 
political agency charged with enhancing collaboration in economic, trade, aid 
and diplomatic relations with international donors and development agencies 
and about its ability to build stronger intra-regional cooperation and a higher 
international profile. The location of the Forum’s headquarters in Fiji is a factor 
in the organisation’s decline in potency. While the coup regime remains in 
power in Fiji a strengthening of the region’s political voice is not in prospect. 
The regionalist effort has thus to some extent become a casualty of the Fiji coup.
At the working level, the Pacific Plan, adopted in 2005 for strengthening 
regional cooperation and integration, has focused largely on making the 
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existing regional organisations more effective; for example on fishing regulation, 
maritime surveillance, climate change mitigation intervention, regional 
education systems, strengthening the ombudsman and audit institutions and 
on development assistance coordination. But the key functional area of greatest 
moment to the PICs is progress on key regional trade agreements and potentially 
the integration of markets – an area, however, in which there have been few 
significant results. And there remain continuing doubts about the viability of 
the Forum Secretariat’s efforts in this direction. Pacific economist Satish Chand 
has commented that it was the security concerns of the major powers that shaped 
regionalism – and they still remain important factors – but trade integration 
is not a significant factor contributing to regionalism today. Pacific Island 
countries, he suggests, may want to pursue trade liberalisation unilaterally. 
The South Pacific Community (SPC), however, with its headquarters in New 
Caledonia has been a beneficiary of this regional strengthening process with 
policy coordinating responsibilities for the major technical agencies of the 
region including the region’s fisheries and environmental organisations now 
falling within its ambit.
PIC Domestic Political Trends
Through the early years of the 21st century, Pacific Island countries experienced 
degrees of both turbulence and stability. Fiji has been the most conflicted 
with its history of coups – the most recent occurring in December 2006 with 
Commodore Frank Bainimarama’s seizure of power from a civilian government 
following a breakdown in power-sharing arrangements between leaders of the 
country’s communally based parties. Bainimarama subsequently consolidated 
his authority in 2009 by dismissing the Court of Appeal judges (and all the 
judiciary) who had found his coup illegal, abrogating the constitution, and 
transferring total control of the country to himself and his military forces for 
a period of five years. He has proceeded to shake up the institutional fabric of 
the Fijian polity by challenging both the long-established order of its eastern-
based chiefly authority and that of the Methodist Church. The Commodore has 
held out the prospect of elections in 2014, but the question now remains: is the 
military ever likely to withdraw from the political scene?
Solomon Islands politics and society has been disturbed dramatically by over a 
decade-long period of ethnic tension precipitated in the late 1990s on Guadalcanal 
and which led in its initial stages to conflict, the loss of several hundred lives, 
considerable damage to property and sharpened antagonism between peoples 
from the islands of Guadalcanal and Malaita. An intervention by regional forces 
from the Pacific led by Australian police and military personnel stabilised the 
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situation. While open conflict was contained, the mistrust generated and the 
disruption to services and to confidence across the nation impacted strongly 
on the economy and the body politic. Shifting factional alignments within 
the Parliament and frequent changes of Prime Ministers via Parliamentary 
ballots, together with the raiding of the country’s timber resources through 
exploitation by ‘foreign loggers’, have limited the prospect of responsible and 
reformist government and for the building of an effective state. In fact, it has 
been suggested that a ‘shadow state’ of sorts exists in Solomons with influences 
outside the formal state structure continuing to exercise control over resources 
and key development decisions.
Papua New Guinea – the largest of the PICs – has a substantial resource base 
with oil, natural gas, copper and gold deposits, forests and fisheries stocks, all of 
which provide a solid foundation for long-term income generation and national 
wealth. Its problems are those of political and economic management, hefty 
population growth and of service delivery to its six million people across a 
rugged topography. It has a democratic though fractious political system with 
security of tenure for coalition governments being problematic – a situation 
made even more so by a 2010 Supreme Court ruling that allowed MPs to move 
amongst parties at will. Its rambunctious, ‘spoils’ and patronage type politics in 
which parties have little consistent platform or ideology mean that state/public 
resources are readily squandered. Papua New Guinea’s political leadership, 
however, is undergoing a generational shift and its bureaucracies (central and 
provincial) are beginning to develop policy and implementation traction which 
may augur well for future policy-making and administration. Election outcomes 
in mid-2012 will provide a significant marker for stability or otherwise. 
Vanuatu is the more stable of the ‘authority-lite’ Melanesian states despite 
having had a history of ‘revolving-door’ ministerial appointments and fluid (re)
placements of senior administrators. It is noteworthy that one of the gurus of 
‘state-building’ theory and practice, Francis Fukuyama, a few years ago, took an 
interest in Melanesia’s conundrum of ‘strong societies and weak states’ and the 
relative absence of – and difficulty in establishing – central authority. 
Samoa – which gained its independence from New Zealand in 1962 – is the 
region’s most stable polity characterised by a one-party-dominant political 
system, few changes of government, and an extremely able bureaucracy. It 
has benefited from the continuance of a bonded, hierarchical political culture; 
an early history of anti-colonialism; a well-developed education system; a 
close and continuing relationship with New Zealand; and a diaspora which is 
diligent in sending remittances to relatives in Samoa. Samoa’s domestic critics 
decry the degree of control exercised by the ruling party (the Human Rights 
Protection Party), though its civil society is active and informed. The Kingdom 
of Tonga – unified in the mid-19th century – is transiting gradually from a 
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benign monarchical system to a form of democratic governance. The first ever 
democratic poll in 2010 produced a reformist-orientated government, though 
radical change is not on the agenda. 
The Micronesian states of Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, the Federated States 
of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, along with the 
small Polynesian state of Tuvalu, are small but generally reasonably stable 
political entities. But they all face the constraints of distance, small size, small 
populations and limited resource bases in formulating national development 
strategies. All are dependent on foreign aid and on remittances from their 
nationals abroad. National income from, for example, fisheries exploitation has 
been less momentous that anticipated at independence. Cook Islands and Niue 
enjoy a special independence in association relationship with New Zealand. 
Their politics – as with most of the smaller island states – are essentially ‘family 
politics’ and rarely do situations arise that threaten their stability. 
Indicators of Development and Governance 
In attempting to assess the relative strengths, weaknesses and durability or 
otherwise of states within the international system; to gauge their relative levels 
of political, economic and human development; and to estimate how well or 
otherwise a particular state can withstand crises or the threat of state failure, a 
raft of indicators and indexes have been developed.
Some have proven useful to our analysis of development in the Pacific region – 
others not. Most offer an interesting guide to how well or otherwise a particular 
state is progressing relative say to its neighbour – or to similarly-sized states 
elsewhere in the globe. They are not necessarily analytical tools in themselves, 
but they are useful to policy makers, governors and civil society organisations 
within these states in identifying areas of governance, economy and polity that 
might be supported or strengthened. Donor agencies find them of some value 
in identifying areas and programs to support. Some of the more regularly used 
indexes are briefly canvassed below. 
The World Governance Indicators represent the aggregate views on the quality 
of governance in countries across the globe drawn from a survey of enterprise, 
citizen and expert respondents in think tanks and other institutes within each 
country. Most Pacific Island countries are surveyed for the WGI and their 
performance can be usefully compared (though with caveats – see below – in 
mind) on each of the six indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of law, and Control of 
corruption.
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There are clear limitations on the utility of these indicators as precise measures of 
governance within each country and on their direct comparability with others; but 
they nonetheless provide us with a generalised indication of the state-of-play within 
PICs and of progress or otherwise towards an ideal-type goal. Papua New Guinea, 
for example, does reasonably well on the Voice and Accountability indicator with a 
score of 50 per cent; though its scores for the other five indicators are close to the 25 
percentile mark. Its scores on the Corruption control and the Rule of Law indicator are 
quite low and would appear to be regressing. Solomon Islands, having had a difficult 
decade marred by an as yet unresolved internal conflict, would appear to have regressed 
from a mid-way position on all the above indicators to a ranking of 25 per cent or less 
over the past decade – and especially so in relation to Government Effectiveness. Fiji has 
nose-dived on all six WGI indicators since the coup in 2006; whereas Vanuatu – with 
the exception of a low Government Effectiveness indicator – scores well into the third 
quartile on all other indicators. Tonga has mid-range third quartile performance scores 
across all indicators. The clear stand-out countries in terms of governance performance 
across all indicators are Samoa followed closely by the Cook Islands.
On the Ease of Doing Business index created by the World Bank as a guide 
to private sector conditions and the environment for foreign and national 
entrepreneurship (and which includes business start-up times, credit availability, 
taxation regimes and investment protection), of the 24 countries in the Asia-
Pacific region many PICs score quite well. Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands and Fiji are placed in the top ten, while Papua New Guinea comes in at 
15th, followed by the smaller PIC states with Timor Leste in 24th place at the 
tail-end of the list. (Singapore is at the top of the Asia-Pacific list).
Pacific Island states – because of their small size and often distant location from 
the large centres of power and influence in international politics – are often 
regarded as belonging to the world’s weak and fragile sets of states. Fragile 
states have long been regarded by policy-makers and security analysts in 
the ‘developed’ world as: vulnerable to overthrow, to political and economic 
instability, to ‘capture’ by unscrupulous neighbours, to be easily ‘penetrated’ 
by organised crime and seduced by the blandishments of international criminal 
organisations; easily led astray by carpet-baggers; more likely to fail because of 
weak institutions and inexperienced leadership; and therefore likely to be in 
need of support and ‘rescue’ by larger powers of the developed world!
The Failed States Index published by the ultra-conservative US Foreign Policy 
magazine ranks 60 states across the globe that have prospects of failing: the 
most likely to fail according to this list is Somalia at number one, and the least 
likely is Djibouti at number at 60. Only three Pacific states make the list: Timor 
Leste at number 23, Solomon Islands at number 48, and Papua New Guinea at 
number 54. Note that these ratings do not predict collapse, but rather attempt 
to measure vulnerability to collapse or conflict – that is, conflict of sufficient 
magnitude that would render those state institutions and those embryonic 
‘forces that bind’ to become totally ineffective and/or dissipate. 
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Perhaps more pertinent to the situation of small Pacific Island states is an 
assessment of the ‘Fragility of Small Island Developing States’ produced by 
Carleton University in Canada’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy Project. It 
is not a predictive (i.e. of collapse) calculation but rather an index of fragility for 
small states that in certain severe circumstances may be more prone to collapse. 
Of the 37 states ranked in this index from ‘Least Fragile’ to ‘Most Fragile’, Samoa 
is ranked 9; FSM 10; Vanuatu 11; Fiji 16; Palau 20; Tonga 21; Papua New Guinea 
30; Kiribati 31; Solomon Islands 33; and Timor Leste 35. (The SIDS least fragile 
small state is Barbados at number 1, while the most fragile is Guinea-Bissau at 37).
The United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index includes 
all PICs and its 2011 rankings show that all – with the exception of Palau and the 
Federated States of Micronesia – have risen steadily up the rankings over the last 30 
years. Countries are ranked from number 1 (Norway) to number 187 (Congo) on a 
four-step scale of Human Development: Very High, High, Medium, and Low. None of 
the PICs feature in the top two rankings of ‘Very High’ or ‘High’. Most PICs inhabit 
the Medium ranking (as per the table below), while Solomon Islands, Timor Leste 
and Papua New Guinea are ranked in the ‘Low’ category.
Table 1: UNDP Human Development Index Rankings 2011
1-47 Very High
(Norway #1 – Barbados #47)
48-94 High
(Uruguay #48 – Tunisia #94)
95-141 Medium











(Solomon Islands #142 - Congo #187)
142 Sol Islands
147 Timor Leste
153 Papua New Guinea
Note: Tonga has slipped from a HIGH ranking in 2004 to a MEDIUM ranking in 2011. SI, PNG and TL 
slipped from the bottom layer of MEDIUM in 2004 to the upper ranks of the LOW category in 2011 
(thereby slipping below the Regional Asia-Pacific average).
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The anti-corruption agency Transparency International’s well-known 
‘Perception of Corruption Index’ ranks the PICs in the following table:
Table 2: Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index 2011







Papua New Guinea 154 
(Somalia = Rank #182)
Perhaps of the most utility to PIC governments in addressing their development 
issues and policies are the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). A 2011 
Asian Development Bank workshop on ‘The Millennium Development Goals in 
Pacific Island Countries: Taking Stock, Emerging Issues and the Way Forward’, 
reported that low growth rates, few employment opportunities and subsistence 
economies for most rural people makes it a difficult proposition for the Pacific 
region as a whole to make substantial progress in achieving the MDGs by the 
target date of 2015. Mixed progress has been made, however, across the Pacific 
Islands region. ‘On track’ towards achieving the goals are: Cook Islands, Niue, 
Palau, Samoa and Tonga. Making ‘Mixed progress’ towards achieving the MDGs 
are Fiji, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. ‘Off track’ in achieving the MDGs are Kiribati, Nauru 
and Papua New Guinea. The Pacific region overall is on track to achieving the 
MDGs in the areas of access to primary education, gender equality in education, 
and reduction of infant and child mortality. Maternal health is a widespread 
problem though many countries are picking up their performance on that goal.
The GFC has made things more difficult for government expenditure on service 
delivery. But in the process of helping PIC governments pursue development 
targets the policy, planning and management effort involved by national 
bureaucracies has enhanced the effectiveness of national budgeting strategies, of 
development decision-making and of implementation strategies more generally. 
In other words the governance spin-off from attempting to attain these Goals has 
been important for PICs.
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Themes and Issues
The chapters in this volume canvass political change and development across the 
Pacific Islands from a variety of perspectives, each contributing to the analysis 
of a region growing in complexity and in confidence.  They fall neatly into three 
sections:  Oceania and its Inheritance; Oceania – Current Needs and Challenges; 
and Oceania and its Wider Setting.
Oceania and its Inheritance
Political Institutions
Jon Fraenkel opens the volume with a survey of what he regards as the second 
phase of post independence politics and institutions in the South Pacific, noting 
– from the mid-1980s – an increasing complexity of domestic and regional issues 
and a persistent instability confronting leaders and their societies. Despite the 
hybridisation of political systems – the political engineering and experimentation 
with power-sharing, decentralisation, and electoral arrangements and the 
testing of constitutions all of which were intended to settle fractious polities – 
volatility, he suggests, is likely to persist well into the 21st century. He identifies 
key ‘gaps’ in political arrangements – including the absence of popularly-based 
parties, of women in politics, and, in Fiji’s case, of respect for constitutional 
democratic rule – all indicating that many Pacific countries have yet to reach 
their post-colonial ‘settlements’. Fraenkel book-ends this volume with a chapter 
discussing the relevance or otherwise of European models of government to 
Pacific Island states.
Fiji: Which Way?
Interpreting Fijian politics has not proven an easy task. Its polity – divided 
ethnically, communally and geographically – experienced democratic rule 
from the time of Fiji’s independence in 1970 until a coup in 1987 seemingly 
irretrievably altered the political landscape. A second coup followed later that 
year (again led by Rabuka) – then a brief return to civilian rule was punctuated 
in 2000 (by a George Speight led coup). Elections and a return to parliamentarism 
followed; but then in 2006 a further coup (led by Commodore Bainimarama) 
took place. Bainimarama has ‘promised’ a return to civilian rule by 2014. In 
his chapter in this volume Jone Baledrokadroka – a former senior officer in 
the Fiji military and an arch critic of Bainimarama – writes that Fiji entirely 
deserves the descriptor of a ‘coup-prone state’. In the communally bifurcated 
Fiji there has long been ambivalence towards democracy, and support for it by 
Fiji’s communities over the years has always been conditional.
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Baledrokadroka offers an interpretation: in many ways the focus on 
‘professionalism’ in the military and its experience in ‘peacekeeping’ over many 
years in the Middle East has led the hierarchy to believe it has a clear ‘mandate’ 
or ‘obligation’ to undertake a ‘nation-building’ role and to address what it sees 
as a severe weakness in civilian authority and an ineffectiveness in decision-
making structures and patterns. But coup regimes – particularly the most recent 
– become self-serving. If military officers want political power they should 
resign their commissions and contest elections, he argues. 
Hélène Goiran suggests that there is a degree of inevitability about coup d’etats 
in Fiji because (a) managing a communally bifurcated society virtually requires 
the strong arm and discipline that a military force offers, and (b) the continuity 
of a warrior tradition – built from Chiefly rule within the hierarchically ordered 
Fijian society and reinforced by battlefield and peacekeeping experience – 
affords a natural transposition into the political sphere by the military.
Samoa’s Story
The Samoan political system, in quite stark contrast to that of Fiji and other 
PICs, has a police force but no military, holds democratic elections every five 
years, is built on underlying notions of ‘Fa’a Samoa’ – or Samoan ways – and 
has had for the past 30 years a government led by the same political party, the 
Human Rights Protection Party, which has strong links to leaders at the local 
level. It is, as former Samoan diplomat Afamasaga Toleafoa writes in Chapter 5, 
a one-party state with strong executive dominance and one that can be quite 
authoritarian in its attitude to dissenters and opposition. Toleafoa is concerned 
about the corruption and loss of integrity that longevity in office can bring. But 
by the same token Samoa enjoys an enviable reputation in the Pacific region and 
beyond for stability, improving living standards, and economic management. 
Consensus Seeking in New Caledonia
In New Caledonia – after decades of bitter division (including inter-communal 
violence and bloodshed) and of fraught political and constitutional processes – 
there is now a positive search for consensus among the Kanak and Francophone 
peoples of this French Territory. Through power sharing and balancing 
arrangements, Jean-Eves Faberon suggests, New Caledonians will find over 
time an identity and common destiny. Faberon eloquently traces: the phases 
in the ‘idea of decolonisation’ from the 1950s and the formation of the Union 
Caledonien – the first anti-colonial political party; the conservative resistance 
to it as the nickel boom gripped New Caledonia through the 1970s and the 
substantial in-migration of metropolitan French citizens that followed; as well 
as the bloodshed that occurred in reaction to the formation and demands of 
the independentist FLNKS through the 1980s. He is taken by the ‘genius’ of 
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the Noumea Accord which settled on a gradualist and pluralist power-sharing 
approach to political change and to limited autonomy and which has helped 
install a 20-year period of peace and relative consensus. While guardedly 
optimistic about the future of New Caledonia’s power-sharing arrangements, 
Faberon can offer no guarantee of long-term success.
Political ‘Nomadism’ in French Polynesia 
A perspective on politics in French Polynesia by Sémir El Wardi suggests 
many similarities and differences in the political styles of the Pacific’s island 
polities. The continuing relationship between colonised and coloniser is quite 
different from that prevailing in the ‘Anglosphere’ Pacific – France not having 
introduced ‘Republican’ values to its Pacific territories. But patronage style 
politics stemming from the cultural practice of gift-giving linking constituents 
to MPs are undoubtedly similar. The ‘looting of public resources’ of which Al 
Wardi writes echoes similar themes of ‘raiding the state’ in polities further west. 
These personalist and communitarian socio-political type linkages run counter 
to Weberian rational-legal conceptions of the public good and of ‘responsible 
government’. Political ‘nomadism’ – floor-crossing and party-switching are 
familiar across the South Pacific – though less so in Samoa and Fiji. Politics at 
all levels, Al Wardi asserts, is a ‘theatre of persistent conflict’ – a point that 
also resonates well in western Melanesia – though perhaps much less so in the 
smaller island states of Micronesia.
Oceania: Current Needs and Challenges
Assessing Progress in Development
In assessing development across the South Pacific region one of the best guides – as 
we have seen above – is the progress or otherwise made towards the achievement 
of the UN Millennium Development Goals. Pacific Island governments use the 
MDGs to track and measure their performance particularly on social development 
progress. Linda Petersen – a long-time development analyst and practitioner in 
the Pacific – examines the record across the region noting that the target date 
of 2015 is still some way off and that the cumulative impact of development 
initiatives will take time to register/show-up in quantitative terms. The record 
so far is patchy. Progress on MDG 1 (Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger), 
for example, is not promising – a problem often being the widespread belief in 
many PICs that social networks, tradition and a strong subsistence base alone 
will ensure positive futures. For the MDGs relating to health (MDGs 4, 5 and 6) 
the performance is mixed with some gains in the health status of women and 
children and in control of communicable diseases. Unfortunately the prospect 
remains for these positive trends to be reversed. The clear message from the 
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mixed progress to date is that enhanced political and societal commitment will 
be required for the PICs to meet these social and development targets. Donor 
analysis – by AusAID in particular – has found that while some PICs have made 
good progress against and even achieved some MDG targets, the Pacific region 
as a whole ‘still appears to be seriously off track to achieve the MDGs by 2015.’ 
A Gender Lens
The need to integrate key gender dimensions into all development frameworks 
and strategies is argued by Treva Braun, a gender specialist and social planner 
with the South Pacific Community in Noumea. Braun argues for a reframing of the 
development discourse (and architecture) so that gender equality is considered 
as fundamental. The imperatives and implications of ‘development’ are often 
significantly different for men and women. A gender ‘lens’ is regrettably absent 
from definitions of security and development. Were such a ‘lens’ applied at 
‘defining moments’ in the region’s history – as for example with the adoption of 
the Pacific Plan by the South Pacific Forum in 2005 – Pacific women’s concerns for 
stability and security as well as opportunities for eradicating gender inequality 
would have been significantly enhanced. 
A gendered ‘lens’ on development also requires greater representation and 
participation of women within the decision-making apparatuses of Pacific 
governments. The small numbers of women occupying senior political positions 
across the Pacific states has been a matter of public record now for some time. 
The ‘list system’ of representation in the New Caledonian Assembly does 
ensure equal gender representation, but that is an exceptional case. Despite 
some national and donor effort on affirmative action programs for enhanced 
participation and representation by women over the past decade, the results so 
far have been disappointing. Excluding the French Pacific, women hold only 3 
per cent of the seats in Pacific Parliaments – well below the world average of 18 
per cent. Women’s representation in Pacific national politics has been estimated 
at only 50 per cent of that which pertains in the Arab states of the Middle East 
and North Africa! 
But what of women in Pacific public services – hitherto a generally neglected 
area of research? Asenati Liki Chan Tung’s chapter highlights her research on 
women’s upward mobility into senior positions in the Samoan and Solomon 
Islands bureaucracies – pointing to strong senior bureaucratic representation 
by women in Samoa and some positive trends emerging at the upper levels in 
Solomon Islands. The chapter identifies the barriers to upward mobility for 
women and the attitudinal shifts necessary for further advancement to occur. 
It also shows a correlation between expanded educational opportunities for 
girls and an increase in public service participation by women at higher levels. 
Further research into the teaching, nursing and legal professions will shed light 
on the status of women in other Pacific agencies of government.
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Youth
 ‘YouthQuake’ is the startling title of a Discussion Paper produced by the Pacific 
Institute of Public Policy in 2011. The paper argues that all PICs face serious 
demographic challenges and particularly so in Melanesia where populations are 
doubling every 30 years and urban populations are doubling every 17 years. Is this 
the likely catalyst for radical change? ‘Will democracy be sunk by demography?’ 
In this volume Rose Maebiru argues that with an overall population growth rate 
of 2.2 per cent per annum and the mean age of the Pacific Islands population at 21 
years, creative thinking is indeed necessary within the PICs about socialisation, 
education, employment opportunities and lifestyles for the Pacific’s youth. 
Research on Caribbean youth has shown, for example, that investing in young 
people – especially through the provision of and encouragement for education – 
can result in GDP increases of 2 per cent. The South Pacific Community’s ‘Pacific 
Youth Strategy 2010’ provides some positive messages including a framework 
for youth development and the managing of generational change in the region. 
It is, however, an aspirational document that hopes to provide a strategy for 
youth ‘to access integrated educational opportunities, nurture sustainable 
livelihoods, lead healthier lifestyles, build stronger communities, benefit from 
effective national and community mechanisms for addressing youth issues, and 
strengthen their cultural identities’.
Tourism
Tourism has long been regarded as a route to development in the Pacific because 
of the attractiveness of the South Sea Islands’ natural tropical beauty, charm and 
way of life to tourists from metropolitan countries. Tourism has become vital to 
most PIC economies: the industry representing 25 per cent of GDP in both Fiji 
and Samoa; 50 per cent in Cook Islands and 67 per cent in Palau. One tourism 
pathway – a new niche that has opened relatively recently – is a ‘customised’ 
form of tourism focusing on ‘authentic’ settings and societies. ‘Beach Fale’ 
tourism in Samoa is one such example highlighted in Susana Taua’a’s analysis of 
tourism issues in the region.
Rural Development
Agriculture – a most important route to rural and national development and one 
long neglected by donors and international aid agencies – though certainly not 
by Pacific farmers – has made a welcome return to the global assistance agenda. 
Matthew Allen helpfully traverses the changing phases in development theory 
– from modernisation through structuralism, to post-development and post-
structuralist perspectives on rural production. He predicts that those who see 
hybrid and syncretic approaches and who can capture the localised conceptions 
of what is a fulfilling holistic approach to rural development will make the most 
useful contribution to rural political economy across the region. 
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Oceania and its Wider Setting
Security Tensions?
An overview of regional security issues by James Bunce concludes the regional 
studies. The security interests of most Pacific Island states align well with those 
of the region’s ‘traditional partners’ – Australia, France and New Zealand. 
Australia and New Zealand military forces are engaged in peace building 
operations (Solomon Islands, Timor Leste), and France has a small continuing 
military presence in New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Internal security 
issues are regarded as low-level. The virtual disappearance of the Taiwan-
Beijing tension of recent decades has given room for China to take its place as 
a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in regional development – and it seems intent (as 
it has in other parts of the developing world) in providing aid with no strings 
attached and investing in infrastructure and resource development via its 
various business enterprises (3,000 or more of which are said to be registered in 
the Pacific Islands). 
Regionalism
Henry Ivarature, political adviser to the South Pacific Forum, reviews the various 
components of the regional architecture of the Forum aimed at strengthening 
regional cooperation and integration, that encourage regional dialogue and that 
seek to support and complement national PIC policies and ambitions. He admits 
to an apparent regional ‘jig-saw puzzle’ of institutions and frameworks. The 
Forum – and all those agencies that work to support the PICs’ political and 
developmental efforts – falls well short of an integrated and authentic model of 
Pacific regionalism. But perhaps the vision is too big? He sees in the Pacific Plan 
an attempt to harmonise this regional effort under a jointly-owned ‘umbrella’. 
Its efforts to date, however, have been more productive and credible on the 
‘political’ side of the agenda than they are on the ‘economic’ side. The Forum is 
currently dented by political divisions resulting especially from Fiji’s departure 
from constitutional rule and by those PICs which have chosen to support 
Fiji regardless of the composition and nature of its government. Some might 
argue though that the Melanesians are helping contain Fiji’s wilful ‘outriding’ 
behaviour.
Instability and Stability: Muddling Through … 
and Beyond
In assessing the changing ‘pattern of islands’ in the South Pacific over the decades 
since the Island states became independent, a key focus has been on the issue of 
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political stability and/or instability. In the history of new states instability has 
impacted adversely on the prospects for economic and social development and, 
if severe, leads to social and economic breakdown and the possibility of state 
failure. In the world of diplomatic and security analysis, it is also argued that 
in highly unstable situations, new states are liable to penetration or takeover by 
subversive influences – including criminal organisations or unfriendly states. 
But the analysis of instability is an imprecise science, both the causes and the 
outbreak of it being difficult to identify with any certainty. Factionalism is 
one key driver of instability – yet it is also a precursor to the consolidation of 
democratic processes and discourse! 
Political Strife
A quick survey – from Timor Leste in the west to Tonga in the east – over the 
last decade shows a number of serious incidences of political strife. Timor has 
had a difficult transition to independence that included armed resistance to its 
Indonesian colonisers and then a violent internal conflict between opposing 
parties (including an assassination attempt on its then President in 2008). Irian 
Jaya – Indonesia’s eastern-most Province – has seen the suppression of a small 
independence movement over many years including intermittent outbreaks 
of violence. Papua New Guinea eventually placated an armed rebellion by the 
Bougainville Province through a form of decentralised political autonomy; 
but political contestation remains robust and tense, while crime and illegality 
remain a threat to public order. Solomon Islands experienced a ‘coup’ against 
the government by the Malaita Eagle Force in 2000 and although civilian rule 
was quickly restored and a regional assistance mission (RAMSI) in support of 
government remains in situ, the country has had an unsettled decade since 
that time (including riots in Honiara in 2006). Tonga experienced rioting and 
violent behaviour in 2006 though order was quickly restored. Fiji’s coup of 2006 
represents the most serious disruption to democratic state authority across the 
region.
Yet the region is not in constant turmoil and there are many states that have 
not experienced strife and tumult and in which order – rather than disorder 
– has generally prevailed. Even those conflicted states referred to above have 
enjoyed periods of relative calm and (near) normalcy. Vanuatu, despite having 
had a troubled decolonisation period, has had numerous peaceful changes 
of government and has remained free of serious political strife since its 
independence. In fact Vanuatu was named the ‘happiest place on earth’ by a 
‘Happy Planet Index’ in 2006. Samoa has had four decades or more of effective, 
trouble free government. The smaller states of Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, 
Nauru and the former American territories of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia have all been free of destabilising 
tension and political strife. 
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Muddling Through … and Beyond
In surveying the changing ‘pattern of islands’ in the Pacific Island Countries 
over the past three decades or more, and insofar as one can generalise, perhaps 
the most useful descriptor of the ways in which PIC governments have 
managed their political transitions – including their economic development and 
governance agendas – is that of ‘muddling through’. In fact, not only is this 
concept useful as a descriptor of the PICs’ political management style – it could 
also perhaps be seen at times as close to a conscious strategy on the part of some 
PIC governments! And over the course of four decades or more of independence 
across the region, ‘muddling through’ has shown itself in many ways to be a 
positive approach – or at least a non-negative approach – to governing.
The term and its usage in political science and public administration derives 
from a classic article by Charles E Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling 
Through”’, published in Public Administration Review in the late 1950s. Despite 
its American origins, it was a concept adapted and used regularly in the late 
colonial period and early years of independence in classes at the University of 
Papua New Guinea, administrative colleges and in government workshops to 
describe the style and processes of the Pacific’s transitions to Independence – 
especially so in Melanesia. 
Transferring institutions of state and the building of coherent and regularised 
bureaucracies in the context of small-scale, multi-ethnic, fissiparous societies 
with complex inter-relationships and with no bureaucratic tradition to draw 
from, such as are to be found in Melanesia, was no small task. The processes 
involved in re-shaping colonial bureaucracies and in framing new policy 
approaches called not only for adaptation of the familiar but for innovation 
and the adoption of new directions and approaches in all Pacific countries. 
The periods of transition to independence and the first decades of that new 
political and constitutional status were – for Pacific governments of the day – 
times of adaptation and experimentation, of shifting responsibilities, of partial 
implementation and of crisis avoidance that often involved reversal of decisions 
taken earlier.
The Pacific’s early post-independence governments and bureaucracies were 
far from the organised, rational, change management and reform agencies 
prescribed – and idealised – by donors and international agencies. So ‘muddling 
through’ became the default management style and in many ways close to a 
conscious ‘strategy’ in many PICs. It was a tactic or method for resisting external 
‘urgings’ to adopt ‘models’ and ‘innovations’ that were resented (locally) as an 
unwarranted intrusion on sovereignty or that were seen, realistically, to be un-
implementable given the local PIC context and capacity. It was also often the 
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product of rational judgments made by politicians and bureaucrats about the 
pace of and capacity for change with knowledge about what would work in the 
given context and what would not work. 
So ‘muddling through’ has been essentially a positive approach to governance. 
Perhaps had those forces of both change and inertia so evident in Pacific styles 
of operation /modus operandi been allowed to play out – there is nothing to 
suggest that Fiji, for example, would be in any worse socio-economic and political 
situation than it is currently. The new states of the Pacific have demonstrated 
considerable resilience, and in many cases, an extraordinary capacity to bounce 
back from difficulty and to maintain optimism for the future. The continuing 
professionalisation of public management across the region is building on that 
tradition. The growth of civil society organisations is also beginning to play a 
positive role in policy and implementation. Donors are becoming more coherent 
in their strategies, more attuned to the realities of generating development 
outcomes in small island states, and are beginning to acknowledge and map 
progress. 
The chapters that follow explore these themes of governance, development 
and security that signal both continuity and change in the Pacific’s pattern of 
islands.
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2. Post-Colonial Political Institutions 
in the South Pacific Islands: A Survey
Jon Fraenkel
Vue d’ensemble des Institutions politiques postcoloniales dans le Pacifique 
Sud insulaire
A partir du milieu des années 80 et jusqu’à la fin des années 90, les 
nouveaux pays du Pacifique sortaient d’une période postcoloniale 
marquée au début par l’optimisme et dominée par une génération de 
dirigeants nationaux à la tête d’un régime autoritaire pour connaître 
par la suite une période marquée par les difficultés et l’instabilité et qui 
a connu le coup d’Etat de Fidji de 1987, la guerre civile à Bougainville, 
le conflit néo-calédonien et l’instabilité gouvernementale au Vanuatu et 
ailleurs. Dans les pays de la Mélanésie occidentale, cette instabilité a été 
exacerbée par des pressions exercées par des sociétés minières et des 
sociétés forestières étrangères. Cette étude retrace l’évolution et explore 
les complexités des diverses institutions politiques postcoloniales 
dans le Pacifique Sud à la fois au sein de ces institutions et dans leurs 
relations entre elles ; elle montre que  les questions de science politique 
classique ont été abordées de façons extrêmement différentes dans la 
région. On y trouve une gamme de systèmes électoraux comprenant à 
la fois des régimes présidentiels et des régimes parlementaires ainsi que 
des situations de forte intégration d’un certain nombre de territoires 
au sein de puissances métropolitaines. Entre les deux extrêmes de 
l’indépendance totale et de l’intégration, les îles du Pacifique sont le lieu 
où l’on trouve un éventail d’arrangements politiques hybrides entre les 
territoires insulaires et les anciennes puissances coloniales. Cet article 
examine l’absence de partis politiques disposant d’une base populaire 
dans le Pacifique, les faibles taux de représentation des femmes et 
l’expérience acquise par le Pacifique en matière d’accords de partage du 
pouvoir ; il pose également la question de savoir si la fin de la période de 
l’état de grâce qui a suivi l’indépendance représente un glissement vers 
une instabilité permanente ou simplement un intermède précédant une 
certaine consolidation du pouvoir.
After decolonisation, the new Pacific nations mostly experienced a brief 
honeymoon period, presided over by a generation of relatively strong national 
leaders; Fiji’s Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, PNG’s Michael Somare, Vanuatu’s Walter 
Lini, Amata Kabua in Marshall Islands, Ieremai Tabai in Kiribati or Nauru’s 
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Hammer de Roburt. The late 1980s and 1990s saw the demise of that initial 
post-colonial optimism. Fiji witnessed its first coup in 1987, and a year later the 
Bougainville civil war began in earnest. New Caledonia erupted into conflict in 
the mid-1980s until tensions were calmed by the 1988 Matignon and then 1998 
Noumea Accords. Vanuatu’s bipolar party system began to fracture in the late 
1980s, and intense government instability reigned across the 1990s. For later de-
colonisers, like Tuvalu, the watershed was also later; the two elections of 1993 
proved the catalyst for an end to the early era of stability, after which the fall of 
governments became more frequent (Panapa and Fraenkel 2008). In the Marshall 
Islands, it was the death of Amata Kabua in 1996 that ended a hitherto unipolar 
style of government with no genuine opposition, and precipitated the opening 
of a period of sharper rivalry between the deceased President’s successor, Imata 
Kabua and the opposition UDP led by a commoner, Kessai Note. 
In the western Melanesian countries, heightened instability during the 1990s 
was encouraged by increasing interest from foreign companies in the natural 
resource extractive sectors. The Solomon Islands government remained 
reasonably stable until Solomon Mamaloni’s second government, when most 
ministers acquired strong links with logging companies (Frazer 1997: 41). The 
political links of mining and forestry companies became increasingly important 
in PNG politics, particularly around election-time. Growing popular discontent 
with parliamentary processes was indicated by high turnover rates among 
elected MPs. Issues of corruption became a focal point for the assembly of loose 
opposition coalitions; the reformist governments that took power in the Solomon 
Islands under Francis Billy Hilly in 1993 and under Bartholomew Ulufa’alu in 
1997 both tried to define themselves through opposition to the ‘Mamaloni men’ 
(a reference to backers of the governments of Solomon Mamaloni, 1981-84, 1989-
93, 1994-97, which were closely associated with Asian logging companies). Even 
in Tonga, where the monarchy remained in control, in the 1990s, ’Akilisi Pohiva 
and the other pro-democracy activists turned from agitation against abuses of 
office to radical demands for a shift away from royal control over government. 
Only Samoa remained reasonably stable, as the Human Rights Protection Party 
(HRPP) saw off challenges from the Tūmua and Pule movement in 1994 and 
consolidated its grip on state power. 
The Pacific Islands region includes entities closely incorporated with the 
metropolitan powers located around the Pacific Rim, such as Guam (USA), 
Rapa Nui (Chile) and Tokelau (New Zealand), as well as independent states 
like Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Kiribati. The region includes countries that 
achieved independence less than thirty years ago as well as those which are still 
in the process of adjustment to the post-colonial order. It includes resource-
rich territories with strong potential for integration into the world economy 
alongside chronically resource-poor countries with limited avenues for export-
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driven economic growth. It includes territories with open access to metropolitan 
labour markets, and countries without. It includes an extraordinary ethno-
linguistic diversity, mostly in Melanesia which alone accounts for one fifth of 
the world’s documented living languages.1 It includes relatively big nations like 
Papua New Guinea (6.6 million) alongside tiny micro-states like Niue, which 
has a population of only 1,500, and minute dependent territories like Pitcairn 
Island with only 45 inhabitants. Of the 9.7 million people that inhabit the 551.5 
thousand Sq km land area of Oceania, just over two thirds are in Papua New 
Guinea.
Classical political science questions have been addressed in strikingly different 
ways across the region – whether to accommodate ethnic diversity through 
unitary, devolved or federal systems; whether to handle conflict through 
majoritarian or proportional electoral systems and/or through power sharing 
arrangements and whether to adopt parliamentary or presidential systems or, as 
in Kiribati and in the autonomous region of Bougainville, some hybrid between 
the two. Other important questions for the region have been how to meld 
traditional forms of governance with imported institutions; how to respond 
to exceptionally low levels of women’s representation and how to build states 
in countries where – for many who live in rural areas and engage largely in 
subsistence cultivation – the state matters little.
Electoral Systems
Oceania has a history of electoral experimentation. Enthusiasm for preferential 
voting in the Pacific has been encouraged by Australia’s adoption of the 
alternative vote (AV) for the federal parliament in 1918. Colonially inherited 
first-past-the-post systems have been ditched in favour of single-member 
preferential systems in Fiji and Papua New Guinea, although in both cases 
without the expected results (Fraenkel and Grofman 2006; May 2008). In Fiji, the 
alleged ‘unfairness’ of outcomes under the AV system was used to justify coups 
both in 2000 and 2006. When it was adopted in the mid-1990s, AV was intended 
to boost the chances of the moderate centrists, and to disadvantage ethnic 
extremists. Instead, it triggered a sharpening of electoral polarisation. Nauru 
has a unique simultaneously tallied preferential voting system which oddly 
resembles the arrangements invented by 19th century French mathematician 
Jean-Charles de Borda (Reilly 2001). Kiribati uses a two-round system similar to 
that in mainland France, although unusually in multi-member constituencies. 
That system permits voters to express preferences, although over two rounds 
1 Based on data from the US Summer Institute of Linguistics, http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.
asp?by=area
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rather than in a single-round of AV voting.2 It is also considerably simpler to 
administer and count than the AV system, even if the need for two elections 
inevitably raises administrative costs. 
List proportional representation (PR) systems are used only in the French 
territories. Unlike majoritarian systems, list PR systems aim to make the share 
of seats won by each party roughly equivalent to its share of votes, although 
there is a 5 per cent threshold below which parties gain no seats at all. By 
definition, list PR requires multi-member constituencies. New Caledonia, for 
example, is divided into three constituencies, the south (with 32 seats), the 
north (with 15) and the Loyalty Islands (with seven) for elections to the 54 
member territorial congress. Voters simply tick the ballot paper next to their 
favoured political party, and the parties submit lists of their candidates in 
order of preference. After the votes are tallied, electoral officials calculate 
which members are elected according to each party’s share of the vote. In 2004, 
President Gaston Flosse modified French Polynesia’s list PR voting system so as 
to give a 30 per cent seat bonus to the winning party, thus deliberately removing 
the system’s proportionality. His aim was to give his Tahoeraa Huiraatira Party 
a stable working majority and to end many years of dependence on coalition 
government. The result was a crashing defeat for Tahoeraa Huiraatira, and the 
election instead of pro-independence leader Oscar Temaru. Instead of opening 
an era of stability, French Polynesia entered a politically chaotic period, with 
the presidency switching back and forth between the various factions. Paris 
stepped in to squash Flosse’s failed reform in 2007. 
Vanuatu is one of the few countries in the world to still use the single non-
transferable vote (SNTV) system, alongside Jordan and Afghanistan. In an effort 
to bind francophone secessionists into the emerging Vanuatu state, British and 
French colonial authorities agreed on SNTV in the hope of avoiding a clean sweep 
for Walter Lini’s anglophone Vanua’aku Pati (VP). Under SNTV, voters have a 
single vote, but constituencies have multiple members. Thus, if there is a 40 per 
cent francophone minority in a three-seat constituency, and if francophones 
avoid splitting their votes, they should be able to pick up at least one of the 
three seats. The system achieved its objective reasonably well in the initial 
elections after independence, when the parties were reasonably disciplined and 
the contest was a bipolar one between the VP and the francophone Union of 
Moderate Parties. From the late 1980s, however the francophone/anglophone 
cleavage faded in significance, and parties splintered (Van Trease 2005). As 
political parties multiplied, SNTV became less predictable, victor’s majorities 
reduced in size and an increasing number of independent candidates contested.
2 AV is often called instant runoff voting in the USA due to this characteristic.
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Principles of universal suffrage and voter equality have, in some parts of the 
Pacific, sat awkwardly alongside traditional systems of authority. In Tonga, 
the King has not been - as often characterised - an absolutist monarch. Tonga’s 
kings have been bound by the 1875 Constitution. It is the weak powers of 
parliament that have set Tonga apart from its neighbours. The Prime Minister 
and Cabinet have been selected directly by the King, and sat in the legislature 
alongside nine nobles and nine people’s representatives. Although there has 
been universal adult suffrage, there has been no effort to achieve voter equality: 
the holders of 33 noble titles selected nine noble representatives, while the rest 
of Tonga’s 100,000 people chose nine people’s representatives. Commitment to 
change has been in the air since 2005, oddly preceding the riots that destroyed 
much of Nuku’alofa in late 2006. In 2005, for the first time one of the people’s 
representatives, Dr Feleti Sevele, became Prime Minister. The King subsequently 
declined to over-rule Dr Sevele’s choice of cabinet ministers. 
Upon his coronation in 2008, the new King, George Tupou V, committed to a 
majority popularly elected parliament. Parliament settled upon a first-past-the-
post system and elections to the country’s first ever majority popularly elected 
assembly took place in November 2010. Under the new arrangements, the nine 
nobles’ seats remain, but now together with 17 elected ‘people’s representatives’. 
Contrary to expectations that pro-democracy campaigner ’Akilisi Pohiva would 
assume control, his party gained only 12 of the 17 popularly elected seats. The 
remaining five independents aligned themselves with the nine nobles to select 
Noble Tui'vakano as Prime Minister. Although no longer responsible to the 
King, Tonga retains its tradition of strong centralised government: the Prime 
Minister is entitled to nominate an additional four members of parliament, and 
cannot be ousted by a ‘no confidence’ vote for 18 months after an election. 
The principle of universal suffrage was not accepted by the architects of Samoa’s 
1962 constitution. Initially, both voters and candidates had to be holders of 
matai titles (a term often misleadingly translated as ‘chief’, but possibly better 
translated as ‘family head’). A visiting United Nations team in 1959 argued 
that since there was an internal family decision-making process prior to the 
award of matai titles, the Samoan system could be regarded as one of ‘election 
at two stages’ (So’o and Fraenkel 2005: 335). During the 1980s, that system was 
widely perceived – within Samoa – to have led to a proliferation of Matai titles, 
triggered by rival parties exploiting the constitution’s incentives to expand 
their voter bases by awarding titles. In 1990, there were 21,649 such titles, 
almost double the level a decade earlier. In that same year, the country voted 
to shift to a universal suffrage, although retaining the matai-only qualification 
for candidates. The change had several important repercussions for Samoan 
politics, but it did not halt the multiplication in the number of matai titles. In 
1999, over 35,000 matai titles were on the books of the Land and Titles Court 
(So’o and Fraenkel 2005: 342). 
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Presidential or Parliamentary Systems 
The Pacific’s presidential systems are mostly in the north where the US influence 
exerts greatest sway. Freely associated Palau most closely resembles the US model, 
with a President and Congress and even a miniature replica of Washington’s 
Capitol building. The Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Guam and 
American Samoa have governors, rather than presidents, but are faithful to the 
American model in having direct popular elections for the head of government. 
The Marshall Islands and Nauru depart from the pattern in having ‘presidents’ 
that are more like Prime Ministers in the Westminster system; they are elected by 
parliaments. Kiribati is a unique hybrid since although it has a directly elected 
President, (i) the nominees for the presidential election are selected through a 
complex parliamentary ballot, (ii) the president must form his cabinet from within 
parliament, (iii) the president, despite being directly elected, can be ousted by 
a no confidence vote within parliament, but doing this precipitates a general 
dissolution of parliament. Those choices are aimed at lessening the possibility of 
gridlock between an unpopular President and a hostile parliament, diminishing 
the likelihood of mid-term removal of the Head of State and giving the head of 
government a direct popular mandate. As a result, Kiribati has experienced much 
less political instability than neighbours like Tuvalu and Nauru.
In the Pacific parliamentary systems, government formation can entail a delicate 
balancing act. In Solomon Islands, forming a cabinet has always entailed a careful 
harmonising of representation from the most populous island of Malaita with that 
from Guadalcanal and the Western Province. Oddly, this has at times benefited 
politicians from none of those three provinces, such as three-time Prime Minister 
Solomon Mamaloni (from Makira) or 2001-6 Prime Minister Sir Allen Kemakeza 
(from tiny Savo Island), who could appear to stand above the fray. In Papua New 
Guinea, it is inconceivable that a cabinet should exclude representatives from the 
highlands, or Papua or the islands. Even Fiji, which in many respects departs 
from Melanesian political norms owing to its bipolar indigene-Indian cleavage, 
cautious inclusion of powerful regions becomes politically astute. When Laisenia 
Qarase sought to forge a power-sharing government with the Fiji Labour Party 
in May 2006, he was careful to secure his indigenous Fijian base by drawing in 
paramount chiefs from the Kubuna, Burebasaga and Tovata confederacies. The 
neglect of the Tongan-influenced Lau Islands, already suffering from a fading of 
the former glory associated with the deceased Ratu Mara’s years as Prime Minister 
and then President, proved to be that government’s Achilles Heel. The revenge of 
Mara’s descendants, or rather the husbands of his daughters, was to become an 
important aspect of the coup of December 2006.3 
3 Ratu Epeli Ganilau was not reappointed as a government nominee to the Great Council of Chiefs in 2004 
consequently also losing his position as Chair. Ratu Epeli Nailatikau lost his position as Speaker after the May 
2006 election and was to become Ambassador to Malaysia, until the 2006 coup intervened. Both men joined 
the post-2006 coup interim cabinet. 
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Romantics often criticise the colonial imposition of ‘Westminster’ and see this 
as having disturbed traditional styles of political organisation which were, it is 
claimed, characterised by consensus, and the ‘Pacific way’.4 Yet the cleavages 
that prevail across the Pacific between government and opposition are not 
mere reflections of inherited institutions. In the small close-knit micro-states, 
hostility between the government faction and the opposition leadership can on 
occasions become far more bitter than in the industrialised mass democracies 
(even though alliances can also, in other circumstances, become fluid and 
personality-based, and many opposition leaders will, have some point, served as 
ministers together in cabinet with those who are now adversaries). Opposition 
leaders may find themselves out of government for consecutive parliamentary 
terms, rendering them vulnerable in their home constituencies. Government 
victories are carried beyond the floor of the parliamentary chamber affecting, 
for example, opposition leaders’ private business interests or the promotion 
prospects of those in their kin groups. When a chance presents itself to dislodge 
such governments (either through a no confidence vote or a prime ministerial 
election), opposition leaders can become desperate, and willing to make deals 
they would otherwise prefer not to make with wavering opportunists. That 
sharp rivalry amongst Pacific leaders is not, as often imagined, a mere reflection 
of colonially inherited institutions can be seen by the regular legal contestation 
of imposed limits on Prime Ministerial power (for example, Billy Hilly, Solomon 
Islands, 1993, Saufatu Sopoanga, Tuvalu, 2002 and Serge Vohor, Vanuatu, 2004, 
to name but a few). 
Absence of major ideological cleavages or political parties with a substantial 
extra-parliamentary membership can give Pacific parliamentarians considerable 
freedom for manoeuvre. Occupying a ministerial portfolio not only provides 
a salary and status that is often impossible for a local to equal in the private 
sector, it also provides access to state funds and state leverage over foreign 
controlled resource-extractive industries. Particularly in Melanesia, MPs have 
been known to engage in spectacular changes in affinity as they cross the floor 
to join government, often justifying this by claiming - probably accurately - 
that they were not elected to government in order to remain on the opposition 
benches. Many outside cabinet in PNG have preferred to sit on the ‘middle 
benches’ poised between government and opposition, so as to be open to offers 
of ministerial portfolios but equally accessible to being courted by opposition 
schemers planning assembly of a new government. Regular no-confidence votes 
in the Solomon Islands are popularly believed to be money-making schemes: 
even if they do not succeed, the MPs all round earn large sums of cash as 
4 A term coined by Fiji’s Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara (although it has other claimants), and used to convey a 
familiar set of contrasts, such as relaxed timekeeping, a preference for leisure over work and consensus over 
confrontation, felt to distinguish the Pacific from the industrialised societies. Similar ideas are found in the 
Caribbean and Indian Ocean Islands.
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recipients of rival factions’ bids for political support. After Vanuatu’s 2008 
Prime Ministerial election, two MPs were inadvertently heard live on national 
radio talking about the amounts of cash that had exchanged hands, unaware 
that the microphone was still turned on (Van Trease 2009). 
Pacific parliamentarians, although not constrained by powerful party machines, 
may nevertheless be pressured by local constituents, wantoks or urban networks. 
The threat of electoral annihilation haunts Western Melanesian incumbents, who 
generally experience turnover rates well above 50 per cent. Politicians in Kiribati 
are intensely sensitive to home island opinion: while debate on government tabled 
legislation commands slender interest, question-time – when MPs can be heard 
live on national radio interrogating ministers about matters of local significance 
– attracts intense interest. Popular engagement in parliamentary processes may 
be weak, but public interest is strong. When the Marshall Islands Nitijela is in 
session, most shared taxis running down Majuro’s main street will be tuned 
into the debates. During the 1998-99 struggles between the Kessai Note’s United 
Democratic Party (UDP) and former President Imata Kabua, the public gallery 
of the Nitijela was packed with onlookers. Jousts between government and 
opposition leaders in Samoa can likewise grip public attention. Voter turnout is 
far higher in the Pacific Islands than in North America or Western Europe, and 
would be higher still if duplicate or deceased voter registrations were deleted 
from the rolls. Popular engagement with politics is greater than often recognised 
in the Pacific Islands, even if popular participation in decision-making (e,g. 
through select committees) is weak and accountability mechanisms work only 
through the crude 3-5 yearly ditching of incumbents at each general election. 
De-colonisation
Close integration of territories with metropolitan powers is a legacy of the 
colonial experience. Hawaii became the 50th Pacific state in 1959, while other 
American Pacific territories, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth 
of the Northern Marianas (CNMI) are described by the US Supreme Court as 
having become ‘appurtenant to but not a part of the United States’ (Underwood 
2006: 7). Rapa Nui was annexed in 1888 but only legally absorbed into Chile’s 
Valparaiso Province in 1966. Residence on the island by Chileans is still 
restricted as is acquisition of property by those not of Rapa Nui descent. By 
contrast, after West Papua was absorbed into Indonesia with United Nations 
approval after the ‘Act of Free Choice’ in 1969, a mixture of spontaneous and 
sponsored transmigration brought in three quarters of a million people, mainly 
from the islands of Java and Sulawesi. Integration with a powerful neighbour 
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tends to open the floodgates to settlement, as on Saipan (Commonwealth of the 
Northern Marianas) where the majority were non-indigenes in 2000, mostly 
from the Philippines or China. 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna are in law part of the 
French nation state; all participate in elections for the national assembly and 
the Presidency. The CFP franc, the currency in all three territories, is pegged 
to the Euro. In 1958, French President General Charles de Gaulle insisted on 
the doctrine of the ‘one and indivisible republic’, and forced voters in French 
Polynesia to choose between colonial integration or abrupt secession. 64 per 
cent voted in favour of staying with France. The pro-independence movement 
was defeated, and after disturbances in Papeete, its leader, Pouvanaa a Oopa, 
was imprisoned (Henningham 1992: 123-126). The peoples of the French Pacific 
remain confronted with those stark options, although in modified forms: since 
2003 they may opt to become ‘territorial collectivities’, with considerable 
autonomy. French Polynesia went a step further by adopting its own autonomy 
statute. New Caledonia is unique: as a result of the 1998 Noumea Accord, the 
territory has special legislative powers and a schedule for phased expansion of 
domestic political control ahead of a referendum on independence between 2014 
and 2019. To agree to that accord entailed such a rupture with the doctrine of 
indivisibility of the Republic that France had to hold a nationwide referendum, 
the result of which earned New Caledonia a special provision in the constitution 
(Maclellan 2005: 397). 
Of the 16 territories in the world that remain on the United Nations list of non-
decolonised territories, the Pacific accounts for five: American Samoa, Guam, 
New Caledonia, Pitcairn Island and Tokelau. Neither of Tokelau’s two referenda 
(2006 and 2007) on whether to become self-governing achieved the required 
two-thirds majority, and Pitcairn Island’s links with Britain have, if anything, 
been reinforced by adjudication of child abuses cases by the British Privy 
Council. American military build up on Guam in the new millennium makes 
independence less likely, despite longstanding Chamorro disquiet about existing 
arrangements. Inclusion on, or exclusion from, the UN list can prove highly 
controversial, with behind-the-scenes manoeuvring at the UN headquarters in 
New York or Geneva being used to exert leverage towards independence back 
home. The incentives are clear. In 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
urged the world ‘to complete the decolonisation process in every one of the 
remaining 16 Non-Self-Governing Territories’.5 Pro-independence leader Oscar 
Temaru, after his initial election as French Polynesia’s President in 2004, sought 
to get his country onto the UN list following the precedent set by New Caledonia 
in the wake of the 1980s Kanak uprising. 
5 ‘Colonisation has no place in Today’s World, says Secretary-General’, Decolonisation Seminar, 14th May 
2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sgsm11568.doc.htm 
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Samoa was the first of the Pacific Island states to secure independence in 1962, 
and the unique constitutional arrangements chosen at that time (discussed 
later) have probably contributed to that country’s post-colonial stability. Tonga 
formally became independent in 1970, but here the colonial hand was, for the 
most part, light. Financial irregularities under King George Tupou II (1893-1918) 
led the British colonists to demand closer control (Fusitu’a and Rutherford 1977: 
180). Britain became preoccupied with Europe during the 1914-18 war, and on 
its heels the Great Depression enabled Tupou II’s more capable successor Queen 
Salote to preserve Tonga’s political autonomy. Fiji’s independence was inevitably 
problematic because of the need to reconcile the competing aspirations of the 
majority Fiji Indian and minority indigenous Fijian leaders Norton 2004). 
Ethnic Fijian claims that since the country had been ceded to Queen Victoria 
by their chiefs in 1874, it should now be returned to those indigenous chiefs 
were to become a rallying cry of the ethno-nationalists who overthrew elected 
governments in 1987 and 2000. Fiji Indian claims that the communally based 
electoral system left as a compromise by the British at independence perpetuated 
race-based voting were to become a prominent theme of the military-backed 
interim government that emerged in the wake of Fiji’s third coup in December 
2006.
Constitutional choices made at independence also had enduring implications 
elsewhere in the region, in contrast to Africa where initial legal frameworks 
bequeathed by colonial powers were often torn up and new arrangements 
adopted (Chazan 1992). Depth of consultation made a difference to the political 
authority of whatever structures were chosen. Papua New Guinea (1975) and 
Kiribati (1979) used constitutional conventions for deliberation which left 
recommendations that had lasting political legitimacy (Macdonald 1982). By 
contrast, although there was more local consultation than is often appreciated 
in the Solomon Islands, the 1978 Independence Order dealt with issues of 
citizenship in ways that pleased the British Colonial Office and swelled the 
size of the golden handshake, but provided no durable answer to what was 
to become a perennial issue in Solomon Islands politics: how to balance the 
powers of the central government against those of the separate islands.6 The 
western breakaway movement that emerged in 1978 was echoed by demands 
for devolution during a constitutional review a decade later, and then again 
in the wake of the June 2000 coup when many provinces threatened to secede 
from the nation (Premdas et al 1984; Mamaloni 1988; Fraenkel 2004: 182). In 
Vanuatu, the Santo rebellion in 1980 was the most severe of the secessionist 
crises accompanying independence anywhere in the Pacific region; Jimmy 
Stevens’ Vemerana Provisional Government on Santo threatened to break up 
the emerging state, until the rebellion was halted by the deployment of British, 
6 For background on the constitution-making process, see Ghai 1983.
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French, and Papua New Guinean troops. The only actual case of secession in 
Oceania was exceptionally peaceful: in 1976, the British Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
decided to go their separate ways and a few years later became independent 
as Kiribati (1979) and Tuvalu (1978).7 Bougainville’s decade-long conflict first 
with Papua New Guinea and then internally is the most severe of the modern-
day secessionist disputes. Its peace settlement, like that of the New Caledonian 
crisis of the 1980s, included a central provision that delayed the decision on 
independence for at least a decade.8 
In between the extremes of independence and incorporation, the Pacific Islands 
are host to a range of hybrid political arrangements between island territories 
and former colonial rulers. New Zealand experimented with Compacts of Free 
Association with Niue and the Cook Islands. Palau, the Federated States of 
Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands entered Compacts of Free 
Association with the USA that gave them considerable autonomy (allowing 
them, unlike Cook Islands and Niue, to join the United Nations), but left the US 
with ‘strategic denial’ rights enabling the exclusion of other rival superpowers 
powers from establishing military bases in that American sphere of influence. 
As a result of an associated deal, missiles can be fired from Vandenberg air base 
in California across a 6,760 km arc through the Pacific sky before plunging into 
the lagoon of Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. From there, they can be 
retrieved and studied by US scientists working at the nearby Ronald Reagan 
Ballistic Missile Defence Test Site. For this, Kwajalein’s chiefs – including former 
President Imata Kabua, receive substantial rental payments only a fraction 
of which trickles down to the Ebeye indigenous settlement adjacent to the 
American base. Negotiations around a new land use agreement for Kwajalein 
remain an issue of contention between Kwajalein chiefs and the Majuro-based 
Marshallese government. Washington pragmatically extended its 17th December 
2008 deadline for achieving agreement over Kwajalein for a further five years. 
For the Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia, the 1986 Compacts 
of Free Association expired in 2001. They were extended two years before 
being renewed for a further 20-year period in 2003, although now with greater 
scrutiny by the U.S. Department of the Interior. Palau commenced its 15-year 
compact later than its neighbours in 1994, and so the arrangement expired only 
in 2009. U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton agreed a one-year extension and 
‘compact review’ talks commenced in May 2009. Renewed compacts provide 
7 The Congress of Micronesia also broke up into Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Palau and Federated States of Micronesia, but the former was always a US-Controlled Trust 
territory, not an independent state. 
8 New Caledonia’s 1988 Matignon Accord put off the scheduled independence vote for a decade. However, 
in 1998, parties signed the Noumea Accord which put the scheduled independence vote back further, to 
some point between 2014 and 2019. Bougainville’s peace agreement provides that there will be a vote on 
independence at some point between 2015 and 2020. 
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the US-associated states with sizeable additions to government revenue - US$3.2 
billion over the 20 years for FSM and the Marshall Islands. They also give 
access to costly federal programs, for example in health, education and the U.S. 
mainland postal service. 
Atomic rents kept French Polynesia prosperous for many years. Between 1966 
and 1975, 41 atmospheric tests were conducted on the remote atolls of Mururoa 
and Fangataufa, followed by 137 underground tests ending in 1996, when France 
signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. French aid then declined, 
but it still accounts for 35 per cent of French Polynesian GDP. Due to French 
finance, New Caledonia and French Polynesia easily have the highest income per 
capita in the Pacific. For the American nuclear-affected islands, independence 
comes at a price. The Marshall Islands earned global notoriety because of the 
Bravo nuclear test on Bikini Atoll in 1954. In total, 67 tests were carried out 
on Bikini and neighbouring Enewetak between 1946 and 1958, the effects of 
which spread eastwards to Rongelap and Utrik. Washington insists that the 
US$250 million paid to the Marshallese Nuclear Claims Tribunal under the first 
compact, and the similar amount paid for federal programs to affected victims, 
was ‘full and final’ compensation. The Marshallese government disagrees. MPs 
representing the nuclear-affected islands have at times made common cause 
with Kwajalein’s chiefs to urge a more belligerent negotiating stance over the 
new compact and the land use agreement for the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile 
Defence Test Site. 
The economic advantages of close integration with a wealthy metropolitan power 
are everywhere apparent; the independent states are, on average, poorer than 
those which have been incorporated by powerful neighbours around the Pacific 
Rim or those that have retained close ties with former colonial powers (Bertram 
1999: 114). For many in the French territories, ‘free association’ arrangements 
such as those that connect Pacific states to America and New Zealand would be 
preferable to the controls from Paris, but the conventional French government 
position, echoing the Gaullist doctrine of 1958, is to insist that post-colonial 
linkages can only be decided after the territory settles upon independence. 
Financial incentives thus act as strong deterrents to loosening ties, even if such 
marked internal inequalities exist that indigenous groups still back political 
parties that push for independence. 
Political Parties and Integrity Legislation
Nowhere in the Pacific Islands have the popularly-based political parties that 
are so central to conventional western political thinking emerged. Left-right 
ideological cleavages do not anywhere shape the divide between government 
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and opposition. The only Pacific Island territories with fairly robust political 
parties are Fiji and New Caledonia, although Vanuatu and French Polynesia have 
some history of political party organisation.9 Ever since independence in Fiji, 
there has been one party that appeals to the vast majority of ethnic Fijians10 and 
another that represents the Fiji Indians.11 The Fijian party has stood little chance 
in the Indian-dominated constituencies and vice versa. In 1997, when Fiji 
abandoned the first-past-the-post system in favour of the AV system, politicians 
were persuaded that adopting this modified majoritarian system would be most 
likely to encourage multi-ethnic government. That proved false. Over the three 
elections under AV, the party system polarised, so that by the third election 
under the system in 2006 one party claimed 80 per cent of the ethnic Fijian 
vote while the other had over 80 per cent of the Indian vote. Despondency as 
a result of the failure of the AV system to generate anticipated pro-moderation 
outcomes helps to explain why former centrist politicians and associated civil 
society activists sympathised with the military coup of December 2006, even if 
their choice to do so only legitimised Bainimarama’s power grab. 
In New Caledonia, issue-based political polarisation has also proved sharp, 
but not on the ethnic pattern of Fiji. Rivalry in the 1980s between the Front 
de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS) and the French loyalist 
Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la Republique (RPCR) was intense, 
but ethnicity was not coterminous with political allegiance. Some indigenous 
Kanaks backed the RPCR, while the pro-independence parties always obtained 
at least some support outside their core Melanesian voter base. The Noumea 
Accord process in New Caledonia may also have served to erode the bipolar 
divide, in the sense that parties on both sides have fractured politically. 
Institutional incentives took the heat off the bipolar conflict, and permitted 
the political emergence of alternative currents of opinion. The territory had 
long used a closed list proportional representation system, but in the 1998 
Noumea Accord supplemented also proportionality in the formation of cabinet 
through mandatory power-sharing rules. The 1998 deal also devolved power to 
the provincial assemblies. The contrast between the experience of Fiji and New 
Caledonia illustrates the perils of using majoritarian systems in bipolar societies 
with race-based voting. 
Few Pacific states have witnessed a strengthening of political party-style 
organisation. In the Marshall Islands, Kessai Note’s UDP administration was 
elected in 1999 on a ‘good governance’, accountability and transparency 
9 For a survey of political parties across the region, see Fraenkel 2006a.
10 From the 1966 election until the 1987 polls, the Alliance Party, in 1992 and 1994 the Soqosoqo Vakavulewa 
ni Taukei (SVT) and from the 2001 polls Laisenia Qarase’s Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua. The exception 
was the 1999 elections, when the SVT managed only 38% of the Fijian vote, with the remainder split among 
four other parties. 
11 First the National Federation Party and then the Fiji Labour Party.
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platform ousting Imata Kabua’s government. The UDP government survived the 
2003 election, but by 2007 was confronted by a rival party that was backed by 
Imata Kabua and other leading chiefly families in the Ralik chain, the Aelon 
Kein Ad (AKA). The AKA struck a deal with Nitijela speaker, and Ratak chief, 
Litokwa Tomeing, and won the 2007 election. Despite the appearance of an 
‘evolution’ towards political party-style organisation, allegiances remain fluid 
in the Marshall Islands. The triumph of the ‘visionaries’ against the ‘old guard’ 
in Nauru in 2004 was not accompanied by development of political parties; 
the reformist’s access to political power always depended on courting wavering 
opportunists with offers of the presidency. In the smaller Pacific states, a 
hardening of the opposition often entails the formation of a political party 
but, if successful in obtaining office, the new government will usually prefer 
to decry political party-style organisation and claim instead to be ruling in the 
general interest.
Towards the western Pacific, the absence of robust political parties has become 
a major issue, leading in some countries to ambitious legislation aimed at 
encouraging the construction of party-based systems. Papua New Guinea’s 
2001-2 Organic Law on Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPACC) aimed to 
fast-track the development of strong parties by requiring those who back a 
Prime Minister after a general election to stick with that choice in any votes 
of confidence, budgetary votes and votes on constitutional amendments. In an 
effort to avoid the horse-trading that follows each general election, the party 
with the largest share of votes is to be given the first opportunity to form a 
government. 
That legislation is widely believed to have ushered in a period of greater stability 
in PNG; Sir Michael Somare’s National Alliance government survived a full 2002-
2007 term in office, the first government since independence to have achieved 
this. Somare also succeeded in getting re-elected for a further term after the 
general election in 2007, and survived beyond the 18-month grace period that 
ended in February 2009. Yet there are doubts about this simplistic assessment 
of the stabilising merits of OLIPPAC. While the Prime Minister remained 
Somare, deputy prime ministers changed repeatedly over 2002-7, and ministers 
were regularly reshuffled. Contrary to the rules against floor-crossing, 11 MPs 
switched sides from government to opposition during the 2002-7 parliament, 
but none lost their seats as the law said they should do. The Ombudsman - who 
was in law empowered to act in such cases, if necessary to recommend a forfeit 
of seats, wisely preferred not to do so. The law proved a toothless tiger, even 
if in practice floor-crossing did diminish due to the perception of the threat of 
dismissal. Opposition inside parliament became subdued not so much because 
of OLIPPAC but because of the presence of a partisan speaker who closed 
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down hostile debate and ruled out of order questions that might embarrass the 
government. In July 2010, PNG’s Supreme Court ruled that key elements of the 
OLIPPAC violated the freedom of movement provisions in the constitution.12 
Despite this, the myth of OLIPPAC-engineered stability obtained considerable 
currency, for there could be little doubt that the political order was more stable 
than during the chaotic turn-of-the-millennium years (Standish 2000). The more 
plausible explanation was better handling of the country’s second resources 
boom (Baton et al 2009), and the availability of a good deal more money to 
grease the political wheels. Other Melanesian countries have been inspired 
by the PNG experiment, hoping also to discipline their allegedly feckless and 
unruly backbenchers. Serge Vohor’s short-lived 2004 government in Vanuatu 
wanted to introduce PNG-like ‘grace periods’, but the court ruled the attempt 
unconstitutional, and Vohor’s government fell to a no confidence challenge. In 
Solomon Islands, the post 2007 Sikua-led government was assisted by Australian 
think-tanks in deliberations aimed at adopting legislation inspired by OLIPPAC 
in PNG (Haywood-Jones 2008).13 However, several ministers in Dr Sikua’s 
cabinet conspired against the proposed constitutional amendment, which failed 
to obtain the required two-thirds majority. Those ministers were sacked by Dr 
Sikua for this act of rebellion, but they re-emerged, holding key portfolios, in 
the government led by new Prime Minister Danny Philip after the August 2010 
election. 
In PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, bills and laws have been ostensibly aimed 
at beefing up political parties, but in practice at strengthening governments and 
weakening the opposition. Grace periods during which governments cannot 
be voted out of office tend to be much more popular than financing a costly 
political party registration apparatus. Although popular concern centres on the 
horse-trading prior to Prime Ministerial elections, the rule giving the largest 
party the first crack at forming a government - by making this a one shot game - 
generates even greater potential for corruption and instability than the previous 
arrangements. The risk with ‘grace periods’, and other forms of restriction on 
‘no confidence’ motions, is that they allow a deeply unpopular government to 
retain office, and/or that they require the law courts to intervene to control the 
minutiae of parliamentary conduct. 
12 Special Reference by Fly River Provincial Executive Council; Re Organic Law on Integrity of Political 
Parties and Candidates, Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, 7 July 2010. 
13 For a video-recorded debate on these issues between Ben Reilly, Jenny Hayward-Jones, Jon Fraenkel 
and Nicole George, see Pacific Island Update, Panel on Political Change Across Melanesia, 7 December 2008, 
available on http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/media/video/index.php?year=2008&id=156
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Women’s Representation
Of the nine countries worldwide that have zero women members of parliament, 
Oceania accounts for five (Solomon Islands, FSM, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu).14 
Papua New Guinea and the Marshall Islands have only a single female MP. 
Fiji had eight until Bainimarama dissolved parliament in December 2006. 
Samoa and Niue have four, Guam, Cook Islands and Kiribati have three, and 
Vanuatu two women MPs. Male dominance of the political stage occurs not 
only in the national parliaments, but also in local-level assemblies. Traditional 
male preponderance in the political sphere, and the conservatism of island 
societies, are the most frequently heard explanations for inequality in political 
representation. Yet change is in the air, at least in some parts of the Pacific. In 
western Melanesia, a growing number of women are now contesting elections. 
By contrast, in some of the smaller and more remote islands, few women contest 
and those that do are subjected to extraordinary pressures. In some Pacific 
Island polities, female leaders prefer to keep out of the male-dominated political 
world, and to concentrate instead on influencing decisions behind-the-scenes or 
through civil society activism (McCloud 2002). Increasingly aggressive electoral 
contests have also diminished women’s chances on the campaign trail: in the 
PNG highlands, for example, candidates need access to large sums of cash to 
win, and they need large numbers of male campaign backers in order to sustain 
control over the polling booths and coordinate the process of ‘assisted voting’ 
(i.e. the completion of ballot papers en masse by sympathisers). 
Temporary special measures have been used to increase the number of women 
in parliament in the French territories and on Bougainville. The French law 
on parity has given New Caledonia and French Polynesia close to 50 per cent 
female members of territorial assemblies. That law has not yielded similar results 
in the third largest French territory, Wallis and Futuna, where constituencies 
are smaller and where numerous parties enter the contest. Although the parity 
law requires parties to lodge lists that alternate men and women, since most 
‘parties’ in Wallis and Futuna obtain only a single member the law does not 
have the intended effect. Adopting parity laws would have similar results in 
the other party-less Pacific microstates (Fraenkel 2006b). Where political parties 
are absent or weak, reserved seats are the only legal measure likely to increase 
the number of women in parliament. The autonomous region of Bougainville 
is the sole entity in Oceania to have adopted reserved seats for women. Three 
of Bougainville’s 41 seats are reserved for women. In both Papua New Guinea 
14 Data from Inter-Parliamentary Union website, http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm The other states 
with zero women members are Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and Belize. The IPU dataset records only states that 
are members of the United Nations, not territories like American Samoa and Commonwealth of the Northern 
Marianas that also have zero female MPs.
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and Solomon Islands, increasing numbers of female candidates are contesting 
elections, and in both countries there are pressures for reserved seats to increase 
the number of women in parliament. 
Although women are poorly represented in Pacific parliaments they tend to be 
better represented at the top levels of the civil service, where appointments 
are more likely to be on merit. As of late 2009, Kiribati for example women 
accounted for only 3 MPs in its 46 member parliament (6.5 per cent), but seven 
of the fifteen top positions in the I-Kiribati civil service (46 per cent). In Solomon 
Islands, Nauru and Samoa, the percentage of women in top positions in the 
ministries is also markedly higher than the share in parliament. The secretaries in 
the I-Kiribati ministries are, probably uniquely in the Pacific, paid considerable 
more than parliamentarians. Much of the consultation around new legislation 
occurs through the ministries, prior to agreement in cabinet and before bills 
are tabled in parliament. In Kiribati, as in many other Pacific countries, highly 
qualified women prefer to take positions formulating and implementing policy, 
rather than going on the election campaign trail or joining male-dominated 
legislative assemblies. The Kiribati parliament is an assembly open to those over 
the civil service retirement age of 55, and it is a place where MPs focus largely 
on constituency matters rather than law-making. 
Power-sharing Accords
The Pacific has an interesting but little internationally known experience with 
mandatory power-sharing accords. Nowhere in the world has witnessed such 
extensive litigation about mandatory power-sharing rules as Fiji. In the 1997 
Fiji constitution, a power-sharing provision required that all parties with 10 per 
cent or more of seats be proportionally represented in cabinet. The provision 
was modelled on that in South Africa during the transition from Apartheid, 
and similar rules were adopted in Northern Ireland as part of the Good Friday 
agreement in 1998. When Mahendra Chaudhry formed his Labour-led People’s 
Coalition cabinet after the 1999 Fiji election, he proved able to exclude the 
largest Fijian party, Rabuka’s Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei, on the grounds 
that its leaders imposed conditions on cabinet entry that amounted to a decline 
of the invitation. When Chaudhry’s arch-adversary Laisenia Qarase tried to 
follow that legal precedent after the elections of 2001, the Court of Appeal 
rejected his efforts as contrary to the 1997 constitution. Qarase appealed, and 
the cases dragged on until 2004 before the Supreme Court left Qarase’s Soqosoqo 
Duavata ni Lewenivanua party with no option other than to invite Chaudhry’s 
Fiji Labour Party (FLP) into cabinet. Qarase reluctantly complied by offering 
the FLP a series of token minor portfolios in a cabinet so swollen that his former 
ministers also retained their portfolios. It was, unsurprisingly after so much 
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legal action, a compromise with the letter but not the spirit of the law. The FLP 
condemned the expansion in cabinet size as a costly imposition on Fiji’s people 
and criticised the portfolios as trivial. Since a fresh election was anyway looming 
on the horizon, Chaudhry chose instead to occupy the opposition benches. 
After the 2006 election, Qarase complied more wholeheartedly with Fiji’s multi-
party cabinet rules, drawing nine senior FLP parliamentarians into cabinet, and 
giving them major portfolios. It proved an enormously popular decision, but 
Fiji’s political leaders again failed to make the arrangements work. Chaudhry 
stayed out of cabinet, and eventually expelled two of the participating FLP 
ministers. The short-lived 2006 power-sharing cabinet was the first government 
since independence to have brought members from country’s two largest parties 
– one representing the Fijians and the other the Fiji Indians – into cabinet 
(Green 2009). It lasted just seven months before being overthrown by military 
commander Frank Bainimarama. 
In New Caledonia, by contrast, power-sharing provisions agreed as part of 
the 1998 Noumea Accord worked more smoothly, even if they left the pro-
independence parties in a minority. In all post-accord cabinets, the loyalist 
parties dominated, based on their ascendancy in the more densely populated 
Southern Province and their ability to gain a minority of seats in the majority 
Kanak Northern Province. During the initial post-Noumea Accord government, 
the pro-independence groups regularly took legal action regarding the 
composition of government. However, after the 2001 assumption of the 
Presidency by the RPCR’s Pierre Frogier, Kanak activist Déwé Gorodé was 
selected as Vice President, thus meeting one of the major FLNKS demands. The 
2004 election saw a fracturing amongst the loyalist parties, with the emergence 
of Avenir Ensemble, a trend continued at the 2009 election, with further splits 
this time affecting Avenir Ensemble. Pro-independence parties have also been 
prone to schisms. The other Noumea Accord provisions of devolution of powers 
from Paris to Noumea, and a re-balancing of income towards the predominantly 
Kanak Northern and Loyalty Islands Provinces have helped to encourage the 
emergence of new alignments also among the Kanak parties. 
New Caledonia’s arrangements had a more solid foundation than those in Fiji. 
Provisions for the proportional distribution of ministerial appointments fitted 
better with New Caledonia’s list PR electoral system than with Fiji’s majoritarian 
AV system. Fiji’s Westminster-based 1997 constitution was not sufficiently 
redrafted after the belated inclusion of the 10 per cent rule, and drafters did 
not fully consider the likely difficulties of a Prime Minister needing to form 
a coalition government to ‘command a majority’ on the floor of the house 
while at the same time being required to form a power-sharing cabinet that 
includes all the qualifying parties. Whereas Fiji’s power-sharing rule generated 
bipolar incentives for each ethnic group to avoid splits that might entail parties 
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falling below the 10 per cent threshold required for cabinet participation, New 
Caledonia’s rules allowed smaller parties to combine with larger parties to boost 
cabinet entitlements. New Caledonia’s arrangements were considerably assisted 
by French aid subventions, and by a growing flexibility emanating from Paris as 
regards which institutions might prove acceptable. Fiji had to tackle its problems 
alone, with little in the way of helpful advice from supranational institutions or 
powerful neighbours. 
Conclusion: Post-colonial Trends
Does the closing of the post independence honeymoon era represent a shift 
to permanent volatility, or merely a hiatus before some new leadership 
consolidation? Efforts by elites to stabilise and regiment the political order have 
been most ambitious in Papua New Guinea, with OLIPPAC and ‘grace periods’, 
but, as we have seen, similar devices are being experimented with in Solomon 
Islands and have been tried, unsuccessfully, in Vanuatu. Samoa’s HRPP is the 
only political party across the region which has remained in office for close 
to a quarter of a century, consolidating its control by expanding cabinet size, 
increasing the parliamentary term to five years, outlawing party switching 
and creating new sub-ministerial positions for pro-government backbenchers. 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu have sought to increase cabinet size, so as to 
render the executive more resilient to parliamentary challenge. Whether those 
efforts prove successful, whether they prove harbingers of emergence of more 
authoritarian political elites or whether the post-independence era’s highly 
contested and fluid styles of politics reassert their influence remains to be seen.
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3. The Military in Post-Colonial Fiji
Jone Baledrokadroka
Les militaires dans les Fidji à l’époque postcoloniale
Les militaires à Fidji sont devenus une institution omniprésente de la 
politique au sein de l’Etat. Leur rôle traditionnel a fusionné avec un 
rôle de sécurité humaine politiquement nuancé. L’instabilité politique 
actuelle à Fidji est liée à l’expansion du rôle des militaires depuis 
l’indépendance, marquée par un accent trop fort mis sur les activités 
non fondamentales comme la création d’un Etat, le maintien de l’ordre et 
la sécurité intérieure. Ceci a eu un effet délétère sur la stabilité politique 
du pays. Cet article propose une explication de l’intervention des 
militaires dans la politique à Fidji de façon si continue depuis 1987. 
Un point de discussion dans ce débat met l’accent sur l’importance de 
l’héritage colonial et l’image que les militaires ont d’eux-mêmes qui a 
été encouragée pendant la période coloniale. Un autre montre la faible 
division du travail dans les Etats-nations émergents et la façon dont 
ceci peut exacerber les divisions ethniques qui conduisent les militaires 
à assumer un rôle de médiation et à créer un Etat qui a tendance à 
connaître des coups d’Etat ou à être un Etat prétorien. D’après de 
nombreuses personnes, dans les pays nouvellement indépendants, « la 
réaction négative contre l’incompétence des civils et la corruption  » 
a souvent justifié l’intervention des forces militaires. Le commodore 
Bainimarama a maintes fois invoqué cette excuse pour justifier son coup 
d’Etat destiné à réaliser un nettoyage. Cet article affirme que l’intérêt 
des militaires en tant que corporation tient un rôle de premier plan dans 
le calcul que fait une élite militaire en faveur de l’intervention et que le 
nouveau « professionnalisme » militaire dans les pays du Tiers-Monde 
comme le Brésil, la Birmanie, la Thaïlande, le Nigéria, l’Indonésie et Fidji 
s’exprime dans la capacité des militaires à assumer un rôle politisé, à 
tenir les rênes du pouvoir de l’Etat et dominer les institutions de façon 
provisoire ou permanente.
Introduction
Fiji’s military has become an all pervasive institution of politics in the small 
Pacific island nation state. The military’s traditional hard security role has 
merged with a politically nuanced human security role. The present state of 
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Fiji’s political instability is related to the role expansion of Fiji’s military since 
Independence. The expansion has been marked by an over-emphasis on non-
core activities such as nation building, peacekeeping and internal security. This 
has had a deleterious effect on the political stability of the nation. 
Why and how has this development taken place? Since cession in 1874 the 
patriotic adage of For God, King and Country was grafted onto and sat well with 
Fiji’s traditional society. The three central ethos of the British Empire’s imperial 
slogan were integrated into Fijian society as the Lotu, Vanua kei na Matanitu. 
In the 96 years of British rule this slogan underpinned the colony’s military 
service through two world wars and the Malayan Communist emergency 
campaign in the 1950’s. After Independence Fiji’s civil military relations pattern 
was a hybrid between the traditional aristocratic and liberal democratic model 
(Nordlinger 1977: 11-13). This hybrid pattern cohered well since independence 
with the ruling Fijian elite in the form of the Alliance party government of Ratu 
Sir Kamisese Mara. 
Upsizing the Military
Since the mid seventies the military was increasingly used by the Alliance 
government under Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara in a nation building role. The raising 
of the Trade Training School in 1974, the Engineers Rural Development Unit 
and the Naval Division in 1975 saw the military increase to over three times its 
size. 
In 1978, with Fiji’s first deployment of troops with the United Nations interim 
forces in Lebanon, peacekeeping became a force determinant. A detachment 
was sent to Zimbabwe in 1980 and in 1982 another Battalion was raised as part 
of the Multinational Forces and Observers in Sinai Egypt to monitor the Israeli-
Egyptian peace accord. This new role increased numbers to over 2000 regular 
force soldiers by 1982. All during this expansion period recruitment was always 
kept at over 95 per cent ethnic Fijian. The huge ethnic recruitment numbers 
disparity was simply put down to the unappealing nature of soldiering to Indo- 
Fijian. In retrospect a quota system of recruitment should have been done to 
even up the ethnic numbers.
Unfortunately this heavily skewed ethnic recruitment only ‘reinforced tacit 
ethnic elitist political association within the institution’. Being overwhelmingly 
ethnic Fijian the military was always to be a bastion of indigenous political 
paramountcy. In fact during the March 1977 elections (the second since 
independence) where the Indian dominated NFP party had won by the slightest 
majority but were unable to form a government the military was put on alert. 
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The question still remains today, what would have happened had not the 
Governor General, Ratu Sir George Cakobau, appointed Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
to form a minority government.
The three major troop number increases were brought about by local and 
international political expediency rather than in response to any clear defence 
role. Hence Nation Building; Peacekeeping and Internal Security became the 
force determinant for the military.
International peacekeeping exposure to the world’s hot spots, especially the 
Middle East, has imbued a confident political mediator mindset amongst Fiji’s 
military officers. 
Part of the Political Elite
With the 1987 Rabuka coup many of the senior officers became entwined with 
the Fijian political elite. Rabuka’s coup shattered the Westminster civil-military 
relations ethos and explicitly unveiled the fragile nature of Fijian democracy 
since Independence. It seemed the Westminster model only lasted so long as 
government was made up of the Fijian political elite. 
With Bainimarama recently emphasising ‘only the military can bring about 
change’ the political role of the military persists. The militarisation of government 
since is real evidence of this politicised role. Over 40 military officers are still 
holding important government posts from Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries and other postings on boards of various statutory bodies. 
In a parallel development since 1998 the recruitment of over 2,000 Fiji citizens for 
service with the British armed forces has been ongoing. This has had significant 
economic and social implications for Fiji with remittances reaching an all time 
high of more than F300million in 2005.
The third factor that increased military numbers was the internal security role 
that evolved out of the 1987 coup. The size of the military reached 3,600 in 
December of 1988 (Fraenkel, Firth & Lal 2009: 119). The army raised the number 
of infantry battalions and the number of soldiers in each battalion to ‘effectively 
control’ the emergency situation, although many saw that emergency as being 
one that the RFMF had created in the first place. An elite counter revolutionary 
warfare unit was formed to protect against government armed insurgency. 
As a consequence of executing a supremacist coup in 1987 against a phantom 
internal security threat, the military in a convoluted way created for itself an 
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internal security role previously the ambit of the Fiji Police Force. Ironically in 
taking upon itself the IS role, like scores of developing countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s, Fiji is now a coup-prone state. 
Why Coups Happen
In many post-colonial states, civil supremacy under the aegis of democracy is 
often threatened by the military’s colonially-inherited legacies. Often, such 
societies are troubled by severe schisms of a regional or ethnic character. The 
military, however, acquires a colonially-induced unifying function. And that 
given its self image as leading nationalists the military is commonly able to 
rationalise away or sincerely justify their predatory actions. Since they identify 
with the nation what is to the advantage of the military is also good for the 
country. It is almost as if coups promote the national interest. 
Western military ethics stress the supremacy of society over the individual, tribe 
or sub-group, and the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of function 
in the service of the nation state. Foremost of this military colonial legacy is the 
principle that the military commander must never allow his military judgement 
to be warped by political expediency (Huntington 1957: 71). Unfortunately this 
principle has been compromised as in the Nigeria and Fiji coups with highly 
professional armies that are drawn from one predominant ethnic group and do 
not reflect a unified nation. If governments seem captives of those sub-national 
forces, the incentive for military intervention may become strong. 
The degree to which corruption is itself a major cause of military coups is 
however open to question. Despite its prominence in post coup rationalisations, 
one might suspect that it is a secondary cause in most cases. Perhaps more 
significant is military leaders’ distaste for the messiness of politics – whether 
honest or not – and a tendency to blame civilian politicians for failure to meet 
overly optimistic popular aspirations which would be impossible of fulfilment 
even by a government of angels (Nye 1967: 422). Again this type of thinking may 
be the result of the realist and rather simplistic mindset prevalent in military 
leaders that resorts to coercion in dealing with political evils. For the military 
view of man is decidedly pessimistic and that the man of the military ethic is 
essentially the man of Hobbes (Huntington 1957: 63). Bainimarama’s 2006 ‘clean 
up’ or good governance coup rhetoric played to such sweeping justification and 
an instrumentalist view. 
On the other hand military intervention into civilian affairs is not precipitated 
solely by military groups or elites. Amos Perlmutter found that in most cases 
civilians turn to the military for political support when civilian political 
structures and institutions fail or when constitutional means for the conduct 
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of political action are lacking (Perlmutter 1969: 390). The civilians begin to 
form interventionist coalitions or indoctrinate the military with their political 
ideologies. Several examples of this process can be found in the Middle East 
and Latin America and recently in Fiji. Secondly, Perlmutter also found that 
‘corporatism is a prima facia case for interventionism and that professionalism 
is only one guarantor of non- intervention’ (Perlmutter 1981: 2). This appears 
to be the case in Fiji prior to the 2006 coup. The commissioning of a security 
review white paper by the SDL Government in 2003 further undermined 
the fragile relations with the Military Commander. The paper recommended 
among others a fifty per cent cut in numbers of the Fiji Military Forces and a 
change to the selection process for the Commanders position. The Fiji military 
though a considerably small force consisted of a highly professional officer 
corps – a credit to its British military legacy. Since independence the traditional 
aristocratic-liberal democratic pattern of civil military relations worked well 
enough (Nordlinger 1977: 11-15). However this did not stop the RFMF from 
overtaking democratically elected governments in 1987, 2000 and 2006. One 
way to look at the driving forces of military intervention or non-intervention is 
through Finer’s disposition/opportunity theory. 
In his disposition and opportunity theory, Finer identifies the disposition of 
the military elite – which is bound to its corporate and individual interests – 
as the push factor. The pull factor is the opportunity that the political ‘crisis’ 
offers as a key condition for a military political intervention. According to 
Finer’s calculus of intervention the subjective military disposition factor and 
the objective opportunity factor acting in unison are the most relevant triggers 
to the likelihood of a coup. The pre-coup interventionist coalitions of Rabuka 
and the Taukei Movement in 1987, Speight and Nationalist politicians in 2000 
and Bainimarama and the Labour Party in 2006 reinforces this point.
Conclusion
One theme in this debate over why coups happen emphasises the importance 
of the colonial legacy, and the military self-image fostered during the colonial 
period. Another points to the weak division of labour in emerging nation states 
and the way in which it may exacerbate ethnic divisions that give rise to the 
military taking over in a mediator role and creating a coup prone or praetorian 
state. ‘Revulsion against civilian incompetence and corruption’, as many have 
argued, is a frequent justification for intervention by military forces in newly 
independent states. Commodore Bainimarama has often used this excuse for his 
‘clean-up coup’.
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I have argued that military corporate interest is foremost in a military 
elite’s calculus for intervention. In many Third World countries military 
‘professionalism’ has come to mean not Huntington’s old professionalism of 
external defence, meaning that a professional armed force is one that is subject 
to civilian authority; but something quite different. The new professionalism in 
Third World countries such as Brazil, Burma, Thailand, Nigeria, Indonesia and 
Fiji is expressed in the capacity of the military to assume a politicised role and, 
either temporarily or permanently, to take the reins of state power and dominate 
government. Finer takes the argument further in two ways: his disposition and 
opportunity theory offers an explanation of the push-pull factors that cause the 
military to intervene in politics; and he suggests an ascending scale of modes of 
military intervention in politics from working through constitutional channels 
to overthrowing civilian governments. 
In this paper I have endeavoured to explain that the military forces have 
intervened in Fiji’s politics so consistently since 1987 as a result of their 
non-core-role expansion; the extent to which Fiji exemplifies wider patterns 
of intervention found elsewhere; the form which intervention has taken at 
different stages of this story; and the reason for the absolutist character of the 
intervention that began with the 2006 coup.
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4. The Political Roles of the Fiji 
Military: A Brief History of the Chiefs’ 
Warriors, Heroes of the World Wars, 
Peacekeepers and Dictators
Hélène Goiran
Les Rôles Politiques des Militaires Fidjiens: brève histoire des Guerriers 
des Chefs, des Héros des Guerres Mondiales, des Soldats de la Paix et des 
Dictateurs
L’histoire militaire des Fidji a commencé en même temps que leur 
Histoire. La société précoloniale était largement fondée sur la guerre et 
l’art de la faire. L’administration britannique et les missions chrétiennes 
ont fait cesser les conflits armés mais les Fidjiens, héritiers d’une 
puissante tradition guerrière, ont cherché à la maintenir. Ils l’ont 
adaptée et l’ont utilisée pour rétablir puis pour consolider leur pouvoir 
politique ; d’abord dans le cadre de la colonisation, puis pour préparer 
l’indépendance et donner à leur pays souverain une place significative 
sur la scène internationale en participant avec succès à de nombreuses 
opérations de paix. C’est dans ce cadre qu’ils se sont engagés dans les deux 
Guerres mondiales, puis dans la Campagne de Malaisie. Depuis 1978, 
des milliers de soldats fidjiens ont été et sont déployés en permanence 
sur des théâtres d’opérations extérieurs (Liban, Sinaï, Bosnie,   etc.) 
s’illustrant par leur courage et leur efficacité. Aujourd’hui encore, du 
fait de leur valeur, et, malgré le coup d’Etat du 5 décembre 2006 et 
les sanctions internationales décidées contre le gouvernement, l’ONU 
confie aux militaires fidjiens la protection de ses représentants et de ses 
installations en Irak. L’armée fidjienne occupe une place prépondérante 
dans la société et joue un rôle politique majeur, jusqu’à prendre le pouvoir 
par la force, dans les seuls coups d’Etat militaires de l’Océanie. Ce rôle 
politique a, sur le plan intérieur, complètement changé d’orientation en 
une vingtaine d’années. En 1987, les Royal Fiji Military Forces, avec le 
colonel Rabuka, déclaraient vouloir protéger les intérêts des Mélanésiens 
menacés par les Indo-Fidjiens. Depuis 2006, les Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces,  solidaires du Commodore  Bainimarama, se présentent comme 
les promoteurs d’un futur Etat multiracial et démocratique, dans lequel 
chaque citoyen, quelle que soit son origine ethnique, aura les mêmes 
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droits et devoirs. Pourtant, l’armée demeure presque exclusivement 
constituée de Fidjiens mélanésiens, et les Indo-Fidjiens n’y ont jamais 
eu leur place.
The Chiefs’ Warriors
The military history of Fiji is as ancient as her History. In pre-colonial times, the 
warriors were the necessary implements of the chiefly power. The Chiefs gained 
or held authority and influence through the victories of their fighters. War 
was the natural occupation of men, who were all supposed to fight to protect 
the community. Some of them were dedicated fighters. Warfare training was a 
main part of young males’ formation. The importance of the social role of the 
warriors was such that, like the nobles, they were buried with their wives. 
Moreover, the gods wanted human sacrifice and the vanquished were the usual 
victims. War and worship were intertwined. Without wars, the offerings could 
diminish, angering the gods, who could provoke disasters, therefore weakening 
the power of the chiefs. Frequent wars opposed those who aspired to nobility 
titles, extended territories, and superior prestige. All men being supposed to 
the chief’s police, thousands of armed men assaulted the enemy groups. But the 
confrontation was habitually short and the number of casualties was limited, 
because a symbolic victory was sufficient. Generally, these conflicts were aimed 
at establishing power, not at exterminating the opponent, who could have been 
previously an ally, or indeed become one in the future. 
Warriors were therefore a major instrument for the chiefs to win and hold power. 
The leaders who were able to mobilise, train and lead their men into battle 
could dominate more people on wider zones. The first contacts and exchanges 
with Westerners introduced firearms and the engagement, in the service of some 
chiefs, of foreigners whose competences played a major part in the evolution of 
politics. 
The club was the Fijian warrior's favourite weapon. He had his spears, 
from ten to fifteen feet long and often richly carved, efficient bows and 
arrows, and slings for throwing stones; but, although these had each its 
special use, none approached the club in popularity. Whether his tribe 
was at war or at peace, he was seldom without it, for until the latter 
half of last century no Fijian left the precincts of his house unarmed. 
Whenever he left his village, even to work in his garden, he carried his 
club on his shoulder; and should he meet a man in the path, the club 
remained in that position, at the alert, until on friendly recognition both 
men lowered their weapon in greeting (Derrick 1957). 
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These weapons themselves could have a political role: 
The Mace of the Fiji House of the Representatives is the former favourite 
war club that was used in battle by Ratu Seru Cakobau. It is made of a 
type of hardwood called ‘gadi’. He gave it as a gift to Queen Victoria of 
Great Britain in 1874, when Fiji became part of the British Empire. He 
named the war club Ai Tutuvi Kuta i Radini Bau (The coverlet of the 
Queen of Bau).
The club is beautifully mounted and decorated with emblems of peace, 
embellished with small silver doves and olive branches. 
The Mace of the Fiji Senate is another war club used by Ratu Seru 
Cakobau. It was acquired during fighting with the hill tribes in 1874. 
It is a root stock club called na waka. (http://www.parliament.gov.fj/
about/about.aspx?id=hmacehr)
In addition to traditional arms, modern weapons and western strategy enabled 
certain groups to gain influence over others, and that in a context where it seems 
that, previously, no group dominated durably and significantly. 
This is how, notably, Cakobau, chief of Bau Island and adjacent areas, gained 
such authority, in the middle of the nineteenth century, as to be considered by 
the Europeans as the main leader of the entire Fiji archipelago, that is the Tui 
Viti, the King of Fiji.
In the early 1870s, in Levuka, the Western settlers constituted a government 
around Cakobau, This Cabinet, and its leader, protected themselves against those 
who challenged their legitimacy with a ‘Royal Army’. This force comprised 
1,000 men, organised, trained and used in the western way. It was commanded 
by a British Officer who had served in the Crimea and in India. 
On the cession to the Crown, in 1874, London took over control of the ‘Royal 
Army’, and in 1876, the colonial administration renamed it the Armed Native 
Constabulary but retained its military organisation. The colonial authorities 
employed the ANC for the ‘pacification’ of tribes resisting the British presence. 
 During the same period, the Missions, whose influence had been growing rapidly 
since the conversion of Cakobau, in 1854, prohibited traditional warfare. Apart 
from those of the rebellious tribes, the warriors found a new mission by joining 
the Constabulary or the Police. The ANC was terminated in 1905, having no 
mission after the ‘pacification’ and unification of the Fiji Islands under British 
authority.
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The First World War
In 1914, in Fiji, the British settlers and many natives desired to participate in the 
combat in Europe. For the Fijians, who were now the subjects of the Crown, the 
engagement was obvious: not to fight for the Queen would have been a shameful 
and unforgivable breach of the traditions. The Police and all defence-related 
associations, such as the riflemen, were mobilised, and a Fiji Defence Force was 
formed. 
Approximately seven hundred men of European descent left Fiji for active 
service with the Allies. 
Natives also were eager to join the front, but the British Command refused these 
coloured men. A few young chiefs, who were studying overseas at the time, 
succeeded in joining the Maori units. 
The famous Ratu Sukuna, rejected because of his race by the British War 
Office, enlisted in the French Foreign Legion. Seriously wounded in action and 
highly decorated, he was sent back to Suva as a hero. There, he succeeded in 
convincing the colonial authority to send a Labour Detachment of about one 
hundred Fijians to Europe in May 1917. 
The Indians in Fiji, at that time, were still indentured labourers. In 1916, their 
leaders tried to convince the colonial authorities to constitute an Indian platoon. 
The 32 volunteers were ignored by the government.
The Second World War
After the First World War, in the 1920s, the Defence Force, still composed of 
indigenous Fijians commanded by Western Officers, was used against striking 
Indian workers, so creating a feeling of alliance between the Fijians and 
Europeans against the Indians.
However, the Indian Platoon was at last created within the Fiji Defence Force in 
1934 as part of policy of giving Indo-Fijians greater recognition and opportunity 
to participate in the general life of the Colony. 
The platoon was disbanded in 1940. The reason given for this action during 
a war was shortage of equipment: The real reason was that members of the 
platoon had asked for equal pay with the Europeans. The New Zealand military 
authorities (who commanded the Fiji Army at the start of the War) feared that 
this dissatisfaction could spread to the ethnic Fijians.
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When the Second World War began, the Colony already had a Fiji Defence 
Force. A general mobilisation was ordered. Like twenty years before, the British 
authorities did not want the natives to be sent to the front. 
However, the jungle skills of Fijian soldiers were notable after a special 
party of Fiji Commandos was sent to the Solomon Islands for guerrilla 
operations in support of the Allied Forces in operation there. The party 
numbered 30 men under the command of Captain D. Williams. They 
became the first Fijians to go into action in the World War Two. The 
First Battalion, Fiji Infantry Regiment (1FIR) was assigned to the Island 
of Bougainville in December 1943. This followed the establishment of a 
beachhead in Empress Augusta Bay by the United State Marines. The 
battalion’s job on the island was to be forward scouts in support of the 
United States. The excellent results achieved by the First Battalion, 
Fiji Infantry Regiment led to a decision to send the Third Battalion, 
Fiji Infantry Regiment (3FIR) to join the First Battalion in operation in 
Bougainville. It was in Bougainville that Corporal Sefanaia Sukanaivalu of 
the Third Battalion, Fiji Infantry Regiment, was posthumously awarded 
the Victory Cross in June 23, 1944 when a larger and well-concealed 
enemy force ambushed his platoon. The First Commandos, Fiji Guerrillas 
went into action on the island of New Georgia in 1943 and were tasked 
to locate a party of enemy soldiers occupying the island. During this 
operation the Fijian soldiers suffered their first death in action when 
Lieutenant B. Masefield was killed after a patrol he was leading was 
caught in an enemy artillery barrage. The First Commandos were late 
replaced by the Second Commandos, Fiji Guerrillas on November 25, 
1943 (RFMF Website).
Politically and socially, the participation in the Solomon Campaign was of 
major significance for the Fijian soldiers, who operated with Westerners on 
the same level. They constituted a consistent group notwithstanding their 
different origins and were unanimously recognised as valuable servicemen. As 
a consequence, the Fiji Defence Force was not completely dismantled after the 
war. Moreover, in 1949, it was officially decided that the Fiji Defence Force 
would be supported by New Zealand.
The Malayan Campaign
The impression that the Fijian soldiers had left was enduring: in 1951, London 
wished to deploy a Fiji Battalion in the Malayan Campaign. 
World War Two veterans constituted the core of this Fiji Battalion. These men 
spent four years in the jungle to ‘hunt and kill’. The appreciation of the value of 
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the Fijian servicemen as commandos was even superior to those in the Solomon 
Campaign: in Malaya, the officers were Fijian; London left the Fijians to chose 
the method of operating, which was shocking. In this war, contact with the 
enemy was direct; combat close, the environment dreadful. The Fijians were 
particularly well adapted, and their longstanding warrior tradition led them to 
the destroy the enemy without hesitation. 
Possibly, for some Fijians, the presence of Chinese communists in Malaya could 
be compared to the presence of Indians in Fiji: unwelcome visitors who had to 
be chased out. This may explain the enthusiasm of the members of the ‘Fiji Batt’ 
to carry out their mission. 
During the Malayan Campaign, as well as during the two World Wars, the 
Fijian units were organised according to the customary hierarchy. The colonial 
authorities encouraged this structure, which guaranteed loyalty and dedication. 
Through their commitment, as individuals, the Fijian servicemen gained 
prestige among their peers. As a community, following their successful overseas 
engagement, the Fijians gained cohesiveness, in opposition to the Indo-Fijians, 
who scarcely participated in the wars.
The Defence Force of Sovereign Fiji
After the Malayan Campaign, at the time of the preparation of Fiji’s independence, 
London tried, to no avail, to convince the Fijian representatives that the future 
State only needed a police force, not an army. Although the Fijians had been 
impressive combatants, or rather because they had, the British authorities did 
not want to maintain a significant defence force in Fiji, fearing for the internal 
security and the safety of the Indian part of the population: the Indians had 
then become more numerous than the indigenous Fijians. 
In 1970, the new sovereign State inherited what remained of the Fiji Defence 
Force, turned into the Royal Fiji Military Forces, still almost exclusively composed 
of indigenous Fijians. The first years of independence saw the formation of a 
Fijian senior staff in the RFMF. Their main mission was to guarantee internal 
security, by assisting, should it be necessary, the police in maintaining or 
restoring law and order in accordance with Government decisions. The RFMF 
also participated in rural development and youth formation mostly in favour of 
the Fijians.
The command of the RFMF was close to the government. Together, they decided 
to provide this small army with international experience by appointing it to 
peacekeeping missions. Without doubt, it was also a long-thinking reflexion that 
led to the employment of the Fijians’ warriors skills as a powerful instrument of 
international politics for the young Fiji State.
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From 1978, a battalion was engaged in the United Nations Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL). From 1982, a second battalion was engaged in the multinational 
peacekeeping force in Sinai (MFO), under United States command.
Other similar commitments followed, in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Sinai, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, Iraq and Kuwait, Somalia, Bougainville, East Timor, Solomon 
Islands. Some of them are still ongoing. So, for more than thirty years, more than 
1,000 Fijian men were deployed at the same time in external theatres. Nearly all 
of them were, and still are, indigenous Fijians. 
In total, about 15,000 Fiji men have served in these external operations. This 
toughened them up, brought their families and the country a substantial income, 
providing Fiji with international recognition and appreciation, thanks to their 
professionalism, operational value, bravery and strength. Therefore, until the 
mid-1980s, a military coup d’état in Fiji was thought to be very unlikely. The 
submission of the RFMF to the government, the strength of democracy in Fiji, 
and the multiracial harmony commonly received international acknowledgement 
and approval. In 1986, Pope John Paul described the country as ‘the way the 
world should be’.
The Indo-Fijians and the Defence Force
Since its establishment, the Fijian military forces have been strong supporters 
of the long-established customary leaders and the Methodist church. Very 
early, too, a clear separation (segregation) had been established between the 
indigenous Fijians and the Indian migrants. The Military Force (whatever its 
name at the time) was employed to counter their social claim movements.
The RFMF’s ceremonial traditions are very Fijian and Christian (yaqona sessions, 
frequent prayers, etc). There is really no incentive for the Indians to enlist. Their 
very small number in the RFMF is a consequence of their ethnic identification, 
religions, interests and aspirations, as well as an outcome of the place accorded 
to them in Fijian society from the time of the arrival of their ancestors, due to 
the British colonial authorities, more than one hundred years ago. 
Those few Indo-Fijians who join the RFMF, however, have a strong perseverance 
and motivation. 
Some hold important posts as lawyers, doctors or aides-de-camp; and some 
are part of the higher command and close to the Commander of the Republic 
of Fiji Military Forces. Colonel Mohammed Aziz, for example, Bainimarama’s 
deputy, has been in command several times during the recent past, while the 
Commodore was abroad.
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A brief history of the Indo-Fijian peoples is important to this narrative. Today, 
the Republic of the Fiji Islands has a population of 830,000. Nearly 40 per cent 
of them are Indo-Fijians, mostly born in Fiji to parents themselves born there, 
and they do not have any connection with India anymore, despite a strong 
Indian culture. 
Their ancestors arrived several generations ago. The movement has been 
massive: between 1879 and 1916, more than 60,000 Indian indentured labourers, 
including women and children were transported to Fiji. Many settled there. The 
1921 census showed 84,000 Fijians and 60,000 Indians (there were also 12,000 
Europeans, Chinese, Rotumans and others).
Nevertheless, they are still called Indians, both commonly and officially, in 
order to differentiate them from the Indigenous Fijians and the citizens of other 
origins. The Constitution so establishes four separate electoral rolls, according 
to the voters’ registration as Fijians; Indians; Rotumans; or others.
There are few inter-community marriages, and a small number of Fiji citizens 
have Fijian and Indian mixed blood. Those who have, belong to one of the 
communities or to the other, neither to both nor to a real new one of half-caste. 
This situation is a heritage of the colonial times. The conditions of Independence, 
in 1970, set up this separation, and therefore the subsequent identification of 
each Fiji Islander.
Apart from historical and colonial legacy, many characteristics separate the 
communities, such as religion (the Fijians being Christians and the Indians being 
Hindus or Muslims), and profession (three quarters of the farmers are Indians, 
but eighty-three per cent of the land is Fijian-owned).
Until 1987, and the first coup d’état, identities in Fiji seemed plain and clear 
for everyone. The different communities lived alongside each other without 
real integration or worrying tension, in what appeared to be a peaceful and 
prosperous multiethnic and democratic country. The travel agencies successfully 
sold trips to ‘Paradise’. 
Nonetheless, the compartmentalised country was built on an unsound 
foundation, organised by a raced-based Constitution that did not create a common 
national identity. ‘Indigenous Fijians were instilled with fear of dominance 
and dispossession by Indo-Fijians, and they desired protection of their status 
as the indigenous people. Indo-Fijians, on the other hand, felt alienated and 
marginalised, as second class citizens in their own country, the country of their 
birth’ (Bainimarama 2007). And then took place the first military coup d’état to 
occur in the Pacific.
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1987: Colonel Rabuka’s Ethno-nationalist Coup 
d’Etat
In 1987, the general elections saw the defeat of the customary establishment and 
resulted in the formation, for the first time, of a truly multiracial government 
under the leadership of Labour’s Dr Timothy Bavadra. 
In May 1987, Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, number three in the RFMF 
hierarchy, and descendant of customary warriors, overthrew the government. 
His operation was carefully planned and prepared, the RFMF followed him. 
He declared to have taken action in order to preserve the interest of the Fijians 
against the Indians. This was the first military coup of the history of Fiji and 
Oceania. A second one occurred soon after: in September of the same year, 
Sitiveni Rabuka ousted the government again and declared Fiji a Republic. In 
1990 a new constitution was endorsed, establishing the Fijian prominence. Mr 
Rabuka was made a life member (the only one ever!) of the Great Council of 
Chiefs, although a commoner, due to the fact that he had carried out his military 
coup in 1987 in the name of indigenous rights.
For years, the Rabuka government placed Army officers in many posts of 
responsibilities. The RFMF; henceforth Republic of Fiji Military Forces, greatly 
grew in strength, equipment, and budget. As a member of a customary warrior 
clan and a peacekeeping operations hero, Sitiveni Rabuka had charisma and 
authority in Fiji. He retained political power for more than ten years during 
which, despite strong international reproof against his regime, Fijian Peacekeepers 
remained appreciated and welcome in the United Nations’ missions.
In 1997, still in power, Sitiveni Rabuka instigated the adoption of a new 
Constitution, supposed to be considered as progressive. Its provisions maintained 
some of the Fijians’ advantages, but the Indians had significant rights. In 1999, 
the Labour party won the general elections and its leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, 
became Prime Minister. Even more than in 1987, access of the Indo-Fijians to 
political power was a reality. The Melanesian nationalists could not bear it. 
2000: The RFMF’s Reaction to the Speight 
Coup d’Etat
In May 2000, George Speight, a half-European businessman, leading an action 
with members of the Special Forces, took Fiji’s Parliament hostage for 56 days. 
The support of the RFMF was expected, but its Commander, Commodore 
Bainimarama, backed by the large majority of his men, opposed the coup. 
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Bainimarama declared martial law, negotiated with the putschists, succeeded in 
having the hostages released and the weapons returned. Moreover, he had the 
rebels arrested, and, after only a few weeks gave the power back to civilians. 
A provisional government was installed, led by Laisenia Qarase. Commodore 
Bainimarama and his supporters intended to see all the instigators of the coup 
uncovered and punished. But Qarase and his followers revealed themselves to 
be in favour of ‘Melanesian prominence’. They were maintained in power by 
the general elections of 2001 and 2006. Despite its racist policies, the Qarase 
governments were also approved by the international community.
Commodore Bainimarama also stayed in place as Commander RFMF. He too 
had many supporters, including the President. For years he opposed Qarase 
and his policy. Despite visible tensions and dissensions within the RFMF, the 
‘Commodore’ remained their legitimate and rightful commander. Steadily, he 
opposed the government. With him, therefore, the servicemen did the same, 
refuting what the Commodore and his supporters saw as non-democratic policy. 
They demanded the abandonment of outdated and unfair provisions that 
favoured ethnic Fijians and disadvantaged the Indo-Fijian half of the country’s 
population notwithstanding their hundred-year old presence in Fiji. 
Since 5 December 2006: the Anti-ethno-
nationalist Bainimarama’s Coup
On 5 December 2006, through a bloodless coup, Commodore Bainimarama 
removed the Qarase government. He dissolved the Parliament and, after a few 
weeks, assumed the title and responsibilities of Prime Minister. He announced 
and launched anti-corruption campaigns and non-racial government. He admits 
to having conducted a coup d’état and declared so in front of the United Nations 
General Assembly. He pledged to organise truly democratic elections for early 
2009.
For much of the post-Independence period, the Military Forces in Fiji had been 
strong supporters of the long-established customary leaders, including by 
conducting the two coups of 1987 to protect the traditional Melanesian interest. 
From 2000, under Commodore Bainimarama, the Army completely changed its 
position, claiming to champion equal rights for all the citizens, contesting the 
archaic customary power.
Either by supporting or opposing by force the customary chiefs, the elected 
governments or the putschists, Fijian soldiers have played a major political role. 
The ‘Commodore’, without doubt is a military commander who conducted a 
coup d’état to overthrow a functioning democracy. He has assumed dictatorial 
4. The Political Roles of the Fiji Military
67
power. But my point is that in the historical, social and political context of Fiji, 
the positions and actions of the ‘Commodore’ and the RFMF could be said to 
have historical coherence. 
By assuming political and administrative authority they perpetuate, in their own 
different ways, the ancient role of the pre-colonial warriors. And recent history 
seems to indicate that there can be a future for Fijian Dictators: after he had lost 
power in 1999, Brigadier Rabuka did not disappear from the political scene. 
Quite the opposite: nobody really accused him of having definitively destroyed 
the peaceful and prosperous Fiji of the 1980s. Neither the local population 
nor the international community turned their back on him. Not being Prime 
minister anymore, because he had led the indigenous Fijian government to a 
severe defeat and paving the way for the country's first Prime minister of ethnic 
Indian origin, trade unionist Mahendra Chaudhry. Following the polls, Rabuka 
was elected as chairman of the Great Council of Chiefs. Soon Rabuka resigned 
from the chairmanship of the Great Council and membership of the Parliament 
because he had taken up a Commonwealth mission, as the Secretary-General’s 
Special Envoy to Solomon Islands. What better international recognition could 
he have wished for?
Later, allegations were made against him by former President Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara of complicity in the Fiji coup of 2000. Rabuka was also accused of 
instigating or supporting the mutiny that took place at Suva's Queen Elizabeth 
Barracks on 2 November 2000. He was judged ‘not guilty’.
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5. One Party State: The Samoan 
Experience
Afamasaga Toleafoa
Un État avec un parti unique : l’expérience samoane
On fait souvent l’éloge de Samoa pour sa stabilité politique et sociale. 
Depuis 1985, le pays n’a pas connu de changement de gouvernement et 
il est gouverné par un parti unique, le Parti de la protection des Droits 
de l’homme (HRPP), au pouvoir de façon continue. La période n’a connu 
que deux changements de Premier ministre et le gouvernement HRPP a 
gouverné avec des majorités écrasantes au Parlement. A un moment où 
une grande partie de la région connaît l’instabilité politique à des degrés 
divers sous la forme de coups d’Etat, de gouvernements éphémères et 
même de la violence et la désobéissance civile, Samoa est perçu par 
de nombreux observateurs comme un pôle de stabilité et de bonne 
gouvernance. Mais aujourd’hui, après 26 ans pendant lesquels un seul 
parti avait le pouvoir, Samoa est en fait un Etat avec un parti unique, 
avec des conditions actuellement en place pour que le gouvernement 
actuel reste au pouvoir pendant de nombreuses années encore. Cet 
article esquisse les forces principales qui ont contribué à la situation en 
apparence stable de Samoa. Le contenu provient surtout de la chronique 
hebdomadaire de l’auteur, « Democracy maketh not a democracy—La 
Démocratie ne fait pas une démocratie » publiée dans le journal local le 
Samoa Observer. Il s’agit d’une série de commentaires sur la politique 
samoane, notamment le risque que le parti au pouvoir ou l’exécutif 
accapare le pouvoir politique aux dépens de l’intégrité des institutions 
démocratiques du pays.
Introduction
Samoa is often lauded for its political and social stability. In fact, since 1985, 
Samoa has had no change in government with one political party, the Human 
Rights Protection Party (HRPP), holding office continuously. Only two changes 
of prime ministers have taken place during that time and the HRPP government 
has also governed with overwhelmingly large majorities in parliament. At a time 
when much of the region has experienced varying degrees of political instability 
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in the form of military coups, short lived governments and even violence and 
civil disobedience, Samoa is seen by many as a beacon of stability and good 
government.
This chapter sketches the main forces that have contributed to Samoa’s seemingly 
stable political situation. The material is taken mainly from the writer’s weekly 
column ‘Democracy maketh not a democracy’ in the local Samoa Observer 
newspaper. This is a series of commentaries on politics in Samoa including the 
risk of the party in office or the executive accumulating political power to itself 
at the expense of the integrity of the country’s democratic institutions. 
After 26 years of one political group, the HRPP party holding office, Samoa 
is effectively a one party state, with conditions now in place for the present 
government to remain in office for many more years. 
The Samoan Political System
Evolution of Samoa’s Modern State System
When Samoa gained political independence as a modern state in 1962, it did so 
with a Westminster styled democratic constitution with the usual separation 
of powers between the three branches of government. That constitution had a 
built-in system of democratic checks and balances that ensures political balance 
in the system and guards against any one branch assuming excessive power to 
itself. 
Like the rest of the Pacific, Samoa also had its own culture and indigenous 
forms of political and social organisation. Allowance was made for inclusion of 
some of these forms in the new modern state system at the initial stage at least 
and as a transitional measure. But there was an expectation that in time and 
with increased adoption and understanding of the new democratic practices 
and forms, some or all of these would be phased out or adapted to suit the 
democratic substance of and nature of Samoa’s modern state system.
During the first twenty or so years following independence, Samoa relied in 
fact on its existing traditional leadership and forms to usher in and manage 
the change. In parliament for example and in the absence of political parties, 
members of parliament continued to follow Samoan traditions and practices on 
government to the extent that they were not inconsistent with its democratic 
constitution. Decision making in parliament relied on Samoan consensus 
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practices for example with individual members supporting or opposing as they 
saw fit government policy. And Samoan concepts and practices of rotation to 
office as opposed to contesting for office were observed.
These practices would soon change with the emergence of political factions and 
later political parties with the formation of the Human Rights Protection Party 
in 1982 followed soon after by the Samoa National Party. And after a short 
period of changing political fortunes by the two groups, HRPP won office in 
1988 and has been in power since. Today, Samoa has a one party political system 
with HRPP being the only party in parliament. 
Changing Samoa’s Democratic System of 
Government
During the long period of HRPP rule, fundamental changes have been made 
to Samoa’s constitution and system of government. The overall impact of these 
has been to allow the executive to accumulate to itself almost absolute power 
at the expense of parliament and other democratic institutions. The nature of 
these changes as such that in the majority of cases, the democratic mechanisms 
and institutions have remained, but effective control and direction is vested in 
cabinet. The democratic structure of the system remains, but institutions have 
been stripped of their independence and power to act on their own as intended 
in the first place.
Change to Appointment and Powers of the Office of 
Controller and Chief Auditor
One of the first constitutional offices to suffer that fate was the Office of the 
Controller and Chief Officer. The independence and protection for the office of 
Controller and Chief Auditor from political control had been provided through 
security of tenure mainly. Under Samoa’s constitution, once appointed, the 
holder remained in office till age 60 unless he or she resigns earlier. Removal 
from office was possible only by a vote in parliament supported by no less than 
two thirds of the members.
Following an audit report of government operations that heavily criticised 
government and of a number of cabinet ministers in 1994/5, the then appointee 
was controversially removed and the appointment provisions in the constitution 
amended. The term of office was reduced to three years with right of renewable 
reappointment with cabinet becoming the effective appointment authority. The 
change was strongly opposed but government had the necessary two-thirds 
majority to amend the constitution.
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Two of the cabinet ministers cited in the Controller and Chief Officer’s report 
were later convicted of the assassination of one of their ministerial colleagues. 
But unprotected from political control and influence, the office of Controller and 
Chief Auditor has become just another office of government, answerable directly 
to cabinet.
Parliamentary Term Extended
Without reference to the electorate, the parliamentary term of office was 
extended from 3 to 5 years. The change was made retrospectively and adopted 
by parliament in spite of widespread opposition. 
Cabinet Enlarged From Eight to Thirteen Members
Samoa’s constitution had set the size of cabinet at eight members. This was 
extended to thirteen. 
Appointment of Under-Secretaries
After the 1991 general elections, the office of Parliamentary Under-Secretary was 
created. The move was an important part of government’s expanding patronage 
system. It would help to consolidate support for the party in office which would 
now become a magnet for office seekers. Ten years later, the Under-Secretary 
post was upgraded to that of Associate Minister. It meant among other things 
that government was left with no backbenchers as all party members became 
either cabinet ministers or associate ministers.
Ministerial Committee System
Another part of the patronage system, a ministerial committee system that 
allowed government members of parliament to reward political supporters 
through membership of committees was put in place. Committee members 
were in most cases persons of influence in the village ruling hierarchies. Use of 
village authorities to control and even subvert the political process is a strong 
feature of Samoan politics. Village authorities are amongst the main beneficiaries 
of government’s patronage system and strongly support government as well. 
Ministerial committee members are paid from public funds.
Control of the Public Service
The Special Posts Act 1996 placed the position of heads of government ministries 
under three year long contracts, renewable on reselection. More significantly, 
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cabinet became the effective appointing authority. The constitutional position 
of the Public Service Commission as the appointing authority and as a buffer 
between the political process and public servants was accordingly changed. 
Subsequently, the public service was placed under direct political control with 
serious implications for its neutrality and professionalism. In fact, it too became 
an extension of government’s patronage system.
Political Party Rules
During successive HRPP terms in government, party political rules were 
progressively introduced or amended to regulate the formation and operation 
of political parties. While such regulation was necessary, cabinet and the 
ruling party unfortunately had control of the process and therefore determined 
the outcome. The result is a system that today openly violates fundamental 
democratic principles of parliament and the rights of members. Political order 
and stability was given as the justification for these often overly restrictive 
measures, but this was at a time when the ruling party was entrenched in power 
commanding two thirds majorities no less. 
The arbitrary and partisan nature of the system was demonstrated most 
recently when the newly formed opposition Tautua party was excluded from 
parliament in spite of it winning two by-elections. Earlier on when prevented 
from registering in parliament as a political party, the Tautua party registered 
instead as an incorporated society in the Companies Registry office using the 
freedom of association provision of Samoa’s constitution. The constitutional 
freedom of association provision has since been amended to specifically exclude 
organisations with political aims.
Electoral Process
Samoa’s electoral process is directly under cabinet control. As a result, it is 
the subject of frequent change, often politically motivated in response to the 
electoral needs of government. An office of the Electoral Commissioner exists. 
But like other agencies of the state with a part to play in the political process, 
it too is directly under the control of cabinet. The agency’s main functions are 
to organise the holding of elections. It has no capacity to act independently of 
political direction with all substantive matters relating to the electoral system 
remaining under cabinet control. 
Understandably, Samoa has a highly politicised electoral system that combines 
a mishmash of democratic and customary values and practices. In recent years 
– and to accommodate the wishes of the pro-government politically influential 
village leaders – customary value systems and practices have been brought back 
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into the system. The result has been loss of clarity and integrity and persistent 
conflict between traditional values and practices and democratic values and 
practices. 
The Budget System
The budget system has not escaped the reach of cabinet controlling power. 
Changes made recently in the Unauthorised Expenditure provision take control 
of public finance further away from parliament. 
Un-parliamentary Parliament
With government holding large parliamentary majorities in parliament, 
Samoa’s parliamentary system is directly subservient to executive control 
and machinations. Partisan interests and continuity in office become the 
primary motivations and are reflected in the grossly undemocratic approach to 
parliament’s committee system, to the right of members to speak in debate, to 
the rules and standing orders, and to the timing and frequency of parliament 
sittings. 
In 2004, the Inter-Parliamentary Union conducted an inquiry into the running 
of Samoa’s parliament in response to request from the opposition groups. The 
inquiry confirmed the un-parliamentary character of Samoa’s parliament, 
but it had no power to change anything and the situation has remained the 
same. Samoa’s parliament is in effect not much more than a rubber stamp and a 
convenient tool for the party in power.
Other Contributing Factors
Control of Public Media
Control of information inevitably goes hand in hand with undemocratic 
governments and the situation in Samoa’s one party state is no exception. And 
control of information has been relatively easy to effect because government 
traditionally must play a prominent part in information dissemination. This is 
especially true of the more costly television and radio services. Until recently, 
government owned and controlled Samoa’s only television and radio services, 
together with a well established print media information network. 
Direct control of these services has given government in Samoa considerable 
ability to control and manipulate information for public consumption. Television 
5. One Party State: The Samoan Experience
75
and radio in particular play a large part in information dissemination because 
of the underdeveloped state of the print media. Yet, until state television was 
privatised two years ago, opposition groups were barred access to these services. 
The ban remained in effect in spite of a successful legal challenge against it. 
Access to radio broadcasts of parliamentary debate is a primary source of 
information for 70 per cent of the electorate for example. It provides both 
entertainment and valuable learning about government and about the political 
process. By carefully managing this process, government has been able to control 
public opinion and political allegiance especially in the less informed and less 
knowledgeable rural electorates.
Control of the Private Media
Samoa’s private media has also been the target of control and manipulation. 
Samoa has several pieces of media related legislation enacted to control media 
freedom including access to public funds to pay court costs when public 
officials take the media to court for defamation of character for instance. The 
latter provision has been used on several occasions with telling effect on the 
ability of the media to defend itself in court. 
Government’s heavy handed approach to media control in the past has in fact 
turned the Editor of the leading Samoan daily newspaper, the Samoa Observer, 
into a media celebrity with several international media freedom awards to his 
credit as a result.
In recent years, the approach has been more subtle with the staff of the 
Government Information Service taking leadership positions in the national 
journalists’ organisation itself. One outcome of that were the prime minister 
and deputy prime minister receiving the organisation’s ‘press freedom persons 
of the year’ award. Financial and other support to media outlets sympathetic to 
government has also been part of the plan. 
Faa-Samoa versus Democratic Government
As in most Pacific states, Samoa had its own system of political and social 
organisation, Faa-Samoa, the Samoan way, which continues to serve as Samoa’s 
local government system. As a system of government, Faa-Samoa is in most 
respects diametrically opposite to the values and principles and practices of 
democratic government.
Unfortunately, little has been done in the intervening years to bring Faa-
Samoa, at least at local government level, more into line with the democratic 
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requirements of Samoa’s modern state. If anything, the reverse has occurred 
with village authorities being accorded new powers to influence the outcome 
of voting.
Village authorities are among the main beneficiaries of government’s patronage 
system, and giving them more say and influence in the electoral system 
effectively skewers the results in favour of government. According to the prime 
minister, HRPP owes much of its longevity in office to the support of Samoa’s 
village government leaders.
Conclusion
In Samoa’s general elections of March 2011, the present HRPP government was 
returned with yet another overwhelming large number of parliamentary seats. 
The party has been in power continuously for going on to thirty years. That is 
an unusually long period of time to hold power in a functioning democracy.
Samoa cannot be considered as such a functioning democracy. This longevity in 
power is but the sign of a democracy that is in crisis – as this sketch shows. It is 
the sign of a system where an unprecedented level of power is now accumulated 
in the executive through a sustained re-engineering of Samoa’s constitution and 
government systems during the long period of HRPP rule. That power has in 
turn been put to use to retain office and to perpetuate one political party in 
government at great cost to the integrity of Samoa’s democratic system.
It is too early to say how the system will evolve from here, but the implications 
for Samoa of it becoming a one party status are becoming more apparent. Power 
corrupts and the effect on the current leadership of almost thirty years in office 
is beginning to show. And however the political situation develops after the  
2011 elections, Samoa needs to return to democratic government sooner rather 
than later. But that will require a systematic dismantling of the one party state 
power structure that exists at present, and a return to the democratic principles 
and values that underpinned the nation’s constitution. It will also require a 
change in leadership which appears unlikely at present.
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6. Instability and Stability in New 
Caledonia
Jean-Yves Faberon
Instabilité et stabilité en Nouvelle-Calédonie
Le préambule de l’Accord de Nouméa pose un principe de consensus par 
le biais du partage: «Le passé a été le temps de la colonisation. Le présent 
est le temps du partage, par le rééquilibrage. L’avenir doit être le temps de 
l’identité, dans un destin commun ». Si cette déclaration fut approuvée 
par les électeurs de Nouvelle-Calédonie au scrutin de novembre 1998 
avec une majorité de 72%, le chemin vers ce résultat commun a été 
long. Ce chapitre retrace l’histoire politique de la Nouvelle-Calédonie 
depuis 1853, dont le point culminant est l’Accord de Nouméa. Celui-ci, 
prenant en compte le passé colonial, rejette l’hypothèse selon laquelle 
l’indépendance pourrait intervenir brutalement et met en œuvre un 
calendrier de partage progressif des compétences en Nouvelle-Calédonie 
sur une durée de plus de 20 ans.
The preamble to the Noumea Agreement establishes a principle, namely 
consensus through sharing: ‘The past was colonisation time. The present is the 
time for sharing and reaching a new balance. The future must be the time for an 
identity, in a common destiny.’
This statement, which is shot through with the spirit of sharing, was approved 
by voters in New Caledonia in the November 1998 election, with a 72 per cent 
majority. But the road to this common result has been a long one.
Even before the French landed in New Caledonia, Kanaks were far from being 
united. Their languages and their customs were different depending upon the 
area, and for that matter, their ‘warrior traditions’ are referred to in the Noumea 
Agreement.
With the arrival of the French, starting on 24 September 1853, the colonisation 
period started. It shook up the foundations of Kanak society and from a legal 
standpoint, it lasted over one century. That period was characterised by a very 
serious rift: the colonial society on the one hand and the indigenous society 
on the other hand, and they were totally separated, despite some individual 
exceptions.
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With the IVth Republic, the new Constitution, in 1946, put an end to the 
colonial Empire, and the French Union was substituted for the colonial Empire. 
The Constitution’s preamble abolished colonisation: ‘France forgoes any colonial 
system based upon arbitrariness, France guarantees to all equal access to public 
employment and to the individual or collective exercise of rights and liberties.’ 
It was not until 1956 that the Defferre law on the future of overseas territories 
actually implemented the new constitutional provision, and New Caledonia got 
a new status, through the July 1957 specific executive order. 
The year 1953 saw the advent of a unique political organisation advocating a 
consensual New Caledonia— the Union Calédonienne. The Union Calédonienne’s 
motto was: ‘Two colors, one people’. With the 1957 status, this party gave New 
Caledonia its first Vice-President of the government council. He was a member 
of Parliament.
This consensus resoundingly translated into overwhelming support for the new 
French regime, the Vth Republic. General de Gaulle initiated a referendum vote 
on the new Constitution in September 1958, and the question was whether voters 
would choose to remain within the French Republic. Now, in New Caledonia at 
the time, there were more Kanaks than whites, and universal suffrage showed a 
98 per cent yes vote. 
General De Gaulle’s government hardly showed any gratitude to New Caledonia 
for that almost unanimous vote. The government in Paris chipped away at New 
Caledonia’s self-rule. The State advanced through the 1963 and 1965 Jacquinot 
laws and the 1969 Billotte laws. One of the Billotte laws dealt with mining 
regulations, and, precisely, 1969 was the start of a so-called ‘Nickel boom’, which 
lasted until 1972. That was an exhilarating growth period for New Caledonia’s 
nickel resources. This unprecedented development operated across the board 
and impacted all the islands’ activities; it attracted numerous groups of people 
from the motherland and from overseas territories. As a result, Kanaks were 
now a minority in their own land. They did not reap any profit from the new 
economic situation. Their country was a source of riches… except for them!
That period clearly coincides with the emergence of the breakaway movement. 
In 1969, the ‘Red Scarves’ were created by Nidoïsh Naisseline, the first Kanak to 
hold a college degree, and in 1971, Elie Poigoune created the ‘1978 Group’. As a 
result, in 1973, whites walked out of the Union Calédonienne party. In 1977, the 
Union Calédonienne joined the breakaway movement. The buzzword at the time 
was IKS, which means Kanak and Socialist Independence. It created an obstacle 
to consensus and to the communities’ union. The Union Calédonienne’s motto, 
‘one single people’, effectively became obsolete.
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In September 1975, Jean-Marie Tjibaou, dealing more with the cultural than 
with the political ground, set up the ‘Melanesia 2000’ festival. This was to be 
followed by a more general festival called ‘Caledonia 2000’, dealing with the 
whole range of cultures present in New Caledonia. But the time was not ripe for 
it; the second festival never took place.
From then on, political forces started to line up for battle and not for the 
compact. Jacques Lafleur created the RPCR in 1978 under Tjibaou’s presidency. 
Each of the two groups had its charismatic leader and was in battle order. The 
face-off did take place, and the 1980s were the painful and bloody decade: from 
the assassination of Pierre Declercq, the Union Calédonienne’s Secretary General 
in September 1981, through the 21 deaths at the Ouvea cave in May 1988, to 
Tjibaou’s assassination in 1989.
The 1980s, however, experienced a positive happening, an opportunity to 
work and be together, and that was the Nainville-les-Roches round table. In 
July 1983, amidst the conflict, Georges Lemoine, Under Secretary for Overseas 
Territories, a man who valued dialogue, brought together in Nainville-les-Roches 
representatives of various New Caledonia political attitudes, some seeking 
independence, such as Tjibaou, and some opposed to independence, such as 
Jacques Lafleur, along with representatives from the FNSC, the Federation for 
a new New Caledonian Society, who advocated a middle road. The meeting also 
included a representative of customary institutions. 
The upshot of that meeting was a brief document containing the gist of the 
Noumea Accord! A few examples are:
•	 ‘Definitely confirm that colonialism is dead…’
•	 ‘Respect for all ethnic groups’.
•	 ‘The necessity for a specific document with potential for adjustment to new 
situations…’
The RPCR, eventually, refrained from signing the statement… and this refusal 
led straight to what history has elected to call New Caledonia ‘events’.
During those years, there was bloodshed in New Caledonia. On 24 September 
1984, the Front Indépendantiste became the FLNKS, a name that was regarded 
by its opponents as a call to exclusion. The acronym FLNKS, along with the 
creation of a ‘Provisional new government for the Republic’, are clear references 
to the process that took place in Algeria, and which ended in disaster. So, very 
quickly, the situation proved to be a long way from the Nainville-les-Roches 
Declaration.
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The status designed by the peace-loving Mr. Lemoine, dated September 6, 1984, 
was unanimously rejected, as all parties were raring to go, and naturally, tit calls 
for tat.
The French State appointed Edouard Pisani as government representative, as he 
seemed to be the right man for the job, since he was a socialist and formerly a 
long-time Gaullist minister. This political dualism was supposed to allow Pisani 
to create a link between the two political groups in New Caledonia. The plan he 
announced, however, and one he announced in a peremptory way, in January 
1985, was unanimously rejected. Pisani’s failure was as quick as his bursting 
upon the New Caledonian political scene, and not only did he fail to bring 
peace; he had to declare a state of emergency.
The rightist government, coming back into office in Paris in 1986, did not fare 
better in New Caledonia than its predecessor, and for the same reason: it did not 
act as an honest broker.
That led to the Ouvea massacre in April-May 1988.
Yet, there were history-making events. The new French government, under 
Michel Rocard, ultimately took an impartial stand, and wanted to solemnly 
restore peace on that basis. After having a mission called ‘Dialogue Mission’ 
analyze the situation on the field, the Prime Minister brought together Lafleur 
and Tjibaou and had them sign the Matignon Accords. The two partners finally 
agreed to fight for a common cause. And their gamble was a winner! Since 1988, 
New Caledonia has been in peace (even though Tjibaou was assassinated), and 
New Caledonia is on its way to the common destiny.
The genius of the Matignon-Oudinot Accords is that they divided New 
Caledonia into provinces. They succeeded, like a modern sphinx, in answering 
the question which had hitherto been left without an answer: How to allow 
breakaway factions, who are in the minority, to exert some kind of power in 
a majoritarian democracy? The answer consisted in dividing New Caledonia 
into three provinces where the respective majorities are different, so that both 
separatist factions and loyalists could have each a place where they were in the 
majority and where they could exercise power.
The genius of the Noumea Accord, which puts into perspective all the light 
and shadow of the past, lies in a gradual and pluralistic process. It is gradual in 
that it rejects the assumption that independence could occur suddenly, and it 
implements a schedule for power-sharing in New Caledonia spread over 20 years, 
one step at a time, so that at the end of the process, potential independence 
would not be like crossing over an unknown abyss, but only, for the whole 
population, a last step to add to those that had been taken already, and thus it 
would avert clashes and surprises.
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And the agreement is pluralistic in that it decides—and that is an exception 
which is the only one of its kind in the world—that New Caledonia would 
not be governed by a majority government but by a pluralistic government 
including representatives both of the majority and the minority (an ‘opposition’ 
which is in a peculiar situation). At any rate, the government is made up of 
representatives of separatists and loyalists in a sort of ‘mandatory consensus’… 
This is a huge gamble for a model which is totally out of the ordinary, but 
it is working in New Caledonia. New Caledonia is now the place where what 
President N. Sarkozy stated on 22 June 2009 before the French Congress is being 
verified: ‘A democracy where peace has been restored is not a democracy where 
there is general agreement but a democracy where people listen to each other 
and respect each other’.
Does that mean that after 20 peaceful and overall consensual years New 
Caledonia has shaken off its old demons? Of course not. Nobody can assert 
that the Noumea Accord gamble has been won in any definitive way. This 
agreement is a compromise between proponents of antagonistic attitudes as to 
the final relation of the islands to France. It has succeeded in bringing peace and 
spreading the common destiny mystique, which is a huge accomplishment, but 
eventually there remains to be seen (which the agreement does not do) whether 
this common destiny will be within or without France—although, of course, one 
can still hope for a solution in between, with France. Disagreements are certain 
to appear again, as in the issue of the definition of the Electorate or that of 
transfers of powers. People must be aware that when they base their action on a 
compromise basic document, which is inevitably ambiguous, disagreements are 
likely and natural. It is always important to face the problems, since by referring 
to disagreements with a sincere heart, we can make the Accord live on. For, in 
the final analysis, beyond pluralism and gradualism, beyond the fair memory of 
the colonial period that we mentioned, beyond the notions of citizenship and 
power transfer which undeniably make up the spirit of the agreement, what is 
the Noumea Accord? What gives the key to each of those components is respect 
for others, tolerance, the will for dialogue, and loyalty; this is the vital force of 
the Noumea Accord. Now these are components of human nature, and victory 
is never final on the dark side of human nature. Human nature is also made up 
of intolerance and the will to power. For this reason, there is no guarantee for 
success for the Noumea Accord. There simply is none.
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7. Democracy in French Polynesia
Sémir Al Wardi
La démocratie en Polynésie française
La Polynésie est une « collectivité d’outre-mer » au sein de la République 
française. Sa culture politique présente des différences considérables par 
rapport à celle de la République et l’instabilité politique est l’une de ses 
caractéristiques principales. En effet, une « collectivité d’outre-mer » est 
une collectivité « spéciale » surtout parce que, contrairement aux autres 
collectivités, les lois de la République ne s’y appliquent que rarement, 
et ce selon le principe de la spécialité législative  : par-dessus tout, 
ce territoire a le droit à l’indépendance. Par conséquent, puisque les 
anciennes colonies peuvent se séparer de la métropole, la vie politique 
tourne autour de ce droit à l’indépendance, ce qui inévitablement affecte 
leurs relations avec la métropole. Ainsi, cette vie politique est marquée 
par une division entre les indépendantistes et les autonomistes, même 
si cette division peut changer. La faiblesse idéologique et le nomadisme 
politique engendrent également l’instabilité politique. En outre, il 
semblerait que les concepts modernes du pouvoir, les relations entre les 
compétences nationales et les compétences locales, ne soient pas compris 
au sein de la société locale, qui semble elle-même assez réticente quand il 
s’agit d’adopter l’institutionnalisation.
Introduction
Polynesia is an ‘overseas community’ within the French Republic. French 
Polynesian political culture differs considerably from that of the Republic and 
political instability is one of its major characteristics. Indeed, an ‘overseas 
community’ is a ‘special’ community essentially because, unlike the other 
communities, the laws of the Republic apply to it only rarely, according to 
the principle of legislative speciality;1 above all this territory has the right to 
independence. Therefore since former colonies can break away, political life 
revolves around this right to independence, which inevitably affects its relations 
with France. So, political life divides between separatists and autonomists even 
1 Due to this long-established principle, the laws are not fully applicable in former overseas territories. The 
law must expressly mention its applicability to a specified territory. As a consequence, overseas territories 
often become, as Yves Pimont says, ‘the forgotten people of healthy reforms’. Worse, the practice of autonomy, 
in certain cases, even represents a regression compared to metropolitan France.
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if this divide can change. Ideological weakness and political nomadism also 
engender political instability. It would also seem that modern concepts of power, 
relations between national and local powers, are not understood within the local 
society, which itself seems to be rather reluctant to embrace institutionalisation. 
Polynesia is a Special ‘Overseas Community’ 
within the Republic
The involvement of French colonies in national liberation, at the end of the 
Second World War, led to a new approach to overseas French dependencies in 
France. From then on, after 1946, there were ‘French overseas departments’ 
and ‘French overseas territories’, and no longer ‘French colonies’. The words 
‘colonies’ and even ‘empire’ were then abandoned forever. This abandonment 
signified also, the erasure of the reality those very words illustrated, as was the 
hope of L S Senghor (JORF, Assemblée Nationale Constituante, session of 11 
avril 1946: 1729). The change from colony to territorial communities indicates 
that they fall within the purview of territorial communities, which stipulates 
that they are administered by elected councils.
‘Overseas territories’ from this time on consist of citizens and no longer of 
subjects. It was then that political life came into being in these territories. The 
minimum bottom line to any democracy, namely democratic representation (the 
Parliament and/or the executive represents the People and makes decisions on 
their behalf), the guarantee of public and individual liberties and the presence 
of one or several oppositions, is real in French Polynesia. The assembly is elected 
by direct universal suffrage and it is from this assembly that the executive 
members are chosen. Elections take place according to the rules of the Republic, 
the oppositions are represented (Tavini/Tahoeraa), and liberties guaranteed 
normally by the courts. 
The Right to Independence
Former colonies, and overseas territories, can become independent by 
invoking Article 53 of the French Constitution.2 It is first necessary to consult 
the populations involved, then to ask the French Parliament to pass a law 
authorising the secession. In constitutional terms, overseas territories, today 
‘overseas communities’, have enjoyed, as did colonies, ‘a permanent right to 
2 In its decision of 30 December 1975 relative to the Comoros affair, the Constitutional Council states that the 
provisions of Article 53, ‘should be interpreted as being applicable not only if France were to cede a territory 
to a foreign State or should acquire one from it, but also should a territory cease to belong to the Republic and 
constitute an independent State or be attached to one’.
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independence’ (Maestre and Miclo 1987: 1281). The Republic cannot therefore 
unilaterally declare an ‘overseas community’ independent. It has the power to 
decide on and to organise a referendum and even to choose its reading of the 
referendum (archipelago by archipelago or country-wide reading of the results), 
only the concerned populations can express their will to leave the Republic 
or not. The example of Mayotte has demonstrated that if the State wishes to 
disengage, but the population opposes it, then the territory remains French. 
On the other hand, if the population, after local elections, expresses a wish for 
emancipation, then it would seem that France would not oppose it. In other 
words, the former colonies have the possibility of becoming emancipated. 
The Pro-autonomy and Pro-independence Divide
Since they can become emancipated from France, this is becoming a real 
‘obsession’ for French Polynesian politicians. The constant possibility of 
separating from France has several consequences, the most important of which 
is to make political elites take sides on the matter of French presence: within 
(and in which ways) or without France (and again, in which ways); autonomy 
or independence. The Left/Right political divide does not exist in French 
Polynesia, only the line between pro-autonomy and pro-independence.
Originally structured around supporters of direct administration by France 
and proponents of internal autonomy (often labelled independents at the time), 
in the 1980s this division became a division between pro-autonomy and pro-
independence. The French Polynesian political universe is built on this issue. 
The political game revolves around French presence and the various territorial, 
or even national, elections are occasions for political parties to proclaim their 
position relative to the French presence issue. It seems that these are the only 
two categories in the French Polynesian political field, and the only ones driving 
ideological confrontations. Yet, the line can be blurred in everyday reality: 
politicians or voters can swing from one side to the other and back again, and 
make the divide considerably fuzzier. Even beyond the independence issue, it 
is the relationship of French Polynesia with France which dominates political 
thinking.
Unlike what happens in other territories of the French Republic, French 
Polynesian politicians do not look to the national issues for inspiration. Their 
indifference to national or ‘metropolitan’ politics does not mean that they 
are apolitical but rather that they focus on the local scene, the only one that 
matters. Therefore, political parties from the French mainland very seldom have 
a Polynesian extension.
This possibility of emancipation thus triggers a kind of statutory outbidding 
which has never known any rest since French Polynesians really started 
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participating in political life. Gaston Flosse (2001) said that ‘any institutional 
marking time would bring about, if applied, the death of our autonomy’. 
French Polynesia has statutes of 1957, 1977, 1984, 1996 and 2004, not counting 
the amendments of 1991 and 2007 and the major aborted reform of ‘overseas 
countries’ in 2000. 
One People, One Nation?
France recognises in its Constitution only one people and a single nation. 
Now, the French Polynesians consider that they are a different people from the 
French. This feeling strengthened with the granting of autonomy and especially 
its political symbols. These have been authorised since 1984, namely a flag, a 
seal, a hymn (Ia Ora o’ Tahiti Nui), an Order of Tahiti (the decorations and titles 
resembling the French Legion of Honour), a protocol and a territorial holiday. 
Symbolic strength can be added by words such as ‘country’, ‘Tahiti Nui’, ‘love 
of our people’ and ‘love of our country’ commonly used in speeches… In fact, 
the French State is called ‘hau farani’ (French power) and French Polynesia ‘hau 
fenua’ (power of the country). The State is considered, from that time on, as an 
exogenous and temporary entity. 
It is thus the strengthening of national feeling in French Polynesia which has 
characterised these last twenty years: autonomy and statutory outbidding have 
strengthened Tahitian nationalism, with the help of political symbols.
Political Instability
According to the Tahitian Academy, the Tahitian word for ‘democracy’ is 
‘Hau Manahune’ (literally ‘the power of the people’). Maco Tevane (2004), the 
president of the above-mentioned academy specified that “people should be 
understood as ‘common people’ (manahune) and that they were to be taken 
into account in the political system through its access to benefits”. The ‘ona’ 
(the leaders) had to give some benefits to them.’ It is this ‘gift and counter-gift’, 
a phrase beloved of anthropologists, which is perhaps at the origin of political 
patronage. Instability has always existed in Polynesia since the beginning of the 
political life in 1945. The only exception to this applies to the period 1996-2004, 
which was marked by a drift towards authoritarianism, with the complicity of 
the French state. 
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Ballots Full of Surprises 
Electoral results do not always reveal the new holder of power. Last minute 
alliances and political nomadism can result, as in 2008, in the loser winning, 
because in fact he became president of French Polynesia with the lowest score. 
In another scenario the one who wins the elections has no guarantee of holding 
power till the end of his/her mandate: examples are legion also in the Cook 
Islands, in Vanuatu, in the Papua New Guinea, in Solomon Islands, etc. In all 
these islands, elections do not represent a key moment in democratic life but 
simply one moment among others. We invest a lot of energy in elections, but 
immediately after the elections have taken place, the various political parties of 
the opposition constantly look for ‘nomads’ so as to take back power. In brief, a 
party which wins the elections can lose power in the days or the months which 
follow. The political fight does not become diminished after an election and 
patience, one of the conditions of democracy, does not exist. 
Certainly, the proportional voting system has facilitated this instability following 
the example of the 4th Republic in France. Since 2004, for example, we have had 
nine presidents of French Polynesia, from two territorial elections, that is an 
average time in power of about eight months. But, as René Rémond (1991: 392) 
recalls, under the 4th Republic, ‘the same group of men continuously exercises 
power’. It is the same in French Polynesia with the alternations since 2004. It 
is the same elected representatives who succeed one another, either alternately 
or together.
Is it necessary then to simply change the voting system to obtain stability? 
No, answers Georges Vedel in his Report on governmental instability in 1956 in 
France. It would only be one palliative among others ‘completely powerless to 
fundamentally change things’ (Chevallier 2001: 713).
The proposal, constantly renewed by French Polynesian politicians, to elect 
the president of French Polynesia by a direct universal suffrage system (Jean-
Baptiste Céran Jérusalémy, Gaston Flosse from 1985, Jean Juventin, Gaston Tong 
Sang) is not a solution. It would change nothing as in terms of instability: a 
representative elected in a direct universal suffrage system would only be able 
to be censured with difficulty by a local assembly, making it necessary, from 
then on, to set up a real Prime Minister who would represent the majority of the 
aforementioned assembly. The risk of ‘cohabitation’ is real and the problem is 
only moved to one side.
Ideological Weakness and Nomadism
Ideological weakness, marked by an economic and social policy common to 
the various independent or separatist political parties, facilitates political 
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nomadism. Politicians or the electorate can cross from one side to another one 
and conversely and so considerably blur the divide. French Polynesian elected 
representatives have often considered that they were free to use their mandate 
and so to join with any political party after their election. In other words, French 
Polynesian political culture gives a relative autonomy to elected representatives 
to negotiate their membership of a party according to their interests and 
especially to those of their electorate. Alliances even ‘against nature’ can exist. 
It is mostly a question of being the closest to public resources to redistribute to 
one’s electorate or even to reactivate political patronage networks. This political 
nomadism has brought with it a chronic political instability since the beginning 
of political life in French Polynesia, with the exception of the period 1996 - 
2004.
An Emotive Relationship
Democracy is not questioned as such in French Polynesia. Non-violent political 
instability, which is, let us recall, the hallmark of democracy, is explained by 
ideological weakness, political nomadism, the voting system and patronage. 
This latter is aggravated by the gaining of more and more power within the 
framework of the autonomy: it is this which has provided considerable power 
to redistribute public resources. 
But this is possible only because its relationship to power remains personal 
even emotive. Can we say that French Polynesia, following the example of the 
Antilles, ‘is the theatre of a persistent conflict – raised in particular by Aimé 
Césaire – between rational culture, the foundation of modernity, and emotional 
culture inherited from past…’? (Michalon 2006: 442). It seems indeed that it 
is an emotive relationship which wins the support of French Polynesians: it 
is enough to see the difference in the results during the elections between the 
metua (the guide) and any political fellow party member. Rudy Bambridge 
(1975), an influential French Polynesian politician, specified to the Secretary of 
State for French Overseas Departments and Territories, in 1975, that ‘in French 
Polynesia more than elsewhere, politics is based on ‘the affection’ that the people 
have for their leaders. They are a sentimental people.’
It is also what explains the undoubted weight of mayors in the compiling of 
lists for territorial elections: every mayor, supposedly popular because he is one 
of those responsible for the redistribution of public resources, must be able to 
bring with him a certain number of votes for the person who heads the list who, 
once elected, will in his turn redistribute benefactions to the municipalities. 
The fundamental consequence of this is the lack of institutionalisation. As 
emphasised by Max Weber in terms of legal and rational domination, this mode 
of domination which characterises western democracies leads to the prevention 
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of power being exercised ‘as personal privilege’ (Braud 1985: 386). The leaders 
and their administrative departments are subject to the law and the citizens are 
treated in the same way whatever their affiliation. It is this equality of all in the 
eyes of the law which is ‘central to the new society’ (Michalon, in preparation). 
It is even the pivot of the republican values. However, the emotional link 
which allows one to acquire a good, even a symbolic one, thanks to personal 
relationships is in opposition to this equality upon which the State is built. It is 
the person who is important, not his/her function.
In French Polynesia, the relationship of power is based on this relationship of 
patronage and on personal exchange. This also explains that the electorate can 
follow a political leader even if he changes camp several times: it is not a question 
of things being decided rationally on questions of autonomy or independence, 
but often just with regard to a person’s charisma. 
For example, the mayor (Tavana) asks his population to vote for a specific 
candidate in Presidential elections. The population follows the mayor even if 
he is not logical, even if the mayor changes sides without explanation every 
election:3
Table 3: First Round of Presidential Election in Papeete
Year Election of Mayor
Score of socialist 
candidates
Score of conservative 
candidates
1974 F. Mitterrand F. Mitterrand 45 .26%
V. Giscard d’Estaing  30 .37%
J. Chaban Delmas     20 .58%
1981 V. Giscard d’Estaing F. Mitterrand 6 .92%
V. Giscard d’Estaing  64 .05%
J . Chirac                         24 .26%
1988 F. Mitterrand F. Mitterrand 52 .40%
J . Chirac                       30 .54%
R . Barre                        10 .73%
1995 E. Balladur L. Jospin 12 .69%
E. Balladur                    33 .41%
J . Chirac                       44 .02%
2002 J . Chirac L. Jospin 28 .70%
J . Chirac                       57 .28%
F. Bayrou                        1 .21%
2007 N. Sarkozy S. Royal 39 .47%
N. Sarkozy                   46 .22%
F. Bayrou                       8 .24%
3 Tables from Jean-Marc Regnault, to appear in « L’hommage à Paul de Deckker ».
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Table 4: Second Round of Presidential Election in Mahina
Year Election of Mayor
Score of socialist 
candidates
Score of conservative 
candidates
1974 F. Mitterrand F. Mitterrand 52 .39%
V. Giscard d’Estaing 25 .84%
J. Chaban Delmas 17 .54%
1981 V. Giscard d’Estaing F. Mitterrand 13 .92%
V. Giscard d’Estaing 57 .66%
J . Chirac 21 .14%
1988 F. Mitterrand F. Mitterrand 58 .84%
J . Chirac 24 .38%
R . Barre 9 .25%
1995 J . Chirac L. Jospin 13 .99%
E. Balladur 22 .40%
J . Chirac 52 .17%
2002 L. Jospin L. Jospin 40 .07%
J . Chirac 45 .52%
F. Bayrou 1 .07%
2007 N. Sarkozy tS. Royal 37 .83%
N. Sarkozy 44 .92%
F. Bayrou 9 .82%
Nomadism is then possible because the divide really has no more meaning. 
Can we advance the hypothesis according to which only a referendum on 
self-determination would oblige French Polynesians to depersonalise political 
concepts? It is not sure, because emotive relations can take over again and the 
risk can be that the vote is determined with regard to a leader rather than a 
policy. 
Close family and kin ties which we find in French Polynesia and on the other 
islands of the Pacific, is a serious handicap which hampers social relations. 
Thierry Michalon (in preparation) notes that for overseas French: ‘the request for 
and the granting of privileges are considered as the normal and legitimate mode 
of relations with the administration, especially if it is concerns decentralized 
communities, administered by local elected representatives to whom everyone 
has affective links’. Once again, French Polynesians do not recognise institutions, 
but rather recognise people. 
Furthermore, this lack of institutionalisation is often due to politicians who 
draw benefit from it. There would be thus an interest in maintaining this 
‘emotional’ perception of politicians considered as suppliers of services, 
mostly in a private capacity. In other words, if this perception of power based 
on emotional links been a part of the Polynesian political culture, the elected 
representatives are going to maintain this relationship and encourage it so as to 
prevent the emergence of institutionalisation, for their own electoral benefit. 
We can again formulate the hypothesis that it is this emotive approach which 
limits the impact of convictions or gaol sentences: a convicted politician can 
always pursue his career either by being elected, or even recruited by those in 
power. A court decision does not seem to have same impact in a society based 
on personal exchange.
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Looting Public Resources?
Ideological weakness is also explained by a different vision of what constitutes 
the ‘common good’: it is a question of monopolising public resources for one’s 
clan, one’s group, one’s party. One threatens to leave the government coalition 
if the rewards are not considered sufficient. Thierry Michalon (in preparation) 
explains that ‘For these cultures, public institutions are not the place where 
decisions of general interest are taken and where public utilities are managed, 
but an unsupervised deposit of wealth to be divided up within the traditional 
networks of mutual assistance’. Power becomes, according to him, ‘something 
edible’.
The people who French Polynesians call ‘Islanders’ (elected from outlying 
archipelagos), have these last few years beaten all records for political allegiance-
switching and often broken political majorities, because of ‘an insatiable 
appetite’ for the public resources. President Oscar Temaru accuses them: ‘I think 
that there are people who are here for their own personal interest, people there 
whom we know very well in this country, because they have a business on an 
island, because their wife is in such and such business, because they want to 
be a Minister of this or that or would like to become mayor’ (Les Nouvelles, 13 
October 2009). Moreover, elected representatives have a particular perception 
of ministries: there are ‘technical’ ministries and others which are ‘political’. 
It is necessary to understand by ‘political ministries’, those which allow the 
establishment of a relationship of patronage and so to spread the linkages 
over the whole territory. And this is brokered in broad daylight, so that the 
various political groups, at the time of a governmental coalition, fight over 
these portfolios. The M.P. Bruno Sandras recognised, for example, regarding a 
Minister of Postal Services and Sports, that he has an interesting position: ‘He 
has a comfortable portfolio which allows him to play politics for his party…’ 
(Les Nouvelles, 27 January 2006).
Furthermore, there is a socio-economic dimension to power: this latter, thanks 
to the transfers from the State and to delegated powers, is an inescapable element 
in the economic and social game. It is this, for example, which distributes 
jobs, subsidies, diverse authorisations and work to companies: this dominant 
position has led to what the public prosecutor in Polynesia has called ‘a pact of 
corruption’.
Several Theoretical Approaches
Three theories attract our attention: ‘consensual’ democracy, the lack of a 
‘Republic’ and the organised chaos.
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‘Consensual’ Democracy
This is the theory advanced by Professor Boumakani (2008: 499 ff.) – Faculty of 
Law, Brazzaville – according to which, democracy should be consensual in more 
‘traditional’ states and territories. All the decisions are taken in common by 
consensus. Nevertheless, we can advance that on one hand, political nomadism 
reduces this possibility and on the other hand, pre-European French Polynesia 
has never known consensus but was rather a violent society, constantly at 
war. Furthermore, democracy cannot be consensual because it supposes an 
opposition of expectations.
The Lack of a Republic
This is a constant subject: the lack of a ‘political philosophy’ to support 
democracy. Jean-Marc Regnault underlines that from the beginning of political 
life, ‘the leaders of the RDPT (the Pouvana’a party) are little prepared for the 
management of public affairs and have thought little about democratic practices’ 
(Tahiti Pacifique Magazine, October 2009, n°222: 36). Since French Polynesian 
political culture formed only at that time, in the 1950s, quite recently, thinking 
on this topic has not evolved very much. From then on, the new President of the 
Territorial Assembly, in 1953, Jean-Baptiste Céran-Jérusalémy ‘tried to control 
everything to muzzle the opposition’ (ibid.). Much later, former Minister of 
Finance Patrick Peaucellier also noted that Gaston Flosse had, in the 1990s, 
‘acted in such a way that the opposition was essentially abolished’ (Tahiti 
Business n°25, September 2004).
Has there been a misunderstanding of the word ‘democracy’? What is lacking 
is that rather long road towards republican democracy, which derives from the 
theory of a Social Contract, to consolidate the rights of the individual within the 
group or the clan, to impose human rights, and so to create a citizen detached 
from his affiliations (religious, geographical, ethnic, family, clan), to assert 
the love of equality and finally, with Raymond Aron, to demonstrate that the 
democracy is not confined only to the political domain but extends to economic 
development and to the protection of individual liberties (Hadas-Lebel 2002: 
217). Liberal democracy, which is our political system, writes Pierre Manent, 
is ‘the fruit of a very long elaboration, a very long distillation, so that it results 
from all our history, prolongs it and contains it. It is the formula discovered with 
difficulty thanks to which we have managed to live together in a more or less 
satisfactory way, us Europeans’ (2007: 17). We can maintain that the concepts 
of ‘modern State’, of ‘Republic’ and ‘democracy’ collide, become confused, in 
determining modern political life. 
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Therefore the problem would not be democracy but the absence of this very 
long process, rather complex, which carried forward this idea and which has, 
beyond the purely technical aspect of elections, forged a real political philosophy 
which has in turn made possible the government of the people.
But, in summary can we really blame the French Polynesians for this absence of 
a democratic philosophy? 
First of all, we can wonder why the French Republic has not or not sufficiently 
introduced its values and principles into French Polynesia. During a session 
in the National Assembly, the majority and the opposition mutually blamed 
each other for having neglected the principles of the Republic in French 
Polynesia (Les Nouvelles de Tahiti, 29 January 2004.). France has not, moreover, 
introduced its values and principles into its colonies. A point common to all 
the overseas territories, in the years after the war, there was a demand for more 
equality and freedom. Philippe Braud (2004: 39) reminds us of the paradox: 
‘While the assertion of the universalist concept of human rights coincides in 
time with European expansion in the rest of the world, it has been nevertheless 
accompanied by extreme violence against native populations’. The absence of a 
real overseas policy, the constant of the Republic, combined with indifference, 
is going to keep these territories in zones without rights.
It even made the practice of democracy rather vague: Céran-Jérusalémy and the 
other French Polynesian politicians ask why France, while asserting democratic 
principles, arrested Pouvanaa a Oopa who voted ‘NO’, instead of ‘YES’, in 
the referendum of 1958, encouraged demonstrations against some leaders and 
prohibited them against others, and later, closed its eyes on that ‘famous pact of 
corruption’ of Gaston Flosse?
But, we can add also that the French Polynesians did not wish to be assimilated 
to the Republic but wanted an intermediate solution which allowed them to 
remain among themselves yet be under the umbrella of France. We can thus 
note collusion, even unconscious, between the State and French Polynesia in 
keeping the territory outside the values and the principles of the Republic.
Besides, this type of analysis obliges us to consider ideal political modernisation 
within a Western-style rationality: little by little, political life has to align itself 
with developments in metropolitan cities. But can we claim that democracy 
in France was and is perfect? That France would represent the cursor, the 
ideal democracy with which overseas territories should align themselves. The 
recentness of the democratic but unstable regimes of the 3rd and 4th Republic, 
the affairs of corruption under 3rd Republic, obliges us to be more modest. So, 
this proposition of the lack of a democratic philosophy remains insufficient.
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The Theory of ‘Organised Chaos’?
This theory draws attention to the mixture of the democratic principles and 
the practices proper to these societies. Political analysts, specialists of Africa, 
noticed that there was in these territories, in fact, an ‘instrumentalisation of 
disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 177). It is a question of introducing democratic 
principles and of melding them again into a logic which fits in with the dominant 
universe of representations: ‘registers are multiple even contradictory, without 
worrying about coherence’ (ibid.: 172). Coherence is beyond us: We pass from 
one register to another according to circumstance. For example, in French 
Polynesia, political speeches in French and in Tahitian are not the same and 
involve different registers. Another example, in New Caledonia, Jean-Marie 
Tjibaou used ‘procedures appropriate to every political and social organization’ 
(Mokaddem 2008: 63). We also use honorifics, as opposed to institutionalisation, 
which imposes the depersonalisation of power, terms such as ‘Big man’, ‘Metua’ 
or even, in Africa, ‘Lion’. 
We also notice that the systematic research of a ‘profit’, and thus for a patronage, 
a reprehensible redistribution in the modern political game, is recognised by 
the whole population. If a dominant party no longer redistributes enough, it 
is replaced without compunction. It is moreover at the announcement of an 
impending fall of government that one of the members of the coalition will 
hammer the table that the government in power ‘is incompetent’ and/or 
‘ineffectual’ in the redistribution of jobs or subsidies. 
Furthermore, can we believe in ‘citizenship’, the foundation of democracy, 
in an essentially communal framework? In other words, community-based 
and patronage-driven systems are diametrically opposed to the logic ‘of 
individual voters making electoral choices according to programs’ (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999: 176). French Polynesian political parties represent the platform 
on which a recognised personality stands, much more than on any ideology-
bearing organisation. A party serves a man, not a program. This follows a logic 
which is not anti-democratic but rather one which follows a different line of 
reasoning. Can we claim, following the example of certain political analysts that 
‘modernisation’ is possible without real ‘westernization’? This, they add, ‘is not 
easy to accept for a lot of people’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 181).
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Conclusion
French Polynesian political life thus follows a logic which is to organise this 
‘disorder’, to instrumentalise it for purposes of legitimisation. French Polynesia 
thus bases its legitimacy on a double approach: democratic legitimacy and 
redistribution of benefits within a personal relationship.
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8. Stability, Security and 
Development in Oceania:  
Whose Definitions? 
Treva D. Braun
Stabilité, sécurité et développement en Oceanie: Quelles définitions?
Avec le Plan Pacifique qui fête son cinquième anniversaire en 2010 et 
les Programmes de Pékin et du Pacifique pour l’égalité des sexes qui 
célèbrent leur quinzième anniversaire, on a une bonne occasion pour 
réexaminer certaines des définitions sous-jacentes qui continuent à 
guider le discours dominant sur le développement et de voir comment 
les approches régionales pourraient être renforcées afin de mieux rendre 
compte des intérêts à la fois des femmes et des hommes du Pacifique. 
Les dimensions clés des questions de développement en matière de 
sexe, telles qu’elles sont exprimées dans les cadres d’égalité existants, 
peuvent et devraient être intégrées dans tous les cadres et stratégies de 
développement dominants, y compris le Plan Pacifique. La période est 
également propice à la création de mécanismes et de processus clairs 
auxquels doivent adhérer les dirigeants au plus haut niveau en vue de 
recadrer le discours national et régional et le système institutionnel de 
façon que des engagements pris il y a longtemps en matière d’égalité 
des sexes puissent commencer à  animer et guider les progrès de la 
stabilité, de la sécurité et du développement dans la région. Cet article 
vise en premier lieu à fournir une réflexion sur les limites du discours 
régional actuel sur ces questions, ensuite à présenter certains aspects de 
la recherche et les données les plus récentes qui sont de la plus haute 
importance pour parvenir à des définitions qui tiennent mieux compte 
de la question des sexes, et troisièmement à recommander un nouveau 
modèle régional avec la mise au point de mécanismes de haut niveau 
acceptés pour appuyer une intégration plus poussée des droits et des 
voix des femmes dans les processus de développement multisectoriels. 
Dans cet article, on fait des comparaisons entre le Plan Pacifique en 
tant que cadre régional principal qui couvre la stabilité, la sécurité et le 
développement, et les Programmes de Pékin et du Pacifique pour l’Action 
en tant que cadres principaux qui traitent des dimensions relevant de 
l’égalité des sexes dans ces mêmes questions. Enfin, cet article présente 
une critique de l’histoire et de la situation actuelle du Plan Pacifique, 
avec des propositions pour le renforcer et le consolider.
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Introduction
Discussions at the most influential levels in the Pacific on stability, security 
and development are still heavily skewed towards traditionalist masculine 
understandings of these terms. High level discussions on development, as 
reflected in their resulting frameworks and resource allocations, focus on economic 
and public service delivery models, and stability and security are understood 
primarily as the absence of public financial and economic uncertainty and public 
or external threats and conflict. While work in those areas is clearly important, 
the longstanding and now incontrovertible knowledge is that no discussion on 
these topics can proceed meaningfully without full attention being paid to more 
expansive definitions, including those grounded in a full understanding of the 
often differing perspectives of women and men.1 ‘Development’ imperatives 
and implications are still, often, significantly different for men and women. 
Similarly, ‘stability’ and ‘security’ have both overlapping and divergent 
meanings for them. Given that women make up half of the population, their 
definitions in these areas should be driving and informing the development of 
relevant frameworks and budgets on a fully equal footing.
The aims of this paper are firstly to provide reflections on the limits of the 
current regional discourse on these topics, secondly to provide some of the latest 
research and data of critical importance to more gender-responsive definitions, 
and thirdly to recommend a new regional paradigm including the development 
of agreed high-level mechanisms to support stronger integration of women’s 
rights and voices into multi-sectoral development processes. The paper makes 
comparisons between the Pacific Plan as the main regional framework covering 
stability, security and development and the Beijing and Pacific Platforms for 
Action as the main policy frameworks addressing the gender dimensions of 
these same issues. A critique of the history and current status of the Pacific 
Plan, with suggestions for strengthening and bolstering it, is presented.
With the Pacific Plan marking its fifth anniversary in 2010 and the Beijing and 
Pacific Platforms for gender equality celebrating their fifteenth anniversary, it 
is a good time to re-evaluate some of the underlying definitions which continue 
to guide mainstream development discourse, and to consider how regional 
approaches might be strengthened to better account for the interests of both 
Pacific Island women and men. 
1 Even women and men are far from being homogenous groups with identical issues and experiences, and 
such categorisations risk the very real limits of essentialism. People’s perspectives vary according to age, 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, rural/urban locale, disability and sexual orientation among others. Even 
within those categories people are diverse. Nonetheless, there are certain widely shared issues that permit 
broad-based gender analysis, and this paper will focus on those.
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The key gender dimensions of development issues, as expressed in existing 
gender equality frameworks, can and should be integrated into all mainstream 
development frameworks and strategies, including the Pacific Plan. The time 
is also ripe for the development of clear mechanisms and processes, to be 
endorsed by leaders at the highest levels, for reframing the national and regional 
discourse and institutional architecture so that long-standing commitments to 
gender equality can begin to systematically inform and guide the advancement 
of stability, security and development in the region. 
Defining Moments
It is vital to the effectiveness of any dialogue or process that those involved 
in it, and those impacted by it, have a common and complete understanding 
of the underlying definitions of the issue under discussion. Many, however, 
are begun without any opportunity for preliminary agreement on terminology. 
Further, discussion topics and their definitions often become presumed truths 
set for a wider group by a smaller and more powerful group, particularly 
where there has been an advance filtering by virtue of an agenda setting 
process. This is certainly the case with discussions on development, stability 
and security, where those setting the agenda, namely those in senior decision-
making positions in government and in bilateral and multi-lateral donor and 
development agencies, are also the ones deciding upon or making assumptions 
about the basic underlying definitions from which all further discussions flow. 
Unless those definitions are accurate and inclusive, the entire dialogue and its 
outcomes can be highly problematic for certain groups.
The Pacific Plan (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2005a) – the main regional framework 
addressing stability, security and development – provides a useful illustration of the 
problems that can arise from incomplete definition-setting processes.2 
The identification of ‘regional priorities’ for the Pacific was the first of many 
definition-setting processes over the course of the Pacific Plan’s development 
from which the voices of Pacific Island women and regional gender equality 
experts were largely excluded. An Eminent Persons Group (EPG),3 appointed 
2 It is not the intention of this paper to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the Pacific Plan, though it 
is clear that the Plan urgently requires revision based on a comprehensive gender and human rights analysis 
to make it responsive to concerns widely expressed by Pacific women’s groups. The Plan’s weaknesses from 
a gender perspective have been the subject of earlier scholarly commentary (Huffer 2006). These and other 
critical inputs have scarcely been taken up to date.
3 The EPG was comprised of Sir Julius Chan (former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea), Bob Cotton 
(former Australia High Commissioner to New Zealand and special envoy to Papua New Guinea), Dr Langi 
Kavaliku (Pro-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific and a former Deputy Prime Minister of 
Tonga), Teburoro Tito (former President of Kiribati), and Maiava Iulai Toma (Samoa Ombudsman and former 
Ambassador to the United Nations).
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to review the Pacific Islands Forum and make recommendations for addressing 
‘key regional issues’, recommended defining the four priorities of the Forum 
as economic growth, sustainable development, governance and security, and 
these subsequently became the four pillars of the Pacific Plan adopted by the 
Pacific Islands Forum Leaders. As such, the Pacific Plan as endorsed provides 
that its objective is to ‘enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable 
development, good governance and security for Pacific countries through 
regionalism.’
While the EPG laudably recommended that the Forum ‘address the low 
participation of women in all levels of decision-making processes and 
structures,’4 it did not seek to ensure (and the Forum did not require) that the 
very decision-making structures that were already in existence or about to 
be launched in furtherance of the elaboration of the Pacific Plan were gender 
balanced or had the relevant gender expertise, and most of the relevant bodies 
were either exclusively or predominantly constituted by men.
A Task Force was charged with developing the Pacific Plan based on terms of 
reference which themselves constituted a definition-setting exercise. The terms 
of reference instructed the Task Force to consider strategies for better regional 
cooperation ‘taking into account the broader international environment 
and agreements in which the Forum members participate’ and identified two 
international development frameworks as being of primary importance: the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the 2000 Millennium 
Declaration (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2005b: para 4). While both of those 
contain some gender equality language, neither provides a comprehensive and 
transformative agenda for rectifying gender inequalities across the development 
spectrum, in keeping with human rights principles, in the way that the World 
Conference on Women and its Declaration and Platform for Action  – which all 
Forum Island Countries endorsed – did in Beijing in 1995 (United Nations 1996). 
One wonders whether the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) might have been 
considered one of the defining international agreements of primary importance 
for the elaboration of the Pacific Plan – a regional framework in support of 
‘peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity for all Pacific people’5 – 
had women participated on an equal footing in setting the regional priorities 
and drafting the terms of reference, and if it had been what the Pacific Plan 
might look like today. Instead, the Pacific Plan terms of reference only briefly 
recognised the ‘importance of women and gender’.
4 As well as the reduction and elimination of domestic violence, and the improvement of women’s literacy 
and health status.
5 The Forum Leaders’ ‘Vision’ as expressed during the 6 April 2004 Auckland Retreat which set the 
development of the Pacific Plan in motion begins: ‘Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will 
be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can live free and 
worthwhile lives.’
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Perhaps the most defining of the background papers which informed the 
Pacific Plan’s development is an Asian Development Bank and Commonwealth 
Secretariat joint report analyzing issues and possibilities for achieving the 
Leaders’ Vision based on a series of working papers (Asian Development Bank 
and Commonwealth Secretariat 2005). Of the eighteen working papers that 
fed into that joint report, not one is dedicated to the options and benefits that 
regionalism could present for eradicating gender inequality in the Pacific, and 
with the exception of a paper on bulk petroleum procurement which links 
energy efficiencies with social improvements including achievement of the 
Millennium Development Goals (Morris 2005), none even mentions gender or 
uses basic sex disaggregation within its thematic topic. Rather, they focus on 
gender-blind infrastructure and sectoral cost-benefit analyses. 
The gap is glaring. For instance, whereas several quantitative assessments 
were conducted on issues ranging from telecommunications deregulation 
(McMaster 2005) to the economic cost of governance failure in four Pacific 
countries (Duncan 2005), and despite recognition in the main body of the joint 
report that discrimination against women in employment is widespread (Asian 
Development Bank and Commonwealth Secretariat 2005: 29), there was no 
assessment done of the economic cost of systemic sex discrimination and the 
potential benefits to the region of its eradication. As will be discussed below, 
within two years of the endorsement of the Pacific Plan such a study for the Asia-
Pacific region as a whole estimated billions of dollars in losses each year due to 
discrimination against women and girls in education and the labor force alone. 
Similarly, the fisheries sector analysis fails to mention much less address the 
issue of prostitution of women and children on foreign fishing vessels in Pacific 
waters. Not surprisingly, these and other issues which are disproportionately 
women’s concerns remain severely under-addressed in the Pacific Plan and in 
other mainstream Pacific development spheres. 
The concerns and priorities specific to the female half of the Pacific population 
were largely left to public consultations, discussions that were premised on a 
document the parameters of which had been defined without gender or human 
rights analysis or women’s meaningful involvement. Pacific women and gender 
experts had neither agenda-setting nor priority-balancing influence. They were 
merely one of many interest groups or ‘non-state actors’ – alongside youth, 
the disabled etc. – the inputs of which those in control of the agenda and of 
determining the relative importance of various submissions could accept or 
reject.6 This is partly the fault of skewed leadership structures in the Pacific, 
6 Indeed, among the submissions and recommendations of gender experts including the Regional Rights 
Resource Team, UNIFEM Australia and a joint submission by the Fiji Ministry of Women, Social Welfare and 
Poverty Alleviation on behalf of a number of women’s organisations, virtually all were apparently rejected. 
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and partly that of insufficient planning processes. Among others, consultations 
were criticised for being rushed, leaving little time for meaningful input and 
analysis (Huffer 2006: 161). 
Unsurprisingly, the failure of the Pacific Plan to properly address women’s 
issues, as will be discussed below, flows directly from this series of oversights. 
Unfortunately, few if any of the weaknesses have been rectified in the processes 
that have taken place during the first five years of the Plan’s existence. 
Encouragingly, however, the Pacific Plan is a ‘living document’ which has the 
potential for immediate and high impact improvement.
Towards More Inclusive Definitions
The definitions and underlying assumptions in the Pacific Plan and other key 
frameworks, including most national development strategies in the region, about 
what constitutes stability, security and development, as well as the delineation 
and prioritisation of necessary initiatives in these areas, are largely gender blind. 
For these frameworks to acquire legitimacy as being relevant and responsive to 
Pacific Island women, they arguably require a wholesale re-drafting through a 
wholly reconstituted design process. 
However, even if one is limited to working within the existing frameworks, 
a number of substantive improvements are possible. For instance, the BPA 
and its regional counterpart, the Pacific Platform for Action on Advancement 
of Women and Gender Equality (PPA) which was first adopted at a Pacific 
Ministerial Meeting on Women in 1994 as part of the regional preparations for 
the Fourth World Conference on Women and subsequently revised in 2004 – 
both versions pre-dating the adoption of the Pacific Plan – address identical 
issues as the Pacific Plan but from a very different angle (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community 2005). That angle is a critical piece, roughly half the size, of 
the regional development puzzle. 
However, among all of the Pacific Plan’s initiatives for ‘immediate implementation 
between 2006-2008’, for ‘agreement in principle’ and for ‘further analysis’, 
there was no direct reference to implementation of the BPA or PPA.7 This 
contrasts with the multitude of references in the Plan to the need to develop 
and implement other regional strategies and action plans such as the Pacific 
Islands Energy Policy and Strategic Action Plan, the Pacific Regional Action 
Plan on Sustainable Water Management, the Pacific Climate Change Framework, 
7 The December 2004 draft of the Pacific Plan included within the Sustainable Development goal the following 
‘medium-term benefit’: ‘Specialised support provided to help Pacific governments take the implementation of 
CEDAW, the Beijing Platform for Action and the Pacific Platform for Action further.’ This was later removed. 
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the Pacific Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management Framework for 
Action, the Forum Principles on Regional Transport Services, the HIV and STI 
Strategy, and the Regional Digital Strategy. 
The BPA and PPA are extensive, transformative and cross-cutting policy 
frameworks informed and guided by international human rights law on the 
right to non-discrimination on grounds of sex. Their implementation, however, 
has been extremely weak in the Pacific (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
2010a). Among the barriers to better implementation are that they have not 
had the engagement of political leaders, they are mere calls for action rather 
than agreements for action, they remain the purview of highly marginalised 
women’s departments despite their expansive, multi-sectoral application, and 
while they support the implementation of legally binding instruments such as 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW)8 they have no high level accountability. Activities under them 
have been uneven at best, and progress has been largely disappointing. 
As such, an integration of the key thematic recommendations of the BPA and 
PPA into the corresponding thematic areas of the Pacific Plan, and the parallel 
development of clear regional multi-sectoral strategies for achieving gender 
equality commitments, would bring gender concerns into the mainstream 
and onto a more level playing field with other areas of priority concern in 
the region. These measures could go a long way towards overcoming both the 
gender deficiencies of the Pacific Plan and the lack of movement on the BPA, 
PPA and CEDAW.
A few non-exhaustive examples will be discussed below. Several of them do not 
fit neatly into just one of the pillars or strategic objectives of the Pacific Plan. They 
are intended here as illustrations of the history and current status of regional 
development paradigms from a gender perspective and of potential avenues for 
shifting those paradigms, all of which would require more detailed analysis and 
discussion if and when the Leaders take up the call to gender mainstream the 
Pacific Plan and develop the necessary mechanisms and strategies.
8 In force throughout the Pacific with the exception of Nauru, Palau, Tonga and the American territories of 
American Samoa, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands and Guam.
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Stability and Security 
Security is defined in the Pacific Plan as ‘the stable and safe social (or human) 
and political conditions necessary for, and reflective of, good governance and 
sustainable development for the achievement of economic growth.’9 
The ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat joint report’s first working paper notes that 
‘security is no longer viewed in the narrow sense of merely defending a state 
from external or internal threats of a military nature. Rather, it is now realised 
that security is closely linked with generating conditions that free people from 
fear and misery arising from various causes’ (Hassall 2005: 1). It establishes 
that while questions about security had been considered in a number of earlier 
Pacific Islands Forum documents the term was not fully defined in any of them, 
though the range of examples given from those documents makes it clear that 
‘security’ carried a presumed definition limited to internal or external threats 
of a public nature such as natural disasters, threats to national integrity, and 
ethnic or social tension. 
Despite the working paper’s urging that security issues were most likely to arise 
from internal issues such as land pressures, economic disparities and ethnic 
division and that as such ‘security responses must be re-oriented to meet … 
internal threats rather than external ones’ (Hassall 2005: 4), there is no mention 
of the need to address the range of gender-specific internal security concerns. 
For most women, the biggest human security risks come from within their 
borders, communities and often their own home. Yet these security issues which 
are of particular and heightened daily concern to women, and which have 
been the subject of countless international and regional research and lobbying 
efforts, did not register as key causes of the ‘fear and misery’ from which any 
security framework ought to free people. In the end, the joint report, while 
acknowledging that security has become a multifaceted concept, expressly 
elected to focus on ‘those aspects of security that relate to dedicated law and 
order institutions—e.g., police, military, border enforcement, customs, and 
intelligence services—as well as the more dramatic manifestations of insecurity—
e.g., terrorism, transnational crime, civil conflict, secessionist movements, and 
domestic political instability’ (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2005: 170). 
It viewed broader ‘comprehensive’ or ‘human’ security issues as falling within 
the other pillars of the Pacific Plan. 
9 It is curious and perhaps telling that security in the Pacific Plan is linked specifically to an end goal of ‘the 
achievement of economic growth’ rather than being an end in itself.
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The result is that security remains traditionally and narrowly defined in the 
Pacific Plan. Its single strategic objective is ‘improved political and social 
conditions for stability and safety’, with the enumerated security initiatives 
focusing on maritime, aviation, border and bio-security issues.
Among the stability and security concerns specific to or disproportionately 
faced by Pacific women are lack or erosion of land and housing rights, personal 
economic insecurity, and lack of basic physical security, none of which are 
directly addressed as key initiative areas in the Pacific Plan. 
Land and housing insecurity is a major and growing concern for many Pacific 
Island women. Examples vary from the Tongan extreme where women are not 
legally allowed to own or inherit land to traditionally matrilineal land systems 
such as those in the Republic of Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 
where women’s traditional ownership of land in complementary systems of 
custodianship and decision-making with men has increasingly been eroded 
due to the introduction of the cash economy, large scale extractive industries, 
and women’s exclusion from modern decision-making bodies including land 
authorities (Stege, et al. 2008). In many Pacific contexts, women do not enjoy 
equal housing rights. 
The need to ensure women’s equal access to land and other resources, and 
avenues for doing so, are expressed in the BPA (Strategic Objectives A.1-A.4). 
It recognises that women's poverty is directly related to lack of access to land 
ownership and inheritance and recommends legal and administrative reforms 
to protect women’s land rights. At their 2008 meeting in Niue, Forum Leaders 
directed that land be considered as an emerging region-wide priority, yet made 
no mention of women’s specific land insecurity issues, citing only ‘migration, 
urbanisation, increasing numbers of disenfranchised youth, and population 
displacement caused by climate change and natural disasters’ among the list of 
land-related security concerns (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2008: 14-15). 
The meeting communiqué did, however, attach guiding principles in respect 
of land management and conflict minimisation, which include provision that 
consensus-based solutions to land conflict should include strengthening of 
customary and formal institutions and decision-making processes that, among 
others, ‘reflect principles of gender equity’, and that processes for clarifying 
customary land tenure would be consistent with CEDAW for those countries 
that have ratified it (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2008: 19).
Economic insecurity is another major issue disproportionately affecting women 
in the Pacific Islands region. In virtually all countries and territories, women’s 
access to and participation in the labor market is still significantly lower than 
men’s, as is their participation in wage employment in the non-agricultural 
sector, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. 
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Sex disaggregated labor force data on wages are not systematically collected 
in the Pacific and need prioritisation, however estimations show that even for 
women earning an income their earning power is a fraction of that of men (see 
Figure 3).
This structural inequality is exacerbated for women in situations of economic 
downturn, as they typically suffer the greatest adverse impact of generalised 
economic insecurity including under the present global financial crisis. 
Figure 1: Labour Force Participation Rate
Source: SPC PRISM.
Economic imperatives for Pacific women as expressed in the PPA include 
attention to women’s contributions to the informal sector, equal opportunity 
of men and women in employment, better collection and analysis of gender 
specific labor force and economic data, and women’s participation in income 
generating activities in rural areas and disadvantaged households (Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community 2005: paras 89-90). Poverty eradication priorities 
include provision of government-sponsored social schemes for male and female 
wage earners in the private sector and enhancements to financial literacy at 
the community level (Ibid: paras 91-94). The BPA also draws the link between 
women’s poor economic status and their risk of sexual exploitation (Strategic 
Objectives A.1-A.4), a common and increasing security risk for both women 
and girls in the region (see UNICEF, UNESCAP and ECPAT 2006).
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Figure 2: Share of Females and Males in Wage Employment in the Non-
agricultural Sector
Source: SPC PRISM.
Figure 3: Ratio of Estimated Female to Male Earned Income
Source:  UNDP Human Development Report 2007–2008, pp. 330–33.
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Personal physical security in the home and community is a serious daily issue 
for many Pacific women, and one that is still largely unaddressed. For many, 
it is the police and military themselves who present a major security risk (see 
Human Rights Watch 2006). For more still, violence in the home presents the 
single biggest risk to physical security. Domestic violence in some countries in 
this region is occurring at among the highest rates in the world, much more 
frequently than any public conflict or external security threat. Three countries, 
one per sub-region, have conducted national level surveys using a globally 
comparable World Health Organization survey methodology: Samoa (Secretariat 
of the Pacific Community, United Nations Population Fund, and Government 
of Samoa 2006), Solomon Islands (Secretariat of the Pacific Community and 
Government of Solomon Islands 2009) and Kiribati (Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community and Government of Kiribati 2010). Demographic and health surveys 
in the region are also starting to ask questions about the safety of women at 
the household level (Secretariat of the Pacific Community and Government of 
Republic of Marshall Islands 2008; Secretariat of the Pacific Community and 
Government of Tuvalu 2009). The results show that up to two thirds of women 
experience physical and/or sexual violence by an intimate partner in their 
lifetime (see Figure 4). Up to 60 per cent experience physical violence,10 up to 
55 per cent experience sexual violence, and as many as half have experienced 
forced intercourse. Between 20-40 per cent of women aged 15-49 in Kiribati 
and Solomon Islands reported having been sexually abused before the age of 
15. Many women suffer beatings by their partners during pregnancy putting 
not only the mother’s but also the child’s health and safety at risk. The national 
surveys show that the violence suffered by these women is more likely to be 
severe violence such as punching, kicking or having a weapon used against 
them, rather than more moderate forms of violence.
These issues are all compounded by the lack of legal protection in many Pacific 
Island countries. For example, at least three countries have no constitutional 
prohibition on sex discrimination, almost none have comprehensive domestic 
violence legislation, none have comprehensive integrated legislation covering 
all forms of violence against women, and marital rape is not criminalised in 
several countries. Even when legislation is in place it is often very poorly 
enforced. Virtually no strategies, policies and action plans to eliminate violence 
against women exist in the region. 
10 Between 50-70 per cent (and usually much closer to the 70 per cent mark) of both men and women 
surveyed agree with at least one ‘justification’ for such violence, and the most common justifications are things 
like ‘disobedience’, ‘unfaithfulness’ and ‘neglect of household duties’, indicating a very high socialisation of 
both inequality between women and men in the household (women are expected to ‘obey’ their husbands 
rather than being equal partners) and of violence as a means for resolving disputes. This socialisation is 
reflective of the longstanding unequal power relations between men and women and is a mechanism by which 
women are kept in a subordinate position compared with men.
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Figure 4: Prevalence of Lifetime Physical and/or Sexual Violence by an 
Intimate Partner, Among Ever-partnered Women
Sources: World Health Organization, WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence 
against Women: Initial results on prevalence, health outcomes and women’s responses (2005); SPC, UNFPA, 
Government of Samoa, The Samoa Family Health and Safety Study, 2007; SPC and Government of Solomon 
Islands, Solomon Islands Family Health and Safety Study, 2009; SPC and Government of Kiribati, Kiribati 
Family Health and Safety Study, forthcoming.
In addition to the significant personal security risk and high social costs of 
violence against women, the financial cost to Pacific Island economies is 
staggering. The Reserve Bank of Fiji estimated that violence against women 
costs the Fijian economy between FJD300-500 million per year, which at the low 
end amounts to seven per cent of GDP (Jalal 2010). Those estimates are higher 
still if opportunity costs are considered. 
Despite all of this, the only mention in the Pacific Plan of violence against 
women is in one of several ‘milestones’ for Security Initiative 13.3 (‘Strengthen 
law enforcement training, coordination and attachments’), namely through 
regional training courses on family, domestic, gender and sexual violence. All 
other areas of security are addressed through specific initiatives containing 
robust language such as ‘develop and implement strategies and associated 
legislation’ (for maritime and aviation security) with a clear milestone of having 
legislation developed by 2008; ‘implement the Pacific Islands Regional Security 
Technical Cooperation Strategy’ (in respect of border security, including for 
transnational crime and bio-security); and ‘develop and implement policies and 
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plans’ (in relation to biosecurity, urbanisation and mitigating natural disasters). 
If women’s physical security risks had been on an equal footing perhaps they 
would not have been limited to a milestone of training courses but would have 
had clear initiatives for the enactment of appropriate legislation by a fixed target 
date and the development of strategies, policies and plans to eliminate all forms 
of violence against women. 
The unique security issues faced by women are squarely addressed in both the 
BPA and the PPA. The BPA acknowledges that acts or threats of violence against 
women ‘instil fear and insecurity in women's lives and are obstacles to the 
achievement of equality and for development and peace’ (BPA, Critical Area of 
Concern D: Violence against Women: para 117). In keeping with human rights 
standards, both frameworks address violence against women in both the private 
and public spheres including in conflict situations, and provide recommended 
strategies for eradicating it (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2005: paras 
49-56 and 113-121).
Many Pacific women also experience high physical security risk as a result 
of poor sexual and reproductive health and rights. Eleven out of 21 Pacific 
Island countries and territories are ranked as being in either a high or very 
high reproductive risk category (Family Planning International 2009). Key 
causes include low contraceptive prevalence rates, high teenage fertility rates, 
increasing rates of sexually transmitted infections including HIV, poor access 
to antenatal care, poor access to emergency obstetric care, and restrictive 
abortion legislation, all of which contribute to poor maternal health and often to 
maternity related deaths. Underpinning the risk are various persistent forms of 
discrimination against women (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2009). The 
BPA and PPA outline the major contributing factors to maternal risk, including 
social determinants, and the necessary measures for ensuring women’s physical 
reproductive security (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2005: paras 73, 79; 
BPA, Strategic Objectives C.1-C.5).
All of this should be informing both the definition and prioritisation of 
core regional security issues under the Pacific Plan and the elaboration of 
comprehensive initiatives to be agreed by Forum Leaders. However, while the 
EPG report recommended that the Forum address the reduction and elimination 
of domestic violence and the improvement of women’s health status, neither of 
these made it into the Pacific Plan as priority objectives. Indeed, none of the 
gender specific security concerns of women made it in under any of the four 
pillars. 
Certain issues such as violence against women are gaining some attention 
amongst regional leaders. For instance, recently the Forum Regional Security 
Committee – the principal forum for setting the regional security agenda – has 
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given a slot on the ‘day two’ agenda (when ‘soft’ human security issues are 
discussed) to women, peace and security issues including domestic violence. It 
has yet to appear on the main agenda where ‘core’ security issues are discussed, 
demonstrating the continued resistance to seeing women’s security as a core 
regional concern. At the 2009 Pacific Islands Forum meeting, Forum Leaders 
acknowledged that ‘sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is now widely 
recognised as a risk to human security and a potential destabilising factor for 
communities and societies alike’ (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2009, para 
63) It was described as a ‘sensitive issue in most Pacific cultures’ that required 
‘national ownership’ (Ibid.: paras 63-64). The meeting communiqué stops short 
of prioritising the elimination of violence against women as a core regional 
security concern. This contrasts with the outcomes of other thematic discussions 
such as disability, on which Leaders agreed that a Regional Disability Strategy 
should be considered (Ibid.: paras 33-34), and on Influenza A (H1N1) in respect 
of which they called for a ‘more coordinated regional approach’ in part due to 
how stretched national health administrations are and the limits that has on 
their ability to respond independently with any great effect (Ibid.: para 24), a 
situation that is certainly mirrored in national departments for women.
The key structural problem, of course, is that even when gender issues get on 
high-level agendas, they get there in an ad hoc and uncertain way through 
women’s rights advocates biting at the heels of existing structures and 
frameworks that are not designed to take proper account of women’s issues in 
the first instance. As such, women continue to be an afterthought, entering via 
the side door a dialogue that got underway with a set of presumed definitions 
well before they arrived. 
Several of these obstacles could be overcome by explicitly integrating the 
gender-specific security issues discussed above into the security pillar of the 
Pacific Plan as core regional security issues. Parallel with that, a set of agreed 
regional processes could provide for, among others, standardised enhancements 
to data collection including wage gap and gender-based violence data; the 
development of model legislation including to criminalise and punish all forms 
of violence against women, to protect women’s reproductive health rights, to 
ensure equal employment opportunities and social benefits, and to guarantee 
women’s land and housing rights; and the elaboration of more cost-effective 
regional campaigns to create awareness of women’s unique security concerns. 
Governance
Good governance and sustainable development form part of the Pacific Plan 
definition of security, both of the former being pre-conditions for and results 
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of the latter. Good governance is defined as ‘the transparent, accountable and 
equitable management of all resources. Good governance is a prerequisite for 
sustainable development and economic growth.’
Women’s lack of voice and influence in governance structures is a major concern 
in the region, calling into question the legitimacy of virtually all resource 
management and other governance processes from an accountability and equity 
perspective. Although small advances are being made, women are still excluded 
or restricted in their access to most decision making structures across the 
micro, meso and macro levels from the household and customary and religious 
institutions to local and national government and regional organisations. For 
example, the Pacific Islands region has the worst record for gender-balanced 
parliaments anywhere in the world. As Figure 5 shows, Pacific Island countries 
as a whole stayed stagnant between 1995 and 2008 with an average of only 2.5 
per cent of seats in national parliaments held by women. 
Figure 5: World and Regional Averages of Women in Parliaments, 1995–2008
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Equality in Politics: A Survey of Women and Men in Parliaments, 2008, p. 15.
By 2009, the Pacific Islands countries had inched up to an average of 4.2 per cent 
of seats held by women, still coming in at less than half that of the Arab states.11 
The notable exception in the region has been the French territories.12 While 
France’s parity law seems to have done little to bring greater gender balance 
11 The figures for Fiji are based on the 2006 Parliament, prior to the December 2006 military coup. To date 
there is still no democratically elected government in Fiji.
12 The French, American, New Zealand and British territories in the Pacific are not included in the regional 
or international women in parliament statistics since they are not sovereign nations. Figure 6 however 
illustrates the data for all Pacific Island national and territorial legislatures.
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in the national legislature,13 it helped New Caledonia’s Congress and French 
Polynesia’s Assembly achieve 43 and 56 per cent, respectively, of seats held by 
women as of 2009 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Number of Seats Held in National and Territorial Legislatures in 
the Pacific Islands (Male/Female), October 2009
Sources: United Nations Development Programme and Pacific Islands Forum Secretarial, Utilising Temporary 
Special Measures to Promote Gender Balance in Pacific legislatures; A Guide to Options, 2008; Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community government focal points.
At the household level, while women in some countries such as Samoa and Cook 
Islands fare much better, many others in the region still have diminished decision-
making control over issues ranging from household finances and health care to 
how to spend their social time (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2010). In 
some countries and territories customary leadership is restricted to men, while in 
others there is greater though still imperfect balance. As noted earlier, women’s 
strong traditional role in land ownership and decision-making in matrilineal 
societies is being eroded and is in urgent need of protection and strengthening. 
Religious institutions are heavily skewed towards male leadership and decision-
making. The highest levels of decision-making in regional organisations like the 
13 The 2000 French law on parity requires political parties to have 50 per cent of each sex on their list of 
candidates, alternating the names of male and female candidates, to increase the likelihood of gender balance 
in elected positions. In certain cases it is merely a disincentive approach, with political parties who do not 
comply simply being subject to a fine. Many wealthy parties in France have chosen to pay the fine rather than 
comply with the object and purpose of the law.
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Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), the Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
(SPC) and other Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) agencies 
are heavily male dominated.14 
These are just a few examples of the range of governance and decision-making 
spheres that directly impact women’s lives but in which they lack equal (and in 
some cases any) voice and influence, and which presumably contributed to the 
EPG’s recommendation that ‘the Forum needs to acknowledge and encourage 
the participation of women in decision-making at all levels’. 
The Pacific Plan, however, was eventually restricted to an initiative to develop 
‘a strategy to support participatory democracy and consultative decision-
making (including NSAs, youth, women and disabled), and electoral processes’. 
This is a significantly watered down approach which not only lumps women 
in with minors and civil society, it reinforces the faulty yet tenacious notion 
that provided women are consulted governance systems will be equitable and 
accountable to them. The Pacific Plan also makes no reference to the broader 
range of decision-making levels to which women have no or unequal access. 
The 2007 Vava’u Decisions which outlined Pacific Plan priorities for the 
ensuing twelve months included only a single gender-specific agreement (under 
‘governance’), namely to ‘explore ways to enhance participation, particularly 
by women, in decision-making processes and institutions, and in particular 
parliamentary processes’ (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2007: 14). However, 
in the 2008 Pacific Plan Annual Progress Report, in which extensive detail is 
provided on key achievements over the reporting period and anticipated progress 
in the following reporting period, there is no mention of any achievements or 
anticipated progress on this issue. Similarly, the 2009 Annual Progress Report is 
completely silent on gender and women’s issues, including under the governance 
priorities (see See Pacific Plan progress reports at http://www.pacificplan.org/). 
While work in support of women in parliament is being done in the region 
including through PIFS, it is not registering as a priority for Forum or regional 
leaders nor is it being highlighted in Pacific Plan annual reporting processes.
The BPA and PPA provide practical frameworks for transforming decision-making 
structures at all levels including the political, judicial, private sector, community 
and household levels. They recognise the need to consider attitudinal, cultural 
and religious factors surrounding the political advancement of women, and to 
enhance those practices which are supportive while removing with urgency 
those which disadvantage women. Recommended strategies include improving 
the collection and monitoring of data on women and men in decision-making at 
all levels, promoting shared responsibility for household and parental duties to 
14 A 2007 stocktake of the implementation by CROP agencies of the CROP Gender Strategy (1998, revised 
2005) found very little progress by CROP agencies in adhering to their gender commitments. 
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eliminate women’s time disadvantage, providing leadership training for women, 
taking positive action to build a critical mass of women leaders in strategic 
decision-making positions, and aiming for gender balance in the composition 
of delegations to regional and international forums (Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community 2005: paras 42-48; BPA, Strategic Objectives G.1 and G.2). 
Integration of these types of strategies into the Pacific Plan initiatives would 
provide a pathway to the ‘transparent, accountable and equitable’ governance 
that is sought in the region. Further, a set of high-level agreed processes could 
include, among others, the establishment of a Regional Centre for Women in 
Leadership; support for and enhancement of undergraduate and postgraduate 
level gender studies programs;15 agreements on region-wide targets for gender 
balanced decision-making structures at all levels including in local and national 
governments and regional inter-governmental bodies, based on international 
standards; and the development of strategies for ensuring women’s decision-
making and leadership within customary, religious, community and household 
spheres across the region.
Development
Sustainable development is defined in the Pacific Plan as: 
[T]he integration and mutual reinforcement between the three pillars 
of economic development, social development, and environment 
conservation (where conservation is defined as wise use, including 
protection, in some circumstances). Essential requirements for 
sustainable development include active stakeholder participation, 
poverty eradication, changing unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption and managing and conserving the natural resource base 
for economic and social development, while maintaining the underlying 
ecological processes.
The Plan’s eight strategic objectives under this pillar include poverty reduction 
and improved gender equality. However, unlike all of the other strategic 
objectives which have clearly defined initiatives for their achievement, neither 
Strategic Objective 4 (Reduced Poverty) nor 8 (Improved Gender Equality) have 
any initiatives attached. Rather, according to the crafters of the Pacific Plan, 
‘[o]ther regional initiatives contribute to [them] and will be monitored and 
evaluated for their contribution to achieving [them]’. The document is silent on 
15 This has been on the gender agenda for many years. Encouragingly, the University of the South Pacific is 
now embarking on a new initiative to introduce a gender studies programme. This initiative will need to be 
strongly supported to ensure long-term viability. 
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which specific initiatives will contribute to reducing poverty and how, and the 
‘other regional initiatives’ listed as contributing to Improved Gender Equality 
do not include any under Economic Growth and only one peripherally under 
Security.16 Further, as stated earlier, unlike other initiatives which expressly 
reference the need for implementation of relevant existing regional strategies 
and plans of action, there is no reference in the gender equality objective, nor 
anywhere else within the Sustainable Development goal, to implementation 
of the BPA or PPA. Both of these frameworks contain clear recommendations 
to governments for achieving gender equality, including a number of gender-
responsive economic, social and environmental development strategies of direct 
application to any meaningful interpretation of the Pacific Plan definition of 
sustainable development.
It is perhaps reflective of the continued low political attention that is given to 
national and international commitments to gender equality that it was seen as 
being the eventual result of, rather than a condition precedent to, achievement 
of the other regional initiatives of the Pacific Plan. International analysis 
confirms the reverse to be true, and yet there is little practical understanding 
or application of the need for systematic gender and human rights analysis, 
budgeting and mainstreaming at the outset and through the course of all 
development and governance processes and frameworks in the Pacific. At the 
national level, women’s issues are typically restricted to social sectors, usually 
with a social welfare or service delivery approach, rather than mainstreamed 
across the full range of government policy making and programming based on 
a human rights and gender transformative approach (Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community 2010a). Also reflective of the low attention given to women’s issues 
at the highest levels, since the 2007 Vava’u Decisions and through to the 2009 
Annual Progress Report gender equality as a strategic objective is not included 
within annual priority areas, has not been reported on, and has had no specific 
initiatives developed for its achievement. 
The PPA and BPA, on the other hand, had as their raison d’être the elaboration of 
comprehensive analyses of and recommendations for achieving gender equality. 
If the drafters of the Pacific Plan were unclear on potential implementation 
strategies on Strategic Objective 8, they had only to reference these ten-year 
old (at the time) frameworks for inspiration. According to the BPA, for instance, 
the twelve ‘critical areas of concern’ for gender equality are: the persistent and 
increasing burden of poverty on women; inequalities and inadequacies in and 
unequal access to education and training; inequalities and inadequacies in and 
16 Initiative 13.3 relating to the strengthening of law enforcement includes regional training on ‘family, 
domestic, gender and sexual violence’ and human rights. Among others, there is no mention of the need for 
comprehensive legislation on gender-specific security concerns, full inclusion of women in peace and security 
institutions and processes including police forces, or holistic measures to eliminate gender-based violence.
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unequal access to health care and related services; violence against women; the 
effects of armed or other kinds of conflict on women, including those living 
under foreign occupation; inequality in economic structures and policies, in all 
forms of productive activities and in access to resources; inequality between 
men and women in the sharing of power and decision-making at all levels; 
insufficient mechanisms at all levels to promote the advancement of women; 
lack of respect for and inadequate promotion and protection of the human 
rights of women; stereotyping of women and inequality in women's access to 
and participation in all communication systems, especially in the media; gender 
inequalities in the management of natural resources and in the safeguarding 
of the environment; and persistent discrimination against and violation of the 
rights of the girl child (United Nations 1996).
The PPA, which provides the regional perspective on the above critical areas as 
well as emerging areas of concern, notes that a pressing issue in the region is the 
failure of governments to provide adequate resources to women’s departments. 
National budget allocations specifically targeted to women’s affairs were found 
to range between 0.002 and 1 per cent (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
2005: para 28), often just enough to fund a women’s affairs desk. Further, 
despite the cross-cutting nature of gender it is rarely treated as such in any 
practical sense, and women’s departments are rarely included in the various 
sectoral meetings which have clear relevance from a gender perspective. It is no 
surprise that these government departments are completely unable to implement 
any of the BPA and PPA strategic objectives with those meagre resources and 
siloed government structures. The PPA goes on to recognise that the government 
budget is the single most important policy tool of government, mirroring in 
financial terms the importance governments place on different issues, and notes 
the poor performance throughout the region in formulating gender-responsive 
budgets (Ibid.: paras 29-31). Based on these findings, it provides specific 
strategic recommendations for governments including on appropriate staffing, 
resourcing and situating of national government offices for women and gender 
equality (Ibid.: paras 36-37). 
Regional organisations, which play a major role in many aspects of the Pacific 
Plan’s implementation, are characterised by the same barriers of inadequate 
institutional architecture and low attention given to gender equality 
commitments. Out of ten CROP agencies, only two have full-time gender positions 
in their staffing structure. PIFS has only one full-time position dedicated to 
gender issues. The organisation elected not to fill the more senior Gender Issues 
Adviser position that has been vacant since 2006, and as of 2009 it has taken 
that position out of its organisational structure altogether. Until very recently, 
SPC similarly has had only one permanent, dedicated gender position, although 
as of 2008 the Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team which focuses on human 
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rights including women’s human rights became a programme under SPC and 
the Human Development Programme is in the process of expanding its gender 
equality unit. None of the other CROP agencies have gender experts among their 
staff. Within the work of PIFS and SPC, gender equality as a cross-cutting issue 
is often given tokenistic attention, with no processes in place to ensure gender 
expertise informs high level planning, programming and budgeting decisions 
across sectors.
This marginalisation of national and regional institutional structures is a major 
obstacle to the achievement of national, regional and international commitments 
to gender equality including under the Pacific Plan. 
Given the number of commonalities throughout the region on gender equality 
issues, and in light of how stretched women’s departments in national 
governments are, a regional approach to complement and strengthen national 
efforts is necessary. Several of the BPA and PPA critical areas of concern need to 
be integrated as clear initiatives under the Gender Equality strategic objective 
of the Pacific Plan. At the same time, a set of agreed, high-level, multi-sectoral 
processes and mechanisms could, among others, seek to: significantly enhance 
national and regional institutions for the achievement of gender equality 
including through increased staffing and financial resources; develop minimum 
agreed standards and benchmarks for gender and human rights mainstreaming 
and gender budgeting within government; establish processes and timeframes 
for mainstreaming gender and human rights into other existing regional and 
national frameworks and strategies including sectoral strategies and national 
development strategies; develop and implement standardised multi-sectoral 
gender and human rights analysis tools; establish thematic sectoral working 
groups to develop best practices for gender-responsive law- and policy-making 
and programming; strengthen processes for achieving full compliance with 
the CROP Gender Strategy; and create regional platforms at the highest levels 
for monitoring and evaluating progress on gender equality and measuring the 
gender performance and accountability of leaders and regional institutions. A 
regional human rights body will also be critical for promoting and protecting 
women’s human rights in the region, including a dedicated special mechanism 
on gender equality such as a special rapporteur or expert working group, as has 
been used with success in other regions, for example the work of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ special rapporteur on the rights of 
women in Africa.17 
17 This special mechanism has been in place since 1998 and has been responsible for the development of 
a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa and for 
significant work with individual countries and populations on advancing women’s rights. See http://www.
achpr.org/english/_info/index_women_en.html
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Economic Growth
Economic growth is defined in the Pacific Plan as ‘sustainable, pro-poor 
growth’. That is promising on its face since we know that sustainable growth 
and development require the participation by and accrual of benefits to both 
women and men, and that poverty is disproportionately experienced by females. 
However, the economic growth aspects of the Pacific Plan are completely gender 
blind. The initiatives for immediate implementation included expanding and 
integrating trade markets, developing an ecosystem-based fishery management 
framework, developing strategies for bulk petroleum purchase, enhancing 
regional transport services, implementing a regional digital strategy and 
supporting private sector mechanisms. Issues for agreement in principle or 
further analysis were limited to tourism and bulk purchasing of pharmaceuticals. 
Not a single economic growth initiative relates to women’s access to and 
participation in the economy, despite the region’s poor performance in this area 
as illustrated earlier. No gender economic analysis was commissioned among 
the eighteen ADB-Commonwealth Secretariat working papers or otherwise. In 
contrast, the need for better gender specific labor force data, protection and 
promotion of women’s employment rights and attention to the differential impacts 
of trade liberalisation on men and women, among others, is identified in the BPA 
(Strategic Objectives F1-F6) and PPA (Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2005: 
section D and paras 95-98). The BPA recognises that macroeconomic policies 
focus almost exclusively on the formal sector, fail to take into account their 
differential impact on women and men, and need rethinking and reform based 
on proper gender analysis (Strategic Objectives A.1-A.4). It also recommends 
that governments restructure and target the allocation of public expenditures to 
promote women's economic opportunities (Strategic Objective A.1).
A 2007 UNESCAP Social and Economic Survey of Asia and the Pacific found that 
the region as a whole loses an estimated US $42-$47 billion per year because 
of restrictions on women’s access to employment opportunities and a further 
$16-$30 billion per year from gender gaps in education (UN Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2007). While women’s right to equal 
access to economic participation is an end in itself and not something to be 
seen from a purely instrumentalist perspective, this kind of detailed analysis 
of the economic costs of gender inequality specifically in the Pacific Islands 
region should be initiated by regional leaders as part of any economic growth 
discussion, alongside full analysis of the particular barriers women face in 
accessing the economy and what women see as appropriate pathways to full 
economic empowerment. 
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Certain gender aspects need to be mainstreamed into the Pacific Plan text, 
such as a requirement to conduct a systematic gender analysis of trade related 
initiatives within the current trade agenda. A set of agreed regional processes 
could also help address some of the major gender deficiencies, for instance by 
agreeing on modalities for ensuring that analyses of women’s economic rights 
and empowerment inform all regional economic discussions, including at Forum 
Economic Ministers Meetings.
Conclusion
Gender equality continues to be highly ghettoised despite its centrality to 
stability, security and development in the Pacific Islands region. Women’s issues 
are at best being given tokenistic attention across much of the region, which 
is harmful not only to the female half of the population but to development 
and governance effectiveness overall. They are largely left to be dealt with 
by severely under-resourced and poorly placed ‘gender desks’ despite their 
primary and cross-cutting nature across the stability, security and development 
spectra, and despite the multiple development benefits that could accrue to the 
region as a whole if they were put front and centre on all high level agendas. 
Squeezing neglected gender issues into pre-determined definitions and 
frameworks after the fact is a frustrating exercise. Going forward, regional 
discourse, frameworks and resource allocations need to be developed not just 
in consultation with women’s groups but by women participating equally from 
the outset, in structures that they have helped conceptualise and which are free 
from longstanding systemic gender barriers. As a matter of priority, existing 
national and regional structures and processes relating to stability, security and 
development need to be re-conceptualised so as to ensure men’s and women’s 
needs, perspectives and human rights are equally accounted for from the outset. 
Women can no longer be required to chase at the heels of andocentric structures 
and processes that are simply not designed to reflect their different situation or 
address their specific concerns and aspirations.
In the interim, major gains could be achieved in this region by integrating 
existing, comprehensive gender equality frameworks such as the BPA and PPA 
into the Pacific Plan and other national and regional stability, security and 
development frameworks. Those gender equality frameworks address all of the 
same issues as the Pacific Plan (and most national development strategies) but 
from the perspective of women. They are the result of intensive regional and 
international consultation and discussion amongst gender and human rights 
experts within government women’s departments, international agencies and 
civil society. Given that the Pacific Plan lacks the requisite gender perspective, 
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and that the BPA and PPA lack the requisite multi-sectoral ownership, 
accountability and resourcing, a marriage of the frameworks would provide 
for a more comprehensive and inclusive regional development platform going 
forward.
As part of that integration, national and regional leaders should consider 
endorsing the development of a set of agreed regional processes for strengthening 
national and regional mechanisms for gender equality. Such processes should be 
heavily informed and guided by the BPA and PPA along with other legal and 
policy frameworks such as CEDAW and the CROP Gender Strategy, and should 
contain clear timeframes and methods for coordination. In light of the cross-
sectoral nature of gender issues, implementation and monitoring of the agreed 
processes should rest with a high-level, multi-sectoral collectivity. 
These steps should be prioritised as part of the next Pacific Plan review. With 
the fifteenth anniversary of the PPA and BPA now upon us, and the Pacific Plan 
marking its fifth anniversary, 2010 would be a good time to work, and celebrate, 
together.
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9. Millennium Development Goals 
and the Pacific
Linda Petersen
Le Pacifique et les objectifs de développement du millénaire – mise à jour 
2009
Cet article présente une vue d’ensemble du rapport de 2004 sur les 
Objectifs de développement du millénaire (ODM) établie par le Secrétariat 
de la Communauté du Pacifique (CPS) et le Programme des Nations unies 
pour le développement (PNUD). Ce rapport constitue une référence 
utile pour mesurer le développement dans la région du Pacifique 
insulaire par rapport aux Objectifs de développement du millénaire et 
aux indicateurs et objectifs qui leur sont associés. Il couvre 15 pays 
insulaires du Pacifique et donne des indications à la fois sur les pays 
individuellement et sur la perspective d’ensemble de la région quant 
aux réalisations des ODM en 2004 avec quelques projections de progrès 
à l’horizon 2015. On constate que sur la période de six ans,  un certain 
nombre de questions ont influencé les progrès ou constitué une menace 
pour la réussite du programme et on conclut que les gouvernements des 
îles du Pacifique doivent changer leur façon de gérer et d’utiliser les 
ressources ainsi que la façon de présenter les rapports relatifs à celles-
ci. Ces ressources ne sont pas utilisées de façon aussi efficace qu’elles 
le pourraient et en outre elles ne bénéficient pas à ceux qui en ont le 
plus besoin, à savoir le nombre croissant de pauvres et de démunis 
dans nos pays, y compris ceux qui, dans les zones rurales et les îles 
excentrées, ne disposent pas de services et qui n’ont pas les occasions 
de gagner leur vie et de parvenir au bien-être. Pour qu’un changement 
intervienne, les gouvernements doivent concentrer leurs efforts sur la 
façon de faire parvenir ces ressources et ces services à ces personnes. 
Ceci devrait être une priorité. Les pays doivent mettre en pratique leur 
engagement politique et leur détermination afin d’accomplir cette tâche 
dans leur contexte propre en consultant leur population et les acteurs 
du développement.
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Introduction
Since signing up to and endorsing the Millennium Declaration in 2000, 
Pacific island countries have – some more than others – used the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) as a measure of development progress both at 
national and regional level. United Nations development agencies working in 
the Pacific have been the main driving force for using the MDG to measure and 
track development progress in the Pacific but more recently, there has been 
a stronger push from the larger metropolitan Pacific countries towards this 
approach, in particular Australia.
This brief paper provides an overview of the regional MDG 2004 report 
compiled by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) which provided a useful baseline for 
measuring development in the Pacific island region against the Millennium 
Development Goals and their associated indicators and targets (Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community 2004). It covered 15 Pacific island nations and provided both 
an individual country and overall regional perspective on MDG achievements 
in 2004 with some projections of progress to 2015. 
Since then most countries have produced an initial MDG report and many have 
integrated MDG targets and indicators into their national development plans. A 
few countries have gone as far as to begin to assess what it will cost to achieve 
the MDG by 2015. There have also been subsequent regional assessments most 
recently by the Australian Government, in the August 2009 AusAID report, 
Tracking development and governance in the Pacific. This paper will also comment 
on where we are today six years on and provide some reflection on some of the 
issues influencing progress or threatening success.
The Millennium Development Goals
The global focus on the MDG has often overshadowed the Millennium Declaration 
which provides the glue that binds the goals together. The Declaration while 
recognising the role of individual countries and societies in achieving the MDG, 
puts emphasis on collective responsibility, principles of human dignity, equality 
and equity, the duty and the responsibility of leaders to all the worlds’ people 
especially the most vulnerable and particular children and future generations. 
The Declaration is a commitment to the right to development, to peace and 
security, gender equality, the eradication of many dimensions of poverty and 
sustainable human development for all of the world’s people. If each goal is 
mapped against this overall vision for countries and the world it becomes easier 
to understand and appreciate that they all linked in one way or another. 
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The Millennium Development Goals – the eight goals with their respective 
targets and indicators – present a challenge to the world to accelerate the pace 
of development while testing political commitment. For developing countries 
achievement demands policy reforms and strengthened governance while for 
the developing world new aid commitments, equitable trading rules and debt 
relief through mobilising stronger partnerships and resource; initiating pro-
poor policy reforms, institutional change and budget allocations; and improve 
monitoring of social indicators.
The Pacific Islands Regional Millennium 
Development Goals Report, 2004, SPC/UNDP
The report was endorsed by Forum Economic Ministers and a product of the 
UN/CROP MDG working group which was formed in 2004 to assist with the 
integration of the MDG into Pacific island country development goals and 
strategies. It was intended to supplement national reports being prepared by 
countries as part of the first comprehensive review of MDG progress conducted 
the UN. The report was produced in consultation and with the participation of 
countries. The findings are summarised below.
Millennium Development Goal 1: Halving Hunger and 
Poverty
At the time poverty related data was found to be incomplete but suggested that 
poverty was increasing in a number of countries. When this data is combined 
with data on participatory poverty and hardships assessments carried out by 
ADB and the UNDP, the picture is of a significant and growing problem and one 
that calls into question the view that Pacific islanders because of their social 
networks, traditions and subsistence lifestyle are protected from poverty. Data 
on hunger was similarly found to be incomplete but indicated that a significant 
proportion of children are undernourished and that prevalence of underweight 
children is relatively constant or increasing in at least four Pacific island 
countries (PICs).
The report found that poverty reduction is clearly of relevance to the Pacific and 
data needs to be complete and support analysis of differences between countries. 
It also needs to address the non-economic aspects of hardship in order to take 
into account subsistence and traditional resources and social networks which 
are so important for many Pacific islanders. In relation to hunger there is a need 
to develop additional indicators and gather information on family settings and 
hence the causes of childhood malnutrition.
Politics, Development and Security in Oceania
130
Millennium Development Goal 2: Achieving Universal 
Primary Education 
The goal of achieving universal primary education measured in terms of 
enrolment was reported as being reached or on the way to be achieved in many 
Pacific island countries. But the challenge of providing universal primary 
education that effectively addresses both individual and societal needs remains 
and is growing. There is growing evidence from across the region that a large 
number of youth leave school without the adequate life skills and are unable 
to either further their education or gain employment. Contributing problems 
include alienation of poor performing students and poor financial support for 
basic education. Despite the commitment of Ministers of Education to improving 
all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence for all, progress 
towards this goal is not measured effectively through existing MDG education 
related indicators.
The report recommended the development of alternative indicators for the 
Pacific to measure the proportion of pupils who start grade 1 and reach grade 
6 which is the primary school completion rate in the Pacific, in addition to 
developing key indicators to capture quality and relevance of education. It is 
not clear whether this is in fact being done. However, there is the opportunity 
at regional level for new education frameworks such as revisions to the Forum 
Education Ministers Action Plan to be developed with these recommendations 
in mind in order to better measure improvements in educational outcomes such 
as essential life skills and success in providing skills required for employment 
and livelihood in the traditional subsistence economy.
Millennium Development Goal 3: Promote Gender 
Equality and Empower Women
Significant achievements have been made in some PICS with respect to gaining 
equal access to educational opportunities for women, and the importance 
of gender issues and equality are now widely recognised in the region, and 
increasingly reflected in policy documents. Despite this progress serious 
challenges remain. Females are distinctly underrepresented in many PICs at 
one or more educational levels. Census data on literacy levels indicates relative 
gender equality, but the measure used is not rigorous, and more discerning 
indicators are needed to accurately measure literacy levels and gender 
differences. Data on women’s representation in the non-agricultural sector of 
the labor market showed increases in women’s share in some PICs, but country 
specific research suggests women continue to be at a significant disadvantage 
in terms of wages, working conditions and overall opportunities. Women were 
9. Millennium Development Goals and the Pacific
131
severely underrepresented in national parliaments across the Pacific, holding 
and average of 5.5 per cent of seats at the time. Today the Pacific (excluding 
Australia and New Zealand) has the lowest levels of female representation in 
parliaments when compared to other regions of the world.
Recommendations around Goal 3 included: to improve gender related analysis 
of the education sector; and the need to adopt indicators that measure literacy in 
its broadest sense, and in ways that are relevant to PICs, e.g. basic legal literacy 
and business literacy; to develop indicators that measure both the participation 
and relative status of women in the labor market; and encouraged countries 
to include additional indicators to parliamentary representation in order to 
measure the relative status of women in other areas of decision making such as 
the local government level or in the public service.
Moving beyond policy level successes (which may have gone backwards since 
2004 as indicated by recent country indications in the Beijing +15 review 
process) the need for further research and evidence to gauge the effect of 
inequality on broader development progress was highlighted in order to enable 
analysis that can identify where assistance should be targeted. SPC is pursuing 
work in this area and is working with six countries to assess the capacity of 
governments to mainstream gender in all aspects of national development. 
Other work has started to improve the compilation and use of gender statistics 
in national planning and development processes; and there are plans to research 
the cost to governments of neglecting targeted investment in gender equality. 
There have been many other initiatives both regional and bilateral aimed at 
improving various dimensions of gender equality at country level with support 
from UNIFEM (United Nations Fund for Women), UNFPA (United Nations 
Population Fund), and the Government of Australia in particular. Major focus 
has been in the areas of governance and women’s legal and human rights – 
women’s political representation and violence against women.
Millennium Development Goal 4: Reduce Child 
Mortality
The findings in 2004 stated that children’s health status in the region has 
improved significantly from the 1960s as a consequence of health programs 
focusing on maternal and child health, much the same as the 2009 report and 
under –five mortality rates are below the average for all developing countries 
therefore the targets may not be applicable to all PICs. However, child and infant 
mortality and overall health remain serious issues in all PICs as evidenced by 
significant rates of underweight children. The report noted significant under 
reporting of infant deaths in some PICs, and highly variable rates in countries 
with small populations, in addition to highlighting the need for disaggregated 
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data that will allow analysis of sub-national differences and determination of 
various causes of infant and child mortality. Recommendations included the 
need to enhance cooperation between the health sector and national statistics 
offices to improve coverage and accuracy of statistics relating to infant, child 
and maternal health and mortality and for increased support for nutrition 
programs focusing on infants, mothers and children especially in countries with 
high malnutrition and high infant mortality.
Millennium Development Goal 5: Improve Maternal 
Health
Again, the 2004 report notes that maternal health status has improved 
significantly in the recent decades and figures for the Pacific island region are 
below the average for developing countries (440 per 100,000 live births) and all 
except Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea are below the average for the 
Asia Pacific region (110). Despite these improvements, maternal health remains a 
serious concern across the region. Leading causes of maternal death were similar 
to those reported globally: postpartum hemorrhage, preeclampsia, obstructed 
labor, puerperal sepsis, and complications of unsafe abortion. Important indirect 
causes include anemia and malaria (the latter in PNG and Solomon Islands.) 
Improving the level of obstetric care is a priority in all PICs, in addition actions 
need to be taken to expand overall access to health care during pregnancy 
and childbirth, and to improve pre-natal care standards. Early first visits for 
medical checks during pregnancy and regular ongoing health care thereafter are 
important in ensuring the health of both mothers and children. 
Maternal health in all PICs will also benefit from strategies that focus on: 
improving nutrition for women and girls (including prevention of micronutrient 
deficiencies and anemia), combating infectious and non-communicable diseases, 
addressing reproductive health needs, and addressing violence against women.
In relation to tracking maternal health indicators, recommendations included 
the need for other process indicators to measure progress in providing obstetric 
care, and maternal health more generally. Information requirements and issues 
included: common definitions to measure the proportion of deliveries with 
skilled attendants trained in the delivery of emergency obstetric care (EmOC); 
indicators of the number of facilities offering EmOC and their geographic 
distribution within each PIC; indicators for the percentage of women with 
complications treated in EmOC facilities, and for caesarean section and fatality 
rates; age specific fertility rates e.g. rate of teenage pregnancy; rate of births in 
private clinics as opposed to public hospitals or health centers; nos. of overseas 
referrals; data regarding the percentage of women attending antenatal care at 
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least once during pregnancy, percentage of women receiving postnatal care, and 
the percentage of anemic women (antenatal and postnatal care are important to 
monitor birth weight and complications during pregnancies).
Other recommendations included: the undertaking of a regional needs 
assessment relating to maternal mortality and morbidity (with assessment of 
emergency obstetric facilities), and systems instituted to perform maternal 
and perinatal reviews; training of health practitioners and health service 
providers (including midwives and traditional and village birth attendants) in 
the utilisation of evidence-based obstetrical protocols and guidelines relating to 
delivery care; raising awareness of attendants on the importance of birth and 
death registration (as required under the Convention on the Rights of the Child) 
and of the importance of early (and regular) pre-natal care visits. In addition to 
training there is a need for the development and upgrading of infrastructure, 
particularly in rural areas (including communications, medical facilities and 
equipment), and provision of adequate supplies.
Millennium Development Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and Other Diseases
It is commonly known that the Pacific faces a ‘double burden’ of infectious and 
non-communicable disease (NCD) which impacts on the health of individual 
and populations and has the potential to significantly affect broader social and 
economic development as well. Addressing them is critical to development 
progress. 
In relation to HIV/AIDS, although prevalence was low (outside of PNG) when 
compared to global levels, levels of infection were of serious concern and there 
was a real risk of substantial and rapid increase. Data was unavailable for a 
number of indicators e.g. condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence 
rate; condom use at last high risk sex; no. of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS. 
Recommendations included: (i) working with NSOs and Ministries of Health to 
select HIV related indicators (such as access to affordable drugs) that are relevant 
at regional and national level for which data will be available; and (ii) coordinate 
the effort across HIV programs for data comparability. This is being addressed 
through new and ongoing regional programs addressing HIV. 
Malaria is a significant disease burden in the Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu where it is endemic but reliable data on either incidence 
or prevalence was not available. Additional indicators should be adopted that 
will allow a more accurate assessment of progress. This issue is beginning to be 
addressed through support from the Global Fund. Again, NSOs and Ministries 
of Health need to work together to select relevant indicators and ensure that 
data is available as part of this process.
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Tuberculosis (TB) is a serious health problem in a number of countries and there 
is increasing concern over the emergence of multi-drug resistant TB, and co-
infection with AIDS. Although the Directly Observed Treatment Short Course 
(DOTS) strategy has been widely implemented across the Pacific, access to 
DOTS is not universal in all PICs. As a result an important indicator to monitor 
is the population accessible to DOTS. Recommendations include: to adopt an 
additional TB indicator measuring the proportion of the population with access 
to health centers that use the DOTS strategy; and increase efforts to limit the 
spread of drug resistant TB.
Given the prevalence of NCDs in the Pacific the report recommended that PICs 
develop NCD targets and indicators under Target 8 of this goal even though 
they are not monitored globally. Relevance of monitoring specific NCDs and 
NCD risk factors will vary from country to country and implemented through 
national NCD plans supported by WHO and the SPC.
Millennium Development Goal 7: Ensure 
Environmental Sustainability
In summary there has been no systematic effort to monitor the state of the 
environment despite a number of reviews. Consequently, the ability to effectively 
monitor environmental changes is weak. Data from which environmental change 
may be monitored and on which management decisions can be based is scarce, 
with time series information generally not available. 
The 2004 report noted that deforestation continuing at an unsustainable rate 
and a lack of up to date information prevents any comprehensive assessment of 
the status of different forest types and land uses important to PICTs. Protected 
areas have expanded in size and number but again the data not accurate on 
their status, the use of traditional cultural practices to protect marine and land 
resources – these may not be included in internationally accepted protected area 
definitions; threats to biodiversity affect many species or habitats generally and 
cannot be effectively addressed through protected area designation. 
Global warming and climate change are very important issues for PICs and the 
region is committed to reducing carbon dioxide emissions per capita, which are 
already typically well below the average for Asia and Oceania. All PICs have 
committed to phasing out the use of ozone-depleting substances by the end of 
2005, and to increasing the use of alternative energy sources. The sustainability 
of biomass resources is recognised to be an important issue, particularly because 
only 30 per cent of the region’s population has access to electricity. The Pacific 
Islands Energy Policy and Plan recognises the fundamental importance of access 
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to energy for economic and social development, but also the need to ensure that 
energy use and resource development is undertaken in a way that is compatible 
with the special needs and circumstances of PICs.
Access to safe water is vital for health and human development. The data 
quoted in the report is part of a significant body of evidence that indicates 
sustainability of water resources is a significant and increasing problem in much 
of the region as a consequence of drought, population growth, increasing water 
demand for tourism, agriculture and industry, and aging water systems. The 
problems are not new. Many of these issues were identified as concerns over 20 
years ago. Nevertheless, comprehensive, comparable data to evaluate access to 
fresh water on a regional basis are scarce. In many PICs, knowledge about the 
type, extent and sustainable yields of surface and groundwater resources is very 
limited. This is true even on islands where water shortages occur as s result of 
demand exceeding supply during drought periods. Problems in the knowledge 
base include: a lack of baseline water resource assessments; insufficient regular 
monitoring of water resources; limited analysis and interpretation of water 
resources data for planning and design of water resources development projects, 
and for management of catchments.
Access to basic sanitation that serves to protect human health and environmental 
quality (including water resource quality) is of vital importance for both human 
health and development making the target of proportion of urban population 
with access to improved sanitation and the associated indicator very relevant 
for PICs. Inadequate sanitation systems currently have a significant impact on 
water quality and human health in many PICs, making collection and analysis 
of relevant sanitation related data a high priority. 
In general the report found it difficult to make an assessment of progress 
towards Goal 7 targets from existing quantitative data. Data are not uniformly 
available and not of consistent quality. In a number of cases modifications 
are needed to the standard indicator definitions (and/or changes needed to 
the indicators themselves),if a meaningful assessment is to be made. There is 
strong political will within the region to environmental sustainability and good 
regional cooperation in all areas covered under this goal as evidenced by the 
various regional frameworks and action plans. Relevant regional environmental 
priorities not mentioned in the MDG which need to be included are: solid waste 
management and sea level rise.
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Millennium Development Goal 8: Develop a Global 
Partnership for Development
It is clear that the primary challenge for PICs in achieving the MDGs lies in 
securing the necessary extent of external support through overseas development 
assistance, foreign direct investment, trade and development partnerships. ODA 
has been relatively high for most PICS given their small populations. Cost of 
aid delivery is high due to the dispersed and geographic nature of the region. 
The 2004 report noted the declining levels of ODA from Australia and New 
Zealand, FDI declines as a result of inefficient bureaucracies, the high cost of 
doing business, inconsistent policies, poor access to land and a lack of skills 
in the investment promotion area. The situation with respect to ODA, FDI and 
trade in the Pacific highlights the need for ongoing dialogue regarding the 
provision of development support to the region. Recommendations included: 
the need to conduct research on aid effectiveness in the Pacific; strengthening 
civil society partnerships in the delivery of aid particularly in targeting the 
poor and vulnerable groups; the need for both donors and countries to focus on 
capacity building and to support policies and reforms that enhance the quality 
and responsiveness of development institutions; further the need to rely on 
country mechanisms in the provision on aid; to pool resources and to develop 
common reporting and accountability standards. 
Conclusion
The 2004 report demonstrated that substantial progress had been made against 
certain indicators and the Pacific region will meet some MDG targets. It also 
showed that the Pacific region compares relatively favorably to other regions in 
a number of areas – particularly in education and health. Although, progress 
varied greatly across the region and even within countries, the progress that 
has been made towards some goals clearly illustrated the efforts by the region’s 
people, governments and development partners have resulted in positive 
development outcomes. However, much greater efforts is needed if the Pacific 
is to achieve the MDGs by 2015 and in some areas such as health there is a real 
risk that the some of the region’s gains could be reversed.
So where are we in 2009, five years later and as we approach 2015? The Australian 
government’s recent report on Tracking development and governance in the Pacific 
provides an update on MDG progress in the Pacific which in short, shows that 
not much has changed but sets the alarm bells ringing that the Pacific as a region 
is unlikely to meet the MDGs by 2015. 
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Rising poverty is more evident; chronic hunger and poor nutrition persists; 
economic growth was good but concentrated in a few countries with the 
global recession affecting all countries and reducing opportunities for gains 
from this growth. The gains had not necessarily led to a reduction in poverty. 
Despite high levels of children entering the school system there are still serious 
concerns for the numbers of children out of school and not completing primary 
school. Gender equality improvements are mixed with women’s participation in 
political decision-making still very low throughout the region. Reports of very 
high levels of gender based violence in some countries indicate that gender 
inequality is prevalent at the very core of societies in the Pacific and needs to be 
addressed as a fundamental development issue. Despite progress in combating 
Malaria, the health MDGs need serious attention with NCDs now the leading 
cause of death in 8 countries in the region, and only three countries on track to 
reduce maternal mortality by three-quarters in 2015. Improved service provision 
continues to be high priority as while addressing the social determinants of 
these health situations through education, in particular of girls and women and 
through the empowerment of women and communities. Environmental threats 
are intensifying and issues such as climate change have the potential to affect 
progress in achieving the other MDG. All strategies to adapt and mitigate the 
effects of climate change on the health and wellbeing of Pacific island people 
must be designed, planned and implemented with involvement of the people 
who are most affected, including women and young people.
What Needs to Change in Order For Us to Get Back 
on Track?
The most critical change needs to come in the way that Pacific island country 
governments manage, use and report on resources acknowledging that many 
countries are already making significant investments in their own development. 
However, the region’s track record on MDG progress, makes it clear that 
these resources are not being used as effectively as they could be nor are they 
benefiting those who need them the most – the growing numbers of poor 
and disadvantaged in our countries including those lacking services and 
opportunities for livelihood and wellbeing in the rural and outer island areas. 
Governments need to focus on getting resources and services to these people if 
there is to be change. This must be the priority. Tracking MDG progress through 
these regional and country reviews provides valuable direction on what to do 
and how to go about doing it. Countries must follow through on their political 
commitment and resolve to do this within their country context in consultation 
with their people and development actors.
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10. Leading the March for Gender 
Equality? Women Leaders in the 
Public Services of Samoa and 
Solomon Islands
Asenati Liki Chan Tung
Ouvrent-elles la voie à l’égalité des sexes? Les dirigeants féminins dans les 
services publics de Samoa et des Îles Salomon
La notion de « femmes aux postes de direction » est au centre des travaux 
pour promouvoir l’égalité des sexes dans la région Pacifique depuis deux 
décennies. Une grande partie de ces travaux a suivi les efforts effectués 
à l’échelle de la planète pour accroître le pourcentage de femmes dans 
les assemblées parlementaires. Plus spécifiquement, les efforts faits 
par des groupes de femmes dans les sociétés civiles du Pacifique se 
sont concentrés sur la promotion de certaines politiques, stratégies et 
formations en vue de la participation des femmes à la vie politique. 
Cependant, cette insistance a dans une large mesure détourné l’attention 
des autres domaines des institutions, à savoir le secteur public, où les 
femmes occupent des postes de direction importants. La nomination de 
femmes à des postes gouvernementaux de premier plan comme titulaires 
de portefeuilles ou à la tête de subdivisions ministérielles constitue 
une évolution récente dans les secteurs publics dans le Pacifique. 
Pourtant, on connaît peu de choses sur l’importance du nombre des 
postes de direction attribués aux femmes dans ces domaines et sur ses 
conséquences sur l’objectif global d’égalité des sexes comme point 
central du développement. Cet article étudie le lien entre la présence 
accrue de femmes aux postes de direction dans les services publics et la 
valorisation de la cause des femmes en général. Plus particulièrement, il 
pose la question de savoir quel effet la présence des dirigeants féminins 
au gouvernement produit sur le statut ou la situation des femmes dans 
la société. Les résultats de la recherche à Samoa et aux Îles Salomon 
indiquent que si l’amélioration aux niveaux les plus élevés peut ne pas 
forcément refléter le développement au niveau de la société dans son 
ensemble, le changement dans les attitudes au niveau de la population 
et au niveau du gouvernement est d’une importance capitale pour un 
changement effectif et efficace de politique en matière d’égalité des sexes. 
La première partie étudie la situation actuelle des femmes aux postes de 
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direction dans les services publics dans les deux pays  ; la deuxième 
examine les conséquences de la situation actuelle sur l’amélioration de la 
situation des femmes et l’article se termine en insistant sur la nécessité, 
dans la recherche sur l’égalité des sexes, d’intégrer tous les éléments et 
tous les secteurs impliqués en vue d’une connaissance plus équilibrée 
de la condition des femmes dans les îles du Pacifique.
Introduction
‘Women in leadership’ has been a focus of gender-equality advocacy work in 
the Pacific region over the last two decades. Much of this work has followed 
a global push for a higher participation of women in parliaments. Efforts by 
Pacific women’s civil society groups especially have concentrated on policy 
advocacy, strategies and training for women’s political participation. This 
emphasis however has to a large extent sidelined attention to other arenas 
of government, namely the public sector, where women’s leadership is also 
prominent. Women’s appointment to senior government positions such as heads 
of ministries or divisions within ministries has been a recent development in 
Pacific public sectors (Maetala and Pollard 2009; Liki 2010). Yet, not much is 
known about the extent of women’s leadership there nor about its implications 
for the overall objective of gender equality as a development focus. 
This paper examines the link between having more women leaders in the public 
service and the enhancement of women’s cause in general. Specifically, it asks 
the question: To what extent do women leaders in government impact on the 
status of women in society? The paper is based on research conducted in Samoa 
and Solomon Islands in 2009 and 2010 which identified patterns of women’s 
ascension to public sector leadership. In the Solomon Islands the position of head 
of a government ministry is referred to as Permanent Secretary (PS). The Samoan 
equivalent (or near equivalent) of this title is Chief Executive Officer (CEO). I use 
the term ‘women leaders’ to refer to women in these senior positions as well as 
those in deputy, assistantship or managerial levels. Results from research indicate 
that improvement at the upper levels may not necessarily reflect development 
at the broader societal level. Attitudinal change at the levels of community and 
government is central to effective policy change towards gender equality. The 
first part of the paper surveys the current status of women’s leadership in the 
public services of the two countries. The second part discusses the implications 
of the current situation for women’s advancement. The paper concludes by 
emphasising the need for analysis on gender equality to be more inclusive of 
all elements and sectors involved for a more balanced understanding of Pacific 
Island women’s condition. 
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Women in Higher Places
Despite certain political and sociocultural variations, one factor that parallels 
Samoa and Solomon Islands is the noticeable rise of women to decision-making 
levels in government. It is also a notable factor that these women are highly 
qualified in terms of tertiary educational training and the qualifications they 
hold. Women’s appointment to public service leadership of the two countries is 
a recent phenomenon, yet an important one for two reasons. First, never before 
in the respective histories of their public services has been a sharp increase in 
the number of women appointed to senior executive positions. Second, whether 
this phenomenon echoes transition at the broader society level is a complex 
matter and would merit further research. A general picture of the situation 
of women leaders in government is provided here. An emerging trend is that 
there are certainly more women in senior positions today than was the situation 
10 or 15 years ago. Statistics indicate that in the Solomon Islands, 6 of the 24 
government ministries are headed by women. In Samoa 6 of 18 ministries and 8 
of 13 government corporations have women CEOs. 
The research focus on Samoa and Solomon Islands was to understand the current 
status of women’s leadership in the public service. The study objective was to 
understand the socioeconomic, cultural and political reasons behind the absence 
of women in senior Public Service positions. A field visit was undertaken to 
elicit concrete responses from the women and men in government. Two research 
tools were employed for data gathering: a survey questionnaire and interviews. 
The findings indicate an improvement in women’s participation in senior and 
mid-level government jobs pointing to a possible beginning of a new trend for 
women and leadership in this sector for both countries. 
Of the 24 government ministries in the Solomon Islands, five are headed by 
women. The Office of the National Legislative Assembly is directed also by a 
woman with another woman as her deputy. Of these six senior women, two 
have been in these positions since 2002. Two were appointed within the last 
two years and the other two within the last eighteen months. A sharp increase 
in the number of women appointed to mid-level positions is a feature of the 
last ten years. This trend corresponds with a growing number of older public 
servants and younger women completing tertiary training overseas. Typical 
positions occupied by these women include Deputy Permanent Secretary, 
Registrar, Principal Officers, Directors of Divisions within Ministries, Managers 
or Supervisors of sections. For the newer cohort of women graduates the 
major fields of study are general bachelor degrees with majors in management, 
sociology, accounting, biology and education, and a few in law, dentistry and 
medicine. A significant number obtained their diploma and certificates from 
Solomon Island College of Higher Education. About 60 per cent of the women 
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graduated with degrees from the University of the South Pacific in Fiji and 
Vanuatu, and the rest from tertiary institutions in either Papua New Guinea, 
Australia or New Zealand. 
It is likely that the total figure for this younger cohort of graduates is higher. 
There are many women who do not work for the public service. Kathleen Lega, 
for example, graduated with a Bachelor of Pharmacy from the University of 
Otago, New Zealand, in 2005 and now runs her own business, Le Pharmacy, 
in Honiara. Phyllis Maike, graduated with a Masters of Arts in Planning from 
the University of Hawai’i in 2004 and now operates her consultancy firm, 
Positive Development Limited. Others like Linda Au, Dr. Joanna Daiwo, Dr. Alice 
Pollard, Hazel Lulei and Nairie Alamu are employed in either private companies, 
regional organisations (USP, FFA, SPC and RAMSI) or para-public organisations 
(NPF, Central Bank and SICHE). Many more women reside in the outer islands 
operating small family businesses or working in tourist resorts. Indeed, a more 
thorough survey would locate and confirm the exact count for this group of 
women graduates. 
In Samoa, the number of women in top positions in government ministries is 
indeed a new thing for the country. Although women did head government 
departments in the past, appointments were sporadic. Most of those women 
were wives or daughters of politicians, business people, and church leaders. 
Today, it is a very different situation with women from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds making up part of Samoa’s pool of the highly qualified. 
A combination of factors has contributed to the growing number of women in 
top government positions. These include: (i) an established cohort of highly 
qualified women; (ii) international pressure through conventions on the 
enhancement of women’s status; and (iii) the country’s accommodating political 
climate. All these influences happen to emerge at the same time and the right time 
too. Public Sector Reform in Samoa began in the mid-1990s, and it was basically 
driven by the three women Chief Executive Officers at the time. Respectively 
they headed the Public Service Commission, the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs. All of these women have graduate degrees. 
Broader Implications for Women’s 
Advancement
We need to situate the emerging trends for the two countries in the context 
of sociocultural and political processes. There is also a need to adopt a more 
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holistic perspective on the improved status of women based not only on the 
outcome of women’s participation in leadership roles in the public arena but 
also in their leadership at the community and village levels. 
An interesting finding from a recent study by Zubrinich and Haley (2009) 
indicates that for some Pacific women, despite their being senior public servants 
and involved in decision-making processes in government, they continue to 
experience problems of domestic violence from jealous husbands, barriers to 
job promotions and study opportunities, and sexual harassment in the work 
place. These experiences obviously cannot be seen in the statistics that we have 
about the women’s ascension to government leadership. 
Given these problems, we cannot completely claim women’s leadership 
participation as sufficient indicators of the enhancement of women’s status. 
We need to consider more seriously the question of whether high numbers 
are a condition for policy change. Increasing women’s presence in government 
leadership (and political positions, for that matter) may help highlight gender 
demands and lead to greater political unity among women. But what is primarily 
important for the advancement of gender policies is strong advocacy and co-
ordination by those who aim for changes in gender relations. Attention must 
therefore be paid also to other areas or groups that work on increasing awareness 
campaign on gender equality. These include local women’s church or village 
groups and NGOs. 
Domestic violence and VAW are acute social and development issues in the 
Solomon Islands. The lack of educational opportunities for girls has also been 
highlighted in previous studies and surveys as another critical development 
focus. While these are real problems for many Solomon Island women, real 
change can never be effective or meaningful for the local people through formal 
policy approaches alone. Putting a man in prison for the crime of wife beating is 
like band-aiding a big wound. It may earn some points for those fighting against 
VAW, but it will go a long way when there is attitudinal shift among men and 
women. In much of the Pacific, change of attitudes towards women as equal 
partners and who can also be leaders (and towards anything for that matter), 
begins within the circles of the informal tok storis (conversational) sessions 
and daily interactions among local people. This is why attention to local level 
women’s groups and NGO activities is very important.
The work of the Temporary Special Measure Working Group is a good example 
of community level operation that is also directly linked to policy level. The 
Group works to both raise awareness (use of media, lobbying with MPs etc) but 
also tries to influence parliamentary perspectives on women’s leadership. This 
was the main activity related to women that happened at the time while this 
research was undertaken.
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Despite the fact that Samoa is often hailed as the model for the Pacific in this 
regard, the problems of violence against women and incest cases against young 
girls, still exist. Day after day one reads in the paper or hears over the radio 
about crimes against girls and women. The establishment of the new NGOs 
‘Victim Support Group’ and ‘Faataua le Ola’ (Value Life), in the last four years 
reflects the increase of illegal practices against women. These new civil groups 
– alongside the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education, the National 
Council of Women and the YWCA – drive the campaign against domestic 
violence bringing about more awareness at the local level, working with both 
men and women towards a shift of attitudes towards women’s and men’s roles as 
equal partners in development.
Thus while it appears that all is improving at the upper levels, this does not 
indicate a similar pattern at the broader societal level. Policy change at/from 
the top becomes much more effective and meaningful for society as a whole 
when attitudinal change also happens at the community and village level. In 
the Solomon Islands, the call for serious attention to improved educational 
opportunities for girls in particular has never been stronger. Not only has there 
been keen advocacy by international women’s groups and aid donors such as 
UNIFEM, but the unyielding stand of the local women themselves is indication 
that change is inevitable. Almost a decade ago, prominent Solomon Island 
woman leader and scholar, Alice Pollard (2000: 16) argued
...with the greater involvement of women in education and employment 
and increasing male acceptance of female participation in areas 
traditionally denied to them, the old division of labour based on gender 
will gradually be undermined. Solomon Islands society is in the process 
of adapting to a new system of economic relationships that are based on 
cash. Accordingly, new social, political and cultural values are slowly 
being defined, to which these Solomon Islands women (and men) will 
have to adjust. In short, change is inevitable, however much some 
women and men seek to cling to old ways and traditional ideas. 
The potential of women’s leadership as an indicator for improved women’s status 
and means towards gender equality in Pacific societies extends beyond simply 
increasing the number of women in top government positions. It may be a formal 
measure, but it is one that sends a clear message to institutional and social agents 
about gender inequalities. Attention to women’s leadership in government is a 
recognition that women and men are not playing on a level field. And it raises 
the profile of women’s struggles for greater representation in decision-making 
positions. But all this must translate to the language and perceptions of the rest 
of society – at the village and community levels where some extreme examples 
of crime against women and girls and practices reflecting gender inequalities 
still exist. 
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11. Young People Creating the Future 
Today: Youth Development in the 
Pacific
Rose Maebiru
Les jeunes qui aujourd’hui créent l’avenir : L’évolution des jeunes dans le 
Pacifique
Quand il s’agit de l’évolution des jeunes, les pays du Pacifique ont 
besoin de changer de modèle. La période pendant laquelle on se 
tournait vers les sports et le divertissements en tant qu’activités en vue 
du développement de la jeunesse est révolue. Les questions des jeunes 
sont complexes et présentent de nombreux aspects ; elles exigent une 
réflexion et des approches innovantes. Il faut considérer et traiter les 
jeunes et les problèmes de la jeunesse non pas comme une question 
d’aide sociale mais comme une question de développement national. Les 
secteurs public et privé peuvent tous les deux tirer des avantages s’ils 
impliquent les jeunes en tant que participants au développement du 
pays, et les jeunes ont quelque chose à apporter. La croissance annuelle 
de 2,2% prévue pour la population jeune dans la région exige de la 
créativité et de l’innovation dans les méthodes de travail avec les jeunes 
gens et les jeunes femmes pour surmonter des questions comme l’accès 
à une éducation de qualité pour tous, le chômage, les modes de vie et 
les comportements malsains, les conflits et la violence, les qualités de 
dirigeant, la participation à l’activité politique et l’inégalité des sexes. 
Cet article examine les stratégies adoptées par divers pays du Pacifique 
pour traiter du développement de leurs jeunes, en particulier les 
politiques nationales de la jeunesse en vue de donner des conseils et 
orienter le développement des jeunes. L’article se concentre sur le Plan 
Pacifique, sur la Stratégie de la jeunesse Pacifique 2010 et sur d’autres 
initiatives dédiées au développement des jeunes pour analyser les 
efforts des organisations régionales, des partenaires du développement, 
des donateurs et d’autres agences qui soutiennent le développement 
des jeunes qui tentent de reconnaître le besoin d’élargir les choix 
d’investissement dans le potentiel et le développement des jeunes 
comme ressource pour l’avenir et conclut que l’on peut faire davantage 
pour la jeunesse du Pacifique par le biais de partenariats efficaces et par 
la promotion d’une approche multisectorielle.
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From Issues to Policies and Action: Youth 
Development in the Pacific Region
The projections of an annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent of the youth population 
in the region will continue to demand creative and innovative ways of working 
with young women and men to overcome issues of accessing integrated and 
quality education, unemployment, unhealthy lifestyles and behaviours, conflict 
and violence, leadership and participation, gender inequality to name a few. 
The Pacific region has come a long way in its endeavours to unleashing the 
potential of young women and men to become leaders and custodians of our 
societies. With a mean age of 21 years for most Pacific island countries, the 
region has a huge resource at its disposal to address national and regional issues. 
However, for the most part, young people are viewed as ‘problems’ rather than 
solutions; a view that is detrimental to youth development itself. 
Countries in the Pacific have embarked on several strategies to address the 
development of their young people, one of which is the development of national 
youth polices to provide guidance and direction for youth development. These 
‘paper commitments’ often lack political will, resources and capacity to realise 
the policy goals and targets, fuelling discontent, alienation and a sense of 
hopelessness among young people. The frustrations of young people are evident 
in unfortunate events such as political and social upheavals that have occurred 
in some countries where young people were engaged in armed conflict, violence 
and other anti-social actions. These actions have drawn attention to the plight 
of young people in the context of national development and rebuilding. In more 
recent years more regional and international assistances are geared towards 
youth development, which is slowly putting more focus on addressing some 
of the institutional and structural weaknesses that hinder the implementation 
of the national youth policies. These efforts are slowly breaking the cycle of 
producing policies without actions. However, political will to support the 
expansion and sustainability of these changes is still minimal. 
The development of national capacity to develop evidence based youth 
development policies and plans, implementation, coordination and monitoring 
are essential to ensuring that services and opportunities are equally and 
equitably accessed by young people in rural and urban areas. While these 
responsibilities fall within the mandate of the government, very little is being 
done to ensure that these capacities are built and supported. In some countries, 
the capacity does exist however, inadequate resources are allocated to utilise the 
opportunities.
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This next section briefly touches on a strategy that sets the stage for effective 
implementation of national and regional commitments and mandates, recognising 
that youth is not a sector but a cross-cutting matter that requires input from 
various sectors. This section also briefly highlights regional commitments and 
plans for youth development in the region by our leaders. 
Establishing Partnerships to Progress: Youth 
Development in the Pacific
Achieving More for Pacific Youth through Effective 
Partnerships and the Promotion of a Multi-sectoral 
Approach 
Regional organisations, development partners, donors and other agencies 
supporting youth development have recognised the need to widen options for 
investing in the potential and development of young people as a resource for 
the future. Youth development encompasses the inclusion of young people in 
all aspects of national development – economic, political, cultural and social 
– and requires an emphasis on developing young people so that they can 
fully participate in national efforts to increase economic growth, achieve good 
governance, maintain and improve security and stability and achieve sustainable 
development. 
Investing in young people can draw long-term benefits for countries and 
territories in the Pacific region and is a less expensive option to addressing 
issues such as youth violence and crime, mental health, teenage pregnancy and 
HIV/STI infections which are a few of the growing and serious challenges facing 
young people in the Pacific today. Examples from the Caribbean region show 
that the region could increase its GDP by 1 per cent by lowering unemployment 
and by achieving higher enrolment in tertiary education, which could bring 
more than 2 per cent increase in the region’s GDP growth as a result of the 
higher earning potential of university graduates on the labor market. 
The Pacific region has not been able to generate such analysis, and solid research 
and analysis on the benefits of focused investment in youth development over 
the long term at both national and regional level can assist with bringing high 
level attention and resources to the table for progress. What is also clear is no 
single agency can support the full range of development options inclusive of 
programmes and services needed to ensure that young people are given the 
opportunity and experience to become responsible and productive individuals. 
A coordinated multi-sectoral approach can assist; based on sound evidence 
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and analysis that involves countries and agencies in a collaborative planning, 
implementation and monitoring process. This process should cover and involve: 
social services, sports and creative arts agencies, educational institutions, 
representatives of the employment sector, health service providers, private and 
public sectors agencies, policymakers, communities and young people. 
The Pacific Plan, Pacific Youth Strategy 2010 and 
Youth Development Initiatives
Youth development is a strategic objective of the Pacific Plan and the Pacific 
Youth Strategy 2010 provides a solid framework on which to develop and 
mobilise multi-sectoral support for the development of young people at 
both national and regional level. However, limited available resources, weak 
economies and competing national and regional priorities; together with the 
huge challenge of promoting ownership and progressing coordination in the 
youth sector has hampered efforts to progress these youth commitments. At 
the same time, PICTs’ young populations continue to grow putting pressure 
on already inadequate and weak services and the challenges mentioned earlier 
continue to expand. Current commitments and efforts need to be re-examined, 
consolidated with renewed approaches tried and resources up-scaled.
Pacific Plan Initiatives:
Initiative 9.1: Enhance Advocacy for and Coordination of Youth 
Programmes and Monitor the Status of Youth
This refers to the implementation of the Pacific Youth Strategy 2010 which 
was designed to promote, coordinate and monitor youth development in the 
region. Currently, SPC is conducting a review of the strategy in partnership 
with UNICEF Pacific and in consultation with other development partners, 
donors, financing institutions and SPC member countries and territories. This 
review and consultative process will contribute to the development of the next 
Pacific Youth Strategy which this time round will aim for stronger regional and 
country ownership; provide a solid framework on which to base a multi-sectoral 
strategy and implementation plan will require coordination, collaboration and 
joint approaches and programmes – both at regional and national level. This 
time round it is hoped that the emphasis on consultation and country and 
development partner ownership will result in more support and resources being 
directed to implementation.
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Initiative 15.4: Establish Volunteer Schemes and Other Forms of 
Regional Exchanges and Sharing of Services and Expertise for 
Regional Capacity Building
There is huge capacity to implement this initiative both in country but in 
particular across the region as there are many good examples of innovative and 
sustainable youth development programmes that can be shared and duplicated 
through a structured multi-sectoral approach and increased resources. A 
proposal that was designed by the SPC’s Human Development Programme as 
part of this initiative is the Pacific Regional Volunteer Scheme. The scheme 
was designed in consultation with member countries and other regional youth 
agencies in 2005/2005; however it has not been implemented due to a lack of 
financial commitment and resources. The main purpose and objectives of the 
scheme are: contribute to building the skills of young people in the Pacific, 
provide career related opportunities and sharing of services and expertise 
regionally. The expected impact over the long term is to have skills exchange 
and skills development opportunities for young Pacific Islanders and promoting 
regional cooperation and integration.
Pacific Youth Strategy 2010
As mentioned above, the Pacific Youth Strategy 2010 was endorsed by Youth 
Ministers in 2005 and was recognised as the regional road map for youth 
development. Like other regional strategies, this strategy will remain a paper 
commitment if there are no resources and support for its implementation. The 
results of the review of this strategy will reveal the gaps, challenges and success 
stories, which will help to shape the future youth development strategies.
Conclusion
Countries in the Pacific need a paradigm shift when it comes to addressing youth 
development. Gone are the days when we look at sports and entertainment as 
youth development activities. Youth issues are complex and multi-facet and 
require innovative thinking and approaches. Youth and youth issues need to be 
addressed as a national development matter and not merely as a welfare issue. 
Both private and public sectors can benefit from involving young people as 
contributors to national development and young people have something to 
offer. Youth development is a win-win situation.
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12. Tourism Issues in the Pacific
Susana Taua’a
Les problèmes du tourisme dans le Pacifique
Cet article met en lumière quelques problèmes réels perçus concernant le 
tourisme dans la région. On constate trois grands domaines qui affectent 
ce secteur : le domaine social, économique et environnemental. La nature 
et le caractère de ce secteur dans le Pacifique sont également définis 
en fonction de ces trois sphères d’influence. La clé pour comprendre 
le tourisme dans la région est la reconnaissance du fait qu’à la fois le 
secteur et son contexte, mondial et régional, traversent une période 
de transition profonde. On a besoin de comprendre les mutations qui 
se produisent et les raisons de ces mutations afin que le secteur puisse 
être mieux géré et mieux planifié. Il existe des questions plus larges 
qui affectent ou qui sont affectées par le tourisme  : les migrations 
internes, l’émigration, la complexité du foncier, le sexe, la gestion de 
l’information, la restructuration du secteur du transport aérien, le rôle 
des ONG, la capacité de mettre sur pied les ressources humaines, l’usage 
des institutions tertiaires régionales comme l’USP (l’Université du 
Pacifique Sud) et des organismes comme le SPREP et la CPS (Communauté 
du Pacifique Sud). L’article présente une étude des tendances en matière 
de tourisme dans la région en mettant l’accent sur les effets économique, 
social et environnemental, avant de proposer le potentiel du modèle fale 
de plage samoane comme modèle pour gérer quelques-uns des effets 
social, économique et environnemental du tourisme dans la région.
Introduction
This paper attempts to highlight some real and perceived issues concerning 
tourism in the region. There are three broad areas in which the industry has 
impacted strongly: social, economic and environmental. The nature and character 
of the industry in the Pacific is also defined in terms of these three spheres 
of influence. The key to understanding tourism in the region is a recognition 
that both the industry and its context, global and regional, are in a state of 
profound transition. There is a need to understand the changes taking place and 
the reasons for these changes so that the industry can be better managed and 
planned. There are broader issues that impact or are impacted upon by tourism: 
internal migration, emigration, land tenure complexities, gender, information 
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management, airline restructuring, the role of NGOs, human resource capacity 
building, use of regional tertiary institutions such as USP and bodies such as 
SPREP and SPC.
Tourism in the region is created in those places where the natural environments 
are unsuitable for farming or forestry – beaches feature strongly – or where 
there are no valuable minerals. Basically, there are two futures for tourism in 
the region, the product can be exploited and used up as in a mined out mineral 
resource, or it can be managed sustainably (Hall and Kearsley 2001; Cleverdon 
and Milne 2003).
The tourism industry in the Pacific has the capacity to return long-term benefits, 
but to be able to do this and remain sustainable it needs to satisfy four criteria: 
•	 It must be financial viable and provide real rates of return for investors (local 
and overseas) and provide worthwhile jobs for its workforce
•	 It must provide continuing visitor satisfaction. Bad experiences and 
declining satisfaction levels are rapidly communicated (as in a series of stray 
dogs attacking tourists in Samoa)
•	 It should be recognised that while the resources for tourism have often been 
thought of as the natural environment, many tourists are increasingly drawn 
to people’s cultures (hence the festivals – teuila, hibiscus, heilala) and ways 
of life which are just as vulnerable
•	 Tourism must be based upon a supportive host community, very important 
with the beach fale operation in Samoa. 
None of these four criteria operate in isolation, for instance community support 
is enhanced by the visible flow of dollars and jobs into the local areas although 
material benefits are often fragmentary and diverse that making such benefits 
visible is a difficult task. In the same way, without careful resource management, 
locals may find favourite popular picnic spots and beaches crowded and 
commodified as tourist ‘experiences’. Resource strategies must be developed so 
that they benefit locals as well as visitors. After all, satisfied visitors are far more 
likely to interact with locals than are tourists who feel resented or exploited.
Regional Tourism Trends 
There are three types of tourism to the region: business tourism, visiting 
friends and relatives (this is the most common form in Samoa), and holiday/
leisure tourism. There are also other forms but of a lesser degree of importance 
such as adventure tourism (surfing/bungy jumping) and special interest tourism 
(eco-tourism, sports). There has also been a ‘new’ form of tourism emerging 
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since the 1990s that appeals to the experienced and well educated traveller 
who is looking for much more than just the sun or to gaze at culture. This is a 
market that’s complicated, individual and sophisticated tastes are made possible 
by advanced information technology and communication – e-commerce and 
internet booking. It is characterised by variety, diversity, participation and 
individual flexibility (Poon 1993). It is a customised form of tourism to suit the 
consumer and the experiences sought are most likely to be much more diverse 
with a focus on quality environmental experiences, and ‘authentic’ settings and 
societies. For example these types of tourists do not seek standard hotels, they 
patronise backpacking accommodation, bed and breakfast lodgings and beach 
fale stays. This new form of tourism is an off-shoot of the development of the 
tourism industry in the Caribbean. It is important for the Pacific in the sense 
that the product is locally owned and therefore more authentic compared to 
standardised mass tourism which focuses on large destination resorts, group 
travels and scheduled tours. This new wave of tourism demands a particular 
set of products and services, so destinations must provide the facilities and 
experiences in line with the consumer aspirations. The issue is whether the 
small island states can do it in a sustainable manner.
The competitive nature of the industry is manifested in the segmentation of 
destinations in the region into four groups, based on the number of visitor 
arrivals and source markets (Cleverdon and Milne 2003). Fiji, French Polynesia, 
New Caledonia and Palau have visitor flows of 100,000+ people a year from 
Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and North America. The Cook Islands, 
PNG, Samoa and Tonga have around 30,000-70,000 visitors a year mainly from 
New Zealand and Australia, and benefit from the long-haul flight services by 
Air New Zealand and hopefully by Air Pacific in the case of Samoa. The third 
group (the Federated States of Micronesia and Vanuatu) experiences similar 
numbers of visitors as the second group and also mainly from the same markets 
(Australia and New Zealand). American Samoa, Tuvalu, Niue, Nauru, Marshall 
Islands, Kiribati and Solomon Islands make up the fourth group with modest 
levels of visitor arrivals due to access constraints, limited airline flights from 
originating points, leading to high costs of hotel operation and minimising the 
level of demand.
In addition, the organisation and spatial allocation of capital and tourists in the 
region is also segmented and unevenly spread, highlighting the core-periphery 
nature of the industry with Fiji, Tahiti and New Caledonia making up the core 
while the rest are peripheral destinations. Tourism in the region can be defined 
and analysed in relationship to issues of economic restructuring, globalisation, 
and post-Fordist modes of production (Hall 1994; Shaw and Williams 2004) 
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where the region is commodified as an ‘experience’ – a place characterised by 
a relaxed lifestyle where one is released from the stress of everyday life – to be 
consumed.
There is competition for the same product, characterised by aggressive marketing 
campaigns amongst the South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO) member 
countries. The web advertising of the region is surreal, almost fraudulent: 
the ‘exotic melting pot cultures and fascinating lifestyles of Fiji’, the ‘pristine 
aqua-marine waters of Samoa’, the ‘sugary-white magical beaches’ of Tahiti, 
the ‘spectacular marine life and timeless Tuvalu’ and ‘the strict observance 
of the Sabbath and the strong influence of the church provide a fascinating 
experiences for tourists’ in Tonga (SPTO Country Report). These claims conceal 
the environmental, economic, social and governance problems confronting the 
region. They are marketed as ‘premium’ destinations based on quality, safety, 
and their unique and diverse cultures. Product differentiation must take into 
account the great diversities in the culture, size, resources, private sector, and 
the different needs of SPTO countries.
We know for a fact that the economies of the island states are driven by tourism, 
and virtually all governments in the region have identified the industry as a 
priority sector for future economic growth through foreign direct investment, 
so I am not going to dwell on this except to cite some examples to illustrate the 
point. The SPTO suggests target revenue for the region from tourism of US$2 
billion per annum by 2010. If this is achieved tourism would be the largest 
contributor to ‘Pillar 1’ of the Pacific Plan (OSTA 2008:20). In Fiji, tourism was 
25.6 per cent of GDP in 2009 and is expected to increase to 27.8 per cent in 
2019, providing 91,000 jobs – or 23.5 per cent of total employment (World 
Travel and Tourism Council). In Samoa, tourism has boomed since 2005 and 
in 2007 visitor flow exceeded the 100,000 mark (but that was due to the South 
Pacific games – a one-off special interest tourism event). Tourism contributed 25 
per cent of GDP in Samoa in 2006 (Human Development Report 2006). In Palau, 
tourism accounts for 67 per cent of GDP, and in the Cook Islands, 50 per cent 
of GDP. In 2007, strong visitor growth was recorded in Papua New Guinea (+34 
per cent), Solomon islands (+19.7 per cent), Vanuatu (+19.3 per cent), Tonga 
(+16.7 per cent) and Kiribati (6.9 per cent) (South Pacific Tourism Organisation: 
19). Growth was driven by increased cheap air services (for example, Polyblue, 
a no-frills service) and destination marketing. In Samoa, the category of Visiting 
Friends and Relatives (VFR) made up 51 per cent of total visits in 2006 (Ministry 
of Finance 2007). In terms of volume, Samoa has the highest proportion of VFR 
visitors (35-40 per cent) in the region, followed by Tonga (33 per cent), Fiji 
(19 per cent) and Cook Islands (4 per cent) (Kavesi 2000). In Tonga, tourism 
contributes 12.2 per cent of GDP and 10.5 per cent of total employment in 2009 
(World Travel and Tourism).
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Developing a regional cruise shipping strategy to strengthen regional cooperation 
and integration (Pacific Island Forum Auckland Declaration 2004) based on the cruise 
tourism experiences of Fiji, Kiribati (as a remote new destination), PNG and Vanuatu 
would only serve to highlight the differences in size, population and resource 
endowments. In order to develop cruise ship tourism we need to promote the region’s 
cultural richness and natural beauty. The issues identified in the cruise ship strategy 
for action are based on the four beacons approach which are: 1) shore excursions and 
land based activities; 2) marine infrastructure and support services; 3) institutional 
management and cooperative frameworks; and 4) cruise destination marketing and 
promotion (South Pacific Cruise Shipping Development Strategy 2007:3). Samoa 
attempted to boost cruise ship visits and went all the way to Europe to promote 
Samoa as a possible destination and reported an increase from eight to twenty visits 
per year. In comparison, Port Vila gets 60 visits per year. Old ports have been rebuilt, 
turned into international ports in the past 12 months and have yet to receive cruise 
ship visits. Overall, the region is rated highest for friendliness of the locals (1.57, 
where one is excellent and five is poor), and lowest for safety/medical facilities (3.6) 
and port cleanliness (3.57) (Regional Cruise Shipping Strategy 2007:22).
As mentioned earlier, tourism is in a state of transition throughout the world, 
with the Pacific no exception. The industry is emerging as one of the few 
industries that can supply jobs, profits and growth. So it is essential that tourism 
should thrive and grow in ways that do not jeopardise its own future wellbeing, 
nor impose unacceptable pressures on the environment or society – that is, it 
must be sustainable, not only in itself, but also in terms of its wider context. 
As development practitioners, we can devise models of the broad parameters of 
sustainable tourism for the individual states in the region, but I am uncertain 
whether all stakeholders – the industry, host communities, visitors and resource 
managers – see sustainability in the same light. Commitment to sustainable 
tourism in the Pacific Islands is not always translated into practice (Harrison 
2004:13). Table 1 shows the results of a 2007 survey of 30 members of the 
tourism industry in Samoa, randomly selected from a number of sources such as 
the operators of beach fales, hotel and tour operators and administrators, which 
reveals some attitudes towards sustainability and associated issues in Samoa.





A great deal 2 7%
Quite a bit 3 10%
Moderate 6 20%
Very little 7 23%
None 9 30%
No response 3 10%
Source: Research Project for Environmental Geography, National University of Samoa 2009.
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One in three respondents did not give an answer, so it is not surprising that 
many people felt they needed to know more about sustainable tourism. Over 50 
per cent said that they felt they needed to know more. Some of the respondents’ 
comments about issues pertaining to sustainable practices within the tourism 
industry reflected the lack of understanding and awareness about sustainable 
tourism, for instance:
We needed to clear the big trees near the fales because there is too much 
rubbish from the leaves, and adds to breeding grounds for mosquitoes 
which is bad for business (26 year old female, April 2009).
I grew up here in Lalomanu, and our family have lived here for hundred 
years, and yes there are some changes to the beach face but it has always 
been like that in the past, the sea, beach, land is part of our culture and 
will remain when we are gone (60 year old male, April 2009).
Social Impacts 
Governments of the region are focussing on the macro-economic impacts and 
potential for growth of tourism to trickle down to the poor and marginalised 
communities. This is all very well, but it needs to be incorporated into the 
tourism agenda as an additional policy objective (Kennedy and Dornan 2009).
Tourism is more often than not made the scapegoat for the social ills in the 
region. Prostitution, cultural change and environmental deterioration are not 
necessarily a result of tourism. The mass media and other socio-economic 
developments are also responsible if not sole contributors.
Crowding (which is the negative perception of the numbers of groups or 
individuals in a particular setting) is not a measure of density although it reflects 
it, but it is an indicator that social carrying capacities have been breached (Hall 
and Kearsley 2001). A commonly used measure of crowding in the region’s 
tourism sites is the concept of encounter norms – that is, the number of groups, 
families or individuals that a person meets in a given setting. The beach fale 
context in Samoa is a good example to illustrate this perceptual construct, 
particularly over the festive season and public holidays such as Children’s 
Sunday where parents normally would treat the children for a swim and picnic 
at the beach.
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Environmental Trends 
Michael Hall and Stephen Page have written extensively on the environmental 
and ecological impacts of tourism on the Pacific islands including the clearing 
and dredging of mangroves and estuaries for resorts and golf courses and the 
near shore vegetation clearance for beach fale space which has accelerated 
coastal erosion and coastal pollution. On the other hand, tourism can contribute 
significantly to environmental protection and conservation through sound 
environmental management of tourism facilities, especially the large hotels and 
resorts. If it is to be sustainable in the long run, then it must incorporate the 
principles and practices of sustainable consumption, important for the fragile 
ecosystems of small islands like Samoa. Should locals/Pacific islanders reduce 
their ecological footprints to allow for massive uncontrolled consumption of 
global and regional resources in the name of tourism? 
The Samoan Experience: The Beach Fale
This industry can be described as young or new. It only managed to adopt 
a modern approach to marketing and promotion after the two destructive 
cyclones in 1990 and 1991 and the taro leaf blight in 1993 that destroyed the 
islands’ agriculture and main export earner (Twining-Ward and Twining-Ward 
1998). Prior to that, the Samoan government were not too keen to develop and 
promote mass tourism. The 1992 -2001 Tourism Development Plan emphasised 
a policy of ‘low volume, high yield’ and an industry that was environmentally 
responsible and culturally sensitive. The development of tourism in the early 
1990s can be described as cautious and small-scale oriented with a focus on 
sustainable tourism and attracting higher spending leisure tourists who require 
upmarket accommodation options.
Despite plans to attract higher spending tourists, the most obvious growth area 
in the last 15 years has been within the ‘beach fale’ sector which is categorised 
as a small-medium enterprise. A beach fale is an oval shaped hut with wooden 
posts supporting a thatch/corrugated iron roof, with a wooden floor, either with 
no walls but woven coconut leaf blinds or a tarpaulin for privacy and to protect 
against the elements (Scheyvens 2005).The beach fale approach to tourism for 
small island states such as Samoa is an example of ‘best practice’ tourism for 
various reasons:
•	 It is advocated as a ‘pro-poor’ form of development where the grass roots 
benefit directly from the backward and forward linkages entailed in the 
operation
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•	 It provides for a ’sustainable livelihood’ of rural Samoan families – rural 
based industry and people-centred (Haughey 2007:16). The ‘sustainable 
livelihood’ approach to development specifies that a household’s livelihood 
depends on assets (social, human, financial, natural) at their disposal 
which can be harnessed to achieve a desirable/acceptable level of social-
economic wellbeing for the household(s). These assets are fundamental to 
the establishment of beach fales in the first instance and there is adequate 
continuous supply of these ‘factors of production’ for further expansion of 
beach fale tourism.
•	 It integrates subsistence and cash-based livelihoods in that subsistence 
production is enhanced or encouraged by the availability of a ‘market’ for 
fish, pork, crayfish, vegetables, fruit and root crops (Rosalote, Litia, Tanu 
and Vacations beach fale consultations 2009).
•	 There are direct links with the invisible but growing ‘informal economy’ 
both in urban and rural Samoa. Previous work on the informal sector 
suggests strong linkages between beach fale operations and village hawking 
in handicrafts such as printed wraparound lava-lavas, tee shirts, woven fans 
and table mats, coconut and shell trinkets, and souvenirs.
•	 Women feature strongly in beach fale operations as owners and managers 
because of their organisational, hospitality and financial skills (Haughey 
2007). Having women run beach fale operations empowers them socially, 
economically with some financial independence.
•	 It is an authentic way to experience the culture of the place, in this case the 
‘faa Samoa’ and simple living. However it should be noted that beach fale 
operations are evolving away from simple open fales to enclosed modernised 
self-contained units in response to demands for privacy and comfort, 
which appeals to families with young children, older travellers and couples. 
However, ‘authenticity’ is a matter of degree, and the average tourist can only 
bear two to three days of sleeping in an open fale exposed to the elements, 
especially the rain, in a sandy bed, feeling oily and sticky (Haughey 2007: 
53-55).
•	 These fale are privately (family) funded either locally or from remittances. 
Two beach fale owners (one on Upolu and the other in Savaii) who were 
interviewed stated that their cattle farm and small retail shop supported the 
early beginnings of their beach fale venture which started with two small 
fales. They have reclaimed the land and added four other fales and a small-
medium sized conference room. All these extension to the business have been 
funded by the cattle farm, shop, bakery (which supplies other small shops with 
biscuits (popo and masi saina) and buns, and from children living overseas. 
Access to commercial bank borrowing has been difficult due to land tenure 
issues where 80 per cent of the land is customary owned and 98 per cent of 
beach fale operations in Samoa are located on customary owned land.
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•	 Beach fale operations have a minimum impact on the environment but are 
very vulnerable to natural disasters. The latest earthquake on 29 September 
2009 highlighted the vulnerability of beach fales to the forces of nature.
Future Trends
Beach fale tourism will continue to feature strongly in Samoa. While the latest 
disaster destroyed 50 per cent of beach fale operations in the country, this 
will only serve to improve planning and setting standards – building code, 
resettlement patterns, sewage disposal – to minimise loss should there be a 
repeat of the 29 September disaster. We need to think locally while maintaining 
good quality international standards in accommodation.
Given that Samoa lacks the facilities for large scale tourism, nature-based 
tourism (or eco-tours) can be applied to smaller states, and I am hoping that we 
leave the promotion and development of mass tourism such as cruise shipping 
to the larger states of New Caledonia, PNG, Fiji, and concentrate on beach fales 
and small- to medium-sized operations.
Tourism in the region is generating a range of social, economic and environmental 
impacts, although they vary greatly across islands, the impacts invariably manifest 
upon the islands communities at all stages of their respective developments. For 
this reason, there needs to be a longitudinal study of community attitudes to 
beach fale tourism, to monitor the cumulative impacts of beach fale tourism in 
the context of broader demographic, economic and social forces that moderate 
tourism on small islands and will provide some explanation for the change in 
community attitudes to tourism over time. 
Tourism in the islands will be affected by global travel and tourism which is 
expected to grow more rapidly in the coming years, probably outpacing the 
growth of world economic output. The industry in Asia Pacific is projected to 
grow at 8 per cent and the South Pacific will share in this growth. But the growth 
of the industry will require the removal of some major internal constraints such 
as inadequate, low quality infrastructure, land tenure restrictions. Also, there is 
a demand for small island states to focus on specialty tourism to meet growing 
global interests for clean, green, unspoilt natural environments especially for 
health-conscious travellers. Lastly, the islands need to work in partnership with 
academic institutions, regional organisations, the private sector and the donor 
community to develop sustainable tourism practices. The Oceania Sustainable 
Tourism Alliance in collaboration with Victoria University are working with 
Pacific islands to ‘produce a new road map for the growth of their tourism 
industry, a road map that sees island tourism as carbon clean’ (OSTA 2008:20).
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13. Rural Development: Back on the 
Agenda in the Western Pacific?
Matthew G. Allen
Le développement rural  : de nouveau à l’ordre du jour dans le Pacifique 
occidental?
Après des décennies pendant lesquelles on l’avait négligé, le 
développement rural, en particulier l’agriculture, est bien de nouveau à 
l’ordre du jour de l’assistance mondiale au développement. Cette tendance 
semble se refléter dans la région du Pacifique occidental, où quelques 
projets de développement rural bien dotés par les donateurs ont soit été 
récemment lancés soit le seront bientôt. Toutefois, si le développement 
rural peut être de nouveau à l’ordre du jour des donateurs, il l’a toujours 
été pour les Mélanésiens, dont la majorité habite des zones rurales. Le 
développement continue à être le discours dominant qui nourrit tous 
les domaines de l’Etat et de la société. Il continue également à être très 
contesté et devient de plus en plus politisé. Avec l’engagement récent 
par les donateurs dans le développement rural, il serait opportun de 
revisiter quelques-uns des débats les plus en vue sur le développement 
en Mélanésie et la question clé de savoir quelle sorte de développement 
rural est la plus appropriée. Pour explorer ces questions, cet article 
puise dans une partie de la recherche récente et du travail de consultant 
de l’auteur en Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée et aux Îles Salomon.
Introduction
After decades of neglect, agriculture and rural development are very much 
back on the global development aid agenda. The revival of donor interest in 
agriculture and rural development has been enabled by broader shifts in aid 
priorities and delivery mechanisms, particularly the move from the structural 
adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s to the local and community-
level engagement strategies that increasingly characterise contemporary aid 
programming. The Millennium Development Goals, the global food crisis, and 
the 2008 World Development Report – which had as its theme ‘Agriculture for 
Development’ – have also variously contributed to the renewed donor impetus 
to agriculture and rural development. 
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It is not my intention here to describe and analyse the extent to which these 
trends have been mirrored in the Pacific Islands context. Indeed, the absence 
of readily available disaggregated data makes it difficult to do so. Having said 
that, a number of recently commenced, or soon to commence, agriculture and 
rural development programmes in the Western Pacific would appear to provide 
at least anecdotal evidence for renewed donor interest in these sectors. Two 
such projects in Solomon Islands, for example, are the recently-commenced 
Rural Development Program, jointly funded by the World Bank, AusAID and 
the European Union; and the AusAID-funded Rural Livelihoods Program, 
which is at an advanced stage of project design. Similarly, donors in Papua 
New Guinea are increasingly engaging at the sub-national level, engagements 
that have significant rural development dimensions, all the more so if we are to 
include service delivery under the rubric of rural development as I believe we 
should. Importantly, donors are accompanying these local and community-level 
engagements with rigorous political economy analysis.
Rather than exploring the question of whether or not rural development is back 
on the agenda in the Western Pacific, I instead want to ask whether it has ever 
been off the agenda? While there may indeed be renewed donor and, in some 
cases, ‘recipient’ government interest in rural development, if one was to pose 
this question to a Melanesian, be a they a villager or a Member of Parliament, 
the response would be that rural development is, and has always been, firmly on 
the agenda. Development is the dominant discourse in postcolonial Melanesia 
and, as the vast majority of Melanesians continue to reside in rural areas, 
development discourse remains inescapably concerned with rural development 
including, importantly, the delivery of public goods and services.
In an interview on Al Jazeera in 2009, Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua 
New Guinea, denied the existence of poverty in Papua New Guinea. This statement 
spawned a lively discussion on the Association of Social Anthropologists of 
Oceania email list (known as ASAO net). The debate was peppered with words 
like poverty, livelihoods, food security, subsistence, exchange economies, cash 
economies, capitalism, culture and development. I was simultaneously struck 
by the extent to which these issues remain highly contested and unresolved on 
the one hand, and by how little some of us have learned from the story thus far 
on the other. Romanticism about idealised traditional lifestyles, characterised 
by subsistence abundance and social and ecological harmony, persists even 
amongst those who purport to have expert knowledge on these matters. The 
debate eventually and inevitably settled around the time-honoured dialectic of 
tradition and modernity, and to the similarly perennial question of what type of 
development is appropriate for rural Melanesia?
That is the question I explore in this short essay. What type of development 
is appropriate for rural Melanesia? While this is obviously a question that 
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Melanesians themselves are best placed to answer, bearing in mind that their 
perspectives are by no means unitary or homogenous, I proceed from the position 
that informed outsiders, ‘outlanders’ to borrow Margaret Jolly’s term, also have 
a valid voice and role in the debate. However, rather than attempting to offer a 
definitive answer to this question, I instead intend to frame it by discussing a 
number of other questions which contextualise and enrich the discussion, and 
provide some support for the tentative conclusions that are offered. 
These questions include: How has development played out in Melanesia? What 
does it look like? What has been the role of the state? To what extent has rural 
development become politicised? How much agency have local people had in 
forging their own development trajectories? I will base my observations on a 
number of diverse activities I have been undertaking over the past two years: 
teaching an undergraduate course on conflict and development in Melanesia; 
undertaking an analysis of the political economy of rural service delivery in 
Papua New Guinea; and preparing a research proposal to investigate the socio-
economic dimensions of smallholder oil palm production in Solomon Islands.
Theoretical Matters
First I change lexicon in order to delve briefly into matters theoretical and, 
in particular, to locate my discussion and approach within the development 
studies literature. Most readers will be familiar with the successive phases 
and perspectives in development theory: from modernisation through to 
structuralism (encompassing dependency and world-system theory), then to 
poststructuralism and, most recently, to postdevelopment which of course is 
strongly informed by postmodernism. 
Many contemporary development studies scholars agree that development 
has not seen the universal disintegration of culture and traditional societies 
in the face of capitalist modernisation that was posited by modernisation 
theorists. Similarly, developing countries of the so-called periphery have not 
been permanently subjugated as providers of labour to be exploited by the 
capital-intensive core, as theorised by the structuralists. And postdevelopment 
and postmodernism, with what geographer John Connell describes as their 
‘comprehensive yet totally intellectual assault on the foundations of modernism’ 
have, Connell continues, ‘largely failed to shake off the perceived virtues of 
modernity, whether in villages or parliaments, in boardrooms or international 
institutions’ (Connell 2007:122). Governments need to raise revenue to provide 
public goods and perform essential functions. People in rural communities want 
to earn money to pay for school fees, kerosene, clothes, soap, and imported 
food. Postdevelopment’s pronouncement of the end of capitalism clearly seems 
premature. 
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Where, then, does Melanesia fit in this theoretical schema? Poststructuralists – 
those who see the contours of development in terms of hybridity and syncretism 
– appear to have much to offer in the context of rural Melanesia. This perspective 
enables us to account for the persistence and ‘robustness of indigenous economic 
and cultural forms’ (Curry and Koczberski 1998:31). It enables us to consider 
social and cultural logics, as well as purely economic ones, as salient shapers 
of place-based development outcomes and trajectories. It implicitly emphasises 
the social embeddedness of economic activity and decision-making.1
Social Embeddedness
Economic geographer George Curry applies a social embeddedness framework 
to his analysis of the relationships between smallholder palm oil production 
and the local gift-exchange economy in West New Britain Province of Papua 
New Guinea. He employs palm oil production data, interviews conducted with 
smallholders, and ethnographic observations to demonstrate that the timing 
and extent of smallholder engagement with the cash economy is significantly 
determined by the level of activity in the indigenous exchange economy, which 
in turn is underpinned by the need to maintain social relations and group 
identity (Curry 2003:412-418). 
Similar patterns and relationships are seen in the ways in which labour is 
organised and mobilised to produce palm oil (which is often along kinship 
lines), and in the practice of trade stores extending loans and credit to enable 
smallholders to respond to unanticipated requirements for gift-exchange, such 
as funerals. Curry (1999) and fellow geographer Glenn Banks (1999) reported 
similar findings in their studies of trade stores in parts of East Sepik Province 
and the Highlands respectively. Preliminary investigations into smallholders’ 
engagements with a commercial oil palm operation on Guadalcanal in Solomon 
Islanders indicate that similar processes are also at play there (Fraenkel et al. 
2010:70-71).
Curry argues that the West New Britain palm oil example demonstrates how 
smallholders’ engagements with one another and with an ostensibly capitalist 
economic activity are transformed through ‘place-based practices’, in this 
case gift-exchange and its importance in maintaining social relations, to create 
a hybrid modernity that ‘bears little resemblance to the idealised notions of 
market economic relationships and the economically rational, utility maximising 
individual’ (Curry 2003:406).
1 There is expanding body of literature that addresses the social embeddedness of economic activity and 
decision-making, both internationally (see Zukin and DiMaggio 1990 for an overview) and in the particular 
case of Papua New Guinea (see for example Gregory 1982; Banks 1999; Curry 1999, 2003, 2005). 
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Importantly, the social embeddedness framework provides a robust critique 
of the Marxist inspired structuralist perspectives applied by earlier scholars 
of Papua New Guinea’s development trajectory of whom Amarshi, Good and 
Mortimer (1979) and Thompson and MacWilliam (1992) are exemplars. These 
researchers shared a conceptualisation of capitalism as a monolithic, hegemonic 
and homogenising force and argued that the penetration of global capitalism 
would inevitably ‘result in the destruction of non-capitalist societies and 
their infrastructure’ (Curry 2003:407). Poststructuralist perspectives such as 
that offered by Curry (2003) and Connell (2007) are of considerable analytical 
importance for our purposes as they emphasise the importance of hybridity, 
syncretism, agency, and the influence of culture:
In this view socially and culturally constructed place becomes important 
for shaping patterns of interaction at the local level. Agency is therefore 
recognized, and the assumption of a hegemonic capitalism therefore 
undermined (Curry 2003:408).
Capitalist forces thus played out in different cultural universes as did all 
other alien introductions such as Christianity, cricket, clocks and law 
(Connell 2007:124-125).
Extractive Resource Industries
I change tack now to consider the local development discourses surrounding 
large-scale extractive resource industries, especially mining and logging. Why 
have so many rural communities throughout PNG and Solomon Islands allowed 
these activities to occur on their land in spite of their demonstrable ability to 
cause severe environmental and social harm? For Filer and MacIntyre, writing 
in regard to mining in PNG the answer lies, at least partly, in the failed ‘promise 
that wealth generated by mining would strengthen the state and increase its 
capacity to improve services across the nation…’ (Filer and MacIntyre 2006:227). 
A collection of essays on mining in PNG edited by Filer and MacIntyre reveals:
the ways that mining, in spite of the problems it generates, appears 
to be a sure way that local people can gain employment, business 
opportunities, roads, hospitals, and schools – the development that their 
government has been unable to deliver…there is sufficient evidence of 
relative wealth and advantage to feed aspiration among those who have 
no mine and nostalgia among those whose mine has closed (2006:224).
Of course communities are by no means united nor unified in their views on 
extractive resource projects. One need only look as a far as Russel Hawkin’s 
documentary Since the Company Came or Martin Maden’s more recent Crater 
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Mountain Story to see just how locally-contested and divisive such projects 
can be. In some instance these competing local perspectives map onto broader 
epistemological contestations manifest as competing visions for development. 
For example, in the only detailed study to date of the social impacts of commercial 
logging in a particular locality in Solomon Islands, Kolombangarra, Ian Scales 
identifies:
a fractionation of local society into groups competing for ‘large scale’ 
or ‘small scale’ forest resource development. The crosscutting social 
differentiation drives conflict between ‘entrepreneurial landowners’ 
and ‘traditionalist smallholders’ over forest resources and generates 
competing island-level political associations (Scales 2003:iv).
In other instances the localised contestation over extractive resource projects 
takes on salient gender dimensions. Frequently it is women who articulate 
the greatest opposition to mining and commercial logging activities, more so 
perhaps in matrilineal societies such as Bougainville, Guadalcanal and Western 
Solomons.
The Politicisation of State Development Funds
I return now to Filer’s and MacIntyre’s point about communities’ enthusiasm 
for mining and logging being driven by the failure or inability of the state to 
provide services. Ironically, the failure of state service delivery has been used 
to justify the increasing politicisation of the state development budgets, most 
notably in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. Here I am talking about 
the so-called slush funds, the District and Provincial Support Grants and, more 
recently, the District Services Improvement Program in Papua New Guinea; and 
the Rural Constituency Development Fund in Solomon Islands.
Supporters of such funds argue that they were initially devised as a useful way 
of capitalising on MPs’ intimate knowledge of their electorates and bypassing 
bureaucratic bottlenecks to fund critical infrastructure projects to the benefit 
of the whole electorate (Ketan 2007:8-14). However, in the case of Papua New 
Guinea, the history of constituency development funds is perhaps best seen 
in the context of so-called decentralisation reforms. The 1995 Organic Law 
on Provincial Governments and Local Level Governments (OLPGLLG) and 
subsequent amendments can be interpreted as a successful attempt by national 
level politicians, particularly Open MPs, firstly to remove their competitors in 
the form of elected provincial representatives, and then to gradually increase 
the volume of resources directly channelled into the district level over which 
they have developed significant de facto and de jure control. 
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Described by one informed commentator as ‘a kind of decentralisation race to 
the bottom’ (Whimp 2009:3), a string of amendments to the OLPGLLG have 
seen the establishment of district-level committees over which Open MPs have 
significant control; the removal of Regional MPs from these committees; and, 
most recently, the removal of Local Level Government (LLG) presidents from 
provincial assemblies arguably providing Open MPs with more power and 
leverage vis a vis provincial governors.2 Alongside these developments was 
the increase in District Support Grants, but not Provincial Support Grants, to a 
maximum of K1.5 million for each Open MP in 1999 (though we must also note 
the bearing that the machinations of parliamentary politics have had on the 
capricious nature of these allocations); and, most recently, the dramatic increase 
in the District Services Improvement Program grant to K4 million, K6 million 
and K4 million per district in 2007, 2008 and 2009 appropriations. 
De facto arrangements have included the deliberate marginalisation of LLG 
presidents, and even District Administrators, from district level decision-making 
processes, meaning that the significant amount of funds now being channelled 
through the districts can be, and are being, used for pork-barrel politics (see 
Allen and Hasnain 2010:16-17). This comes at the cost of good service delivery 
outcomes not only because projects are targeted at MPs’ voter strongholds at the 
expense of the wider electorate, but also because there is a strong emphasis on 
capital investments made with scant regard to provincial, district, LLG or ward 
planning processes and, therefore, to on-going operational funding.
Importantly these developments have not been driven by the dictates of ‘rational 
actor’ political economy alone. Like the economic behaviour described earlier 
in relation to hybrid forms of modernity, political behaviour in postcolonial 
Melanesia is also significantly determined by social and cultural logics. Elected 
representatives and public servants at all levels of government continue to be 
enmeshed in social networks of reciprocity and obligation (see, in particular, 
Morgan 2005). Their kinship groups, which in the case of elected representatives 
are often coterminous with their political support bases, expect them to 
distribute and share whatever resources they can access. 
This hybridity is not restricted to the behaviour of MPs and government 
officials; it characterises state institutions throughout postcolonial Melanesia. 
Reviewing the literature on the relationships between local political cultures 
and the formal state in Melanesia, much of which is concerned with Papua New 
Guinea, Morgan concludes that ‘pre-existing social forms pervade the state at 
almost every level’ (Morgan 2005:4). Indeed, there is widespread support in the 
2 The Papua New Guinea Supreme Court has recently ruled the 2006 amendment to be unconstitutional, 
which would appear to pave the way for LLG presidents to be reinstated to Provincial Assemblies (National, 
7 June 2010).
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literature for the proposition that the introduced state in Papua New Guinea 
has become thoroughly indigenised (Gordon and Meggitt 1985, Standish 1992, 
Ketan 2000, Morgan 2005).
Conclusion
While rural development may be back on the agenda for donors, it has never 
been off the agenda for the predominantly rural inhabitants of Melanesia. It is a 
discourse that remains enmeshed in historical and contemporary imaginings of 
the state – ‘the government’ – as a provider of services and public goods. Indeed 
it is the failure of state to provide services and generate economic opportunities 
that arguably informs Melanesians’ desire to host extractive resource projects, 
even amongst communities which have directly experienced the catastrophic 
social and environmental impacts of such projects. Ironically, the failure of 
state service delivery has also been used to justify the increasing politicisation 
of development budgets, at least in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, 
thereby further undermining the equitable allocation of public goods. 
In this short essay, I have argued that social and cultural logics, as well as economic 
ones, have shaped the ways in which development, and development discourses, 
have played out in postcolonial Melanesia. The cases examined have highlighted 
the dangers inherent in the bifurcation and dichotomisation that continues to 
characterise much of policy and even scholarly discourse about development 
in Melanesia: modern versus traditional; rural versus urban; informal versus 
informal. Such bifurcation is counterproductive at best. Hybridity as it has been 
elucidated here is best seen as total and complete merging: the emergence of new 
and complete socio-economic forms which are a ‘vibrant blend of modern and 
pre-modern, of capitalist and pre-capitalist phenomena, where the boundaries 
are continually shifting and indistinct’ (Curry and Koczberski 1998:48).
What, then, is the most appropriate form of development for rural Melanesia? I re-
emphasise that this is a question which Melanesians are best placed to answer as 
demonstrated eloquently by Solomon Islander scholar David Gegeo’s exposition 
of the West Kwara’ae (a region of Malaita) philosophy of gwaumauri’anga, 
meaning the ‘good life’ (1998:75). The philosophy encapsulates a holistic 
approach to ‘rural development’ which caters for spiritual, psychological and 
physical needs – in addition to economic goals – and is firmly anchored in 
indigenous knowledge (Gegeo 1998:73-74). Gegeo contrasts this philosophy 
with government approaches to development which villagers describe as ‘a one-
sided vision’. Villagers believe that this disjuncture has led to the inevitable 
failure of official rural development projects in the region. The philosophy of 
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gwaumauri’anga is echoed in the Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin phrase ‘gutpela 
sindoan’, perhaps also best translated as a highly localised conception of the 
‘good life’. 
These conceptions underscore the salience of local epistemologies of 
development, of the dialectics of people and nature, and of the connections 
between land and identity. They also point to the growing recognition that 
Melanesians’ engagements with capitalist economies are inflected to serve place-
based socio-economic and cultural goals as they seek to achieve a meaningful 
blend of modernity and tradition. The forgoing discussion has thrown up some 
implications for development practice. Having applied a social embeddedness 
framework to his analysis of smallholder oil palm producers’ engagements 
with the cash economy in Papua New Guinea, Curry (2003) offers two such 
implications which warrant restating here. First, modes of production and 
marketing should be flexible enough to respond to the demands of the gift-
exchange economy. Second, development interventions should be conscious of 
the ways in which surpluses can be appropriated by the exchange economy. 
This appropriation is more problematic in the case of ventures that require high 
levels of operating capital.
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14. Regionalism: Performance and 
Promise
Henry Ivarature
Le régionalisme – réalisations et espoirs
Cet article examine les réalisations et la promesse du régionalisme dans 
le Pacifique en considérant les accords commerciaux et économiques, 
la fourniture de services et les facilités de soutien (appelées également 
le développement sectoriel), les réactions politiques et en matière de 
sécurité et le Conseil des organisations régionales dans le Pacifique 
(CROP) en mettant l’accent sur le Forum des Îles du Pacifique et la 
promesse d’une plus grande intégration et d’une plus grande coopération 
régionales par le biais du Plan Pacifique. Cette question des réalisations 
et des promesses pour  le régionalisme appelle des réponses variées, 
l’une d’elles étant que les résultats de l’énergie globale dépensée en vue 
de l’intégration régionale sont quelque peu mitigés. On n’a pas obtenu 
les rendements attendus de cette intégration régionale. Par conséquent, 
cela vaut-il la peine d’investir ? En outre, les résultats du régionalisme, 
quelle que soit la façon dont on le définit, ont besoin d’être examinés 
et mis à la disposition de tous ceux qui ont un intérêt à la question 
afin qu’ils soient en mesure de les juger. Une autre proposition est le 
besoin d’un examen plus approfondi du régionalisme. Quelles sont les 
réalisations de ce régionalisme  ? Quels sont les difficultés et les défis 
auxquels il doit faire face ? Quelles en sont les réussites ? Quelles en 
sont les perspectives et les promesses ? Cet article retrace l’évolution du 
régionalisme dans le Pacifique et présente une réponse personnelle au 
défi qui consiste à le construire et le promouvoir tel qu’il s’articule dans 
le Plan Pacifique.
Introduction
From the outset, some qualifications are necessary. As a regional public 
servant involved in coordinating the implementation of some initiatives in 
the Pacific Plan, this chapter may be biased towards regional integration. The 
topic suggests several things. One is that the overall energy put into regional 
integration has been somewhat mixed. The perceived returns on investment in 
regional integration have not been delivered. Therefore, is it really worth the 
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trouble in investment? Moreover, the performance of regionalism, however that 
is defined, needs to be examined and laid out for all stakeholders to assess. What 
has regionalism achieved? What are the challenges and difficulties? What are 
the successes? What are the prospects and what are the promises? 
Regionalism as it is defined by the Pacific Islands Forum will be revisited after 
a review of the regional governance architecture. But from the outset, several 
publications on regionalism should be acknowledged in contributing to the 
discourse and might also help to share perspectives on the subject. These include 
the publication edited by Graham (2008) on models of regional governance, 
Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer (2006) on redefining the Pacific, the article by Freitag 
(2006) on regional integration in the South Pacific, and Fry (2005) on the regional 
governance infrastructure. Reviewing these works bring out the importance of 
the subject as well as its complications and dynamics. Fry’s paper is notable for 
its analysis of the evolving phases of pooled regional governance, overlapping 
in different time periods covering different issues.1 
For this discussions, regionalism will be considered under the following headings: 
trade and economic arrangements; service delivery and support facilities (also 
referred to as sectoral development); political and security responses; Council of 
Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) with a specific focus on the Pacific 
Islands Forum; and the promise of greater regional integration and cooperation 
through the Pacific Plan. The performance of and promise for regionalism 
should speak for itself.
Regional Trade and Economic Arrangements
Many trade arrangements have been entered into by many independent Pacific 
Island states for many different developmental objectives. These include the belief 
that economic growth would be stimulated, jobs and employment opportunities 
would be created, and the national economies would diversify and grow. Often 
it is the challenge to the abilities of Pacific states to generate revenue to support 
public expenditure away from the traditional tariff-based revenue generation 
and the subsequent exposure of national industries to international competition 
which generates much scepticism about trade arrangements. Concessions to these 
concerns have often been addressed through trade preference arrangements but 
have over the years been gradually negotiated away to free trade agreements. 
1 Fry (2005) describes five main phases, beginning with comprehensive regional integration (1971-74), 
overlapping and advancing with sectoral integration (1971-1978), moving with increased collective diplomacy 
(1979-90), and intertwined with regional security community (1984-89) and the harmonisation of national 
policies (1994-2003).
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Early trade preference arrangements for Pacific states include those granted 
by the United Kingdom in the mid-1960s when former colonies joined the 
European Economic Community and later incorporated with Africa, Caribbean 
and the Pacific states as well as the Generalised System of Preference (GSP) 
under the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1971. Initially, the Pacific 
states entered these agreements individually as they became independent self-
governing states and were followed by others. Fiji, Samoa and Tonga entered 
Lomé in 1975 and other Pacific states entered into the series of Lomé agreements 
in 1979, 1984, 1990 and later the broader Cotonou Agreement (1975) – the 
flagship of the ACP-EU development cooperation. The EPAs which are under 
negotiation, involving individual states and groups of countries will replace the 
Cotonou agreement. Only Fiji and Papua New Guinea have signed onto Interim 
EPAs on Trade in Goods Agreement as both need to maintain market access 
to the EU, especially for sugar and tuna respectively. Currently, Fiji’s sugar 
preference is suspended as part of the EU sanctions following the military coup, 
placing at stake approximately 26 per cent of its total export earnings.
Aside from the developmental objectives, the need to export their raw materials 
to sustain national economies inadvertently brought Pacific states into the 
broader arena of globalised and regional trade and economic arrangements. The 
inherent risks, threats, challenges and benefits are all an integral part of this 
process. Trade agreements however provide the broad governance framework 
under which trading parties agree to conduct commercial exchanges, investment 
and trade in goods and services.
Other notable trade arrangements with an economic growth agenda initiated at 
the bilateral level have been entered into between Pacific states with Australia 
and New Zealand, and between Pacific states. Some bilateral agreements interface 
with other regional agreements. For example, the Papua New Guinea-Australia 
Trade and Commercial Relations Agreements (PACTRA) was complemented by 
the South Pacific Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) in 
1980 at the Leaders meeting in Kiribati and which was later incorporated into 
PACTRA. Trade between the 14 Forum countries is limited, estimated at only 2 
per cent of their total trade (Dearden 2008). The Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG) and the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) are amongst 
the most notable examples of reciprocal and non-reciprocal trade agreements 
between and amongst Pacific Island countries. The former was initiated and 
put into place by leaders of the three Melanesian states – Papua New Guinea, 
the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in 1993 and Fiji later in 1998. The agreement 
commits MSG members to liberalise trade over 8 years from 2005. 
Unlike the MSG trade agreement, PICTA essentially laid the basis for a free 
trade agreement and economic integration through the Pacific Islands with its 
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region-wide arrangement. It was signed by 14 Pacific Island states2 along with 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER), with Australia 
and New Zealand in 2001. Reviewed through the Forum Trade Ministers 
Meetings which is held once a year, PACER sought ‘to provide the ‘stepping 
stone’ to allow Forum Island Countries to gradually become part of a single 
regional market and integrate into the international economy’. While tariffs 
were scheduled to be reduced to zero by 2010 and 2012 for different Pacific 
Island states, exemptions and protection of certain industries exist. PICTA is 
broad minded in that it recognises other trade agreements of its members such 
as the Cotonou agreement, SPARTECA and the Compact of Free Association. 
The recent trade and economic integration agreement with Forum countries, 
PACER Plus, is anticipated to assist in ‘furthering regional integration and 
helping to create opportunities for economic growth and prosperity in Forum 
Countries, including employment’. Some observers, notably NGOs are not 
convinced and believe the prospects for some Forum Island countries are not 
good. Others contend that PACER and PACER Plus attempt to offer the Forum 
Island region the real prospects for economic integration. To help overcome 
Fiji’s ‘isolation’, Leaders in 2009 agreed that the Fiji military regime would not 
participate in the PACER Plus negotiations but Fiji officials would be briefed 
following each negotiation meeting and who would also convey Fiji’s concerns.
For the northern Pacific the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit is another sub-
regional political platform for Micronesian leadership to provide a collective sub-
regional voice on a range of issues affecting their region as well as to develop a 
collective position and direction. Similar to the Pacific Islands Forum and MSG, 
outcomes of the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit are issued at the end of their 
meetings. The Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Marshall Islands 
and the Republic of Palau operate under a Compact of Free Association with the 
United States which ends in 2023. Trade arrangements, especially exports to 
the United States are an integral component of the Compact arrangement. The 
Compact arrangement, aside from providing a broad framework for economic 
development and assistance, self-government and national defence and security, 
provides these Island states privileged immigration access to the United States. 
Monetary aid to the Federated States of Micronesia is approximately US$90 
million, about US$60 million a year for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and 
about US$450 million over a period of 15 years for the Republic of Palau under 
the Compact arrangement. Concessions for this arrangement include permitting 
the United States to deploy troops, undertake military exercises and test fire 
missiles until 2066 with an option to extend it to 2086. Claims arising out of 
2 All the Forum Island Countries, except for Australia and New Zealand signed this agreement.
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US nuclear test at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls are deemed to be settled. These 
Island states are restrained from acting contrary to the security and defence 
agreements.
Some Pacific states (Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Tonga) 
have joined the successor of GATT, the World Trade Organization (1995) which 
has stronger enforcement powers as well as the challenges of multilateral trading 
system. Papua New Guinea aside from Australia and New Zealand is the only 
Pacific state that is a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
which also advocates trade liberalisation and the gradual reduction of barriers 
to trade.
Trade and economic arrangements set out the conduct of trading countries 
within a legally enforceable framework which, aside from trade in goods and 
services, and as articulated in PACER, ‘provide a framework for cooperation 
over time to the development of a single regional market’. Essentially, the new 
regional trade arrangements, like earlier ones, make this inevitable but for 
Pacific states to explore alternative revenue strategies. Substantial opposition 
is expected given the narrow economic and revenue base for many small island 
states with growing public sector costs without a correlating increase in public 
revenue.
Like trade and economic arrangements, a new regional effort endorsed by 
Forum Leaders in 2009 is the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development 
Coordination which in many respects complements regional effort at improving 
and coordinating development outcomes, assist Pacific states address global 
financial and economic impacts and strengthen the long-term economic 
resilience of the region. The Compact is currently being worked on. 
Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific 
(CROP)
CROP was formerly known as the South Pacific Organisations Coordination 
Committee. It was replaced with the CROP in 1988. Before the implementation 
of the Regional Institutional Framework (RIF) there were 11 agencies each with 
different roles and functions, and with their own governance structures in 
serving the region. Chaired by the Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat, it ‘exists to ensure that regional organisations pursue their collective 
aim of achieving sustainable development in the Pacific Island Countries in the 
most effective and efficient manner’ and that this can be achieved ‘through 
coordinated and cooperative action’. CROP is the vehicle for the formulation and 
dissemination of the regional strategy on development priorities and exists to 
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provide services to Pacific people. Striving to ensure that regional organisations 
service the needs of the people of the Pacific Islands is an ongoing consideration 
of Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum. The RIF which has been underway 
since 2007 not only reduces the number of regional organisations but seeks to 
minimise duplication of functions and to reduce wastage of regional effort. 
Member organisations of the CROP based outside Fiji are the Forum Fisheries 
Agency (1979) situated in Honiara, Solomon Islands, the Pacific Islands 
Development Programme (1980) based in Honolulu, Hawaii, and the Samoa-
based South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) established in 
1980. The SPC is headquartered in Noumea, New Caledonia with a branch in 
Fiji. New branches are being set up in the region. The rest of the CROP are based 
in Fiji. Education service providers include the USP (1986), the Fiji School of 
Medicine (1885) and the South Pacific Board of Education Assessment (1980). 
Investment and infrastructure enhancing service providers are the Pacific Power 
Association and South-Pacific.travel. Technical service providers include the 
South Pacific Applied Geoscience Programme (SOPAC) established in 1972 and 
which is now absorbed into SPC. 
The Secretariat of the Pacific Community and 
the Pacific Islands Forum
Perhaps the two most pivotal regional organisations are the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Forum. The Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community was established in 1947 as the South Pacific Commission by Great 
Britain, France, the United States, Australia and New Zealand. It is the oldest 
technical organisation delivering specialised services covering land and human 
resources, agriculture, health and demographic statistics to 22 Pacific Island 
territories.
The Pacific Islands Forum is considered as the regional body that sets the Pacific 
region’s political and economic policy agenda. It is made up of 16 sovereign 
independent Pacific States3 and has been around since August 1971. Forum 
Observers include Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna, the Commonwealth, the Asian 
Development Bank and Timor Leste as a Special Observer. Its creation was 
initiated by Pacific Island leaders, in particular the late Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara 
of Fiji, as an informal regional forum with for Pacific states to discuss issues of 
politics, trade and services and as vehicle to register its voice on regional and 
3 Members of the Pacific Islands Forum are Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tuvalu, Tonga and Vanuatu.
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international issues that affected the region. Over the years, it has grown to take 
a formal structure. In 2005, Leaders adopted the new Agreement Establishing 
the Pacific Islands Forum as an intergovernmental organisation at international 
law (see also Spillane 2008). The Agreement also updates the Forum’s purpose 
and functions to reflect the vision and direction taken under the Pacific Plan. 
As a way of facilitating regional cooperation and integration Leaders agreed to 
broaden the Forum’s membership by establishing new associate and observer 
membership categories (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 2005).
Basically, the Forum has no formal rules governing its operations or the conduct 
of its meetings. The agenda is based on reports from the Secretariat and related 
regional organisations and committees, ministerial meetings as well as from 
members. Decisions by the Leaders are reached by consensus and outlined in a 
Forum Communiqué from which policies are developed and work programmes 
are prepared. The Head of Government of the host country is the Chair of the 
Forum until the next meeting. 
The administrative arm of the Forum is the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 
based in Suva, Fiji. It acts as the Secretariat for Forum related events, implements 
decisions by Leaders, facilitates the delivery of development assistance to member 
states, and undertakes the political and legal mandates of Forum Meetings. The 
Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General. The Forum Officials Committee 
(made up of representatives from all Forum governments) is the governing body 
for the Secretariat and oversees its activities. The Secretary General is also the 
permanent Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) 
that brings together the eleven main regional organisations in the Pacific region. 
The Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC) made up of officials from all Forum 
member countries which is also chaired by the Secretary General oversights the 
implementation of the Pacific Plan. 
The formation of the Forum was the expression of many things, one of which 
was certainly about how Pacific Islands states, then making their preparations 
for independence, sought to address the trade and economic challenges posed 
by remoteness, smallness, isolation and resource limitations – issues which the 
Pacific Plan is currently grappling with today. It was and is about functional 
regional cooperation some of which has been discussed above. The list of topics 
considered by the leaders over the years includes the establishment of the FFA, 
regional shipping, regional civil aviation, trade agreements and marketing, the 
environment, the USP and relations with a range of international organisations 
and the admission of new members. 
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Regional Service Delivery and Support Facilities
Regional approaches to overcoming capacity limitations in service delivery and 
support at a national level is perhaps an area where the greatest gains have been 
recorded. Benefits to the region have flowed from tertiary education, transport, 
shipping, telecommunications, fisheries, environment and investment support. 
Since its establishment in 1968, the University of the South Pacific (USP) whose 
main campus is situated in Suva, Fiji has contributed significantly to the human 
development needs of many Pacific Islands states in the areas of science and 
technology, law and politics, economics, accounting, education and others. The 
USP has campuses in Kiribati, Tonga, Samoa, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, and 
a school in Vanuatu offering degrees in law. Partly to harmonise educational 
standards across the region, the South Pacific Board for Education Assessment 
was created in 1980 but under the Regional Institutional Framework (RIF) aimed 
at re-aligning regional organisation, it will merge into the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC). 
In order to provide shipping services in the region, the Pacific Forum Line (PFL) 
was established in 1977. Its fleet of vessels service ports linking Australia and 
New Zealand and the Pacific Islands. Twelve Forum member governments own 
PFL. Air Pacific, Fiji’s national airline evolved in the 1960s through the joint 
collaboration of Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji was designed to 
tackle the challenges of long distances which separated many Pacific Islands. 
Unlike the USP, support for Air Pacific did not go far enough as other Pacific 
states relinquished their shareholding to establish, albeit with mixed results, 
their own national airlines, leaving Fiji to develop Air Pacific. To overcome 
the air services problem and to liberalise the aviation market in the Pacific, 
Cook Islands, Nauru, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu signed the Pacific Islands Air 
Services Agreement (PIASA). The aviation sector however remains vulnerable 
to global fuel and energy crisis, including financial setbacks.
The establishment of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) in 1979 to support the 
management of the Pacific region’s biggest fisheries resources and maximise the 
returns on its harvest of fish on a sustainable scale on behalf of Pacific states is 
considered a success story (Tarte 2006). FAA assists its members negotiate the 
sale of fishing licenses to countries like Japan, Taiwan, Korea and the United 
States. It also undertakes monitoring and surveillance programs against illegal 
fishing and works closely with the SPC on scientific programs and with the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat on trade and investment matters.
Technical assistance on environmental management and climate change is 
provided by the South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme (SPREP) 
which was established in 1973. Geoscience matters covering mineral exploration, 
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petroleum, water management and community natural disaster and risk 
management is provided by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission 
(SOPAC), established in 1972. Under the current RIF process, some of the work 
of SOPAC will merge with the SPC and the SPREP.
In terms of investment development several service delivery vehicles offer that 
support. In harnessing the tourism potential of the region, the South Pacific 
Tourism Organisation now renamed as ‘south-pacific.travel’ was established to 
promote and market the potential of the Pacific as a tourist destination. In 2007, 
the Pacific Islands Private Sector Organisation (PIPSO) was created to support 
private sector organisations in the region. The Oceania Customs Organisations 
(OCO) based in Suva, Fiji offers support to Pacific states to help monitor and 
audit imports as well as the movement of goods, including contrabands and to 
maximise the returns in revenue for governments as well as to protect national 
consumers. 
Other regional organisations that provide technical and advisory support on 
security related matters include the Pacific Islands Police Conference based 
in Wellington, New Zealand, the Transnational Crime Unit and the Pacific 
Immigration Directors Conference. New challenges which have harnessed a 
collective regional voice in the international fora include climate change and 
related environmental issues as well as the global financial crisis which not 
only test the vulnerability of small islands in the region but also the ability of 
regional organisations to response to these challenges.
In response to the global energy crisis, and in response to the Leaders’ directive, 
increasing effort is being made to draw more Pacific Islands countries to sign 
onto the Forum’s regional initiative on bulk petroleum procurement. So far, 
only Nauru, Tuvalu and the Cook Islands signed. Other Forum countries are 
expected to sign up after consulting their governments. The idea of the bulk 
purchasing of fuel to save small island states money has been on the agenda 
of Pacific meetings for years. The global crisis and increasing price of fuel and 
which forced the Marshall Islands to declare a state of emergency, beckons more 
Pacific Islands to seriously consider the Agreement. The bulk procurement 
project essentially promotes the idea of a single market and economy in the 
Pacific - towards the creation of a single Pacific market where this is seen as 
a potentially important strategic response to overcome the issues of market 
smallness and isolation needs to be considered thoroughly given it benefits for 
the region. Its main rationale in response to the recent crisis in the petroleum 
market in the Pacific should expand into other possibilities through the strength 
presented by a single market. The possibilities for developing a coordinated 
regional strategy or package for the Pacific region in readiness for the impact of 
the global financial crisis therefore should not be undervalued. Certainly, the 
Politics, Development and Security in Oceania
188
potential of the Pacific’s regional architecture to respond to critical regional and 
global crisis remains to be fully realiased, including the opportunities available 
through multilateral arrangements.
Political and Security Responses
Forum Leaders in the opening section of the vision statement of the Pacific Plan 
‘believe that the Pacific can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, 
security and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead free and 
worthwhile lives’. Except for the separatist rebellion in Santo, Vanuatu, the 
region enjoyed a relatively quiet and peaceful transition to Independence. In 
recent years, however, the demise of parliamentary democracy and the rule of 
law in Fiji which has experienced four military coups in under 30 years, the 10-
year long civil conflict on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea in the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s, the political and ethnic tensions in the Solomon 
Islands in the early 2000s and the riots in Tonga in 2006, reminds the region of 
the costs of internal threats to the welfare of the people and governance. 
The Biketawa Declaration
Noting the important need to play a role, a regional mechanism – the Biketawa 
Declaration – was endorsed by Leaders in 2000. The Declaration is essentially 
a guiding tool which seeks to develop a collective and coordinated regional 
response to national conflicts and crisis in the region but which at the same 
time recognises the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its 
members. The Declaration was invoked in 2003 where a police-led operation 
restored law and order, supported by regional peacekeepers, and a programme 
of assistance strengthened the justice system, restored the economy and basic 
services in the Solomon Islands. The intervention now known as the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) received the full support 
and endorsement of the Solomon Islands and all Forum members. This was a 
significant milestone for the Forum in regional cooperation. 
The Biketawa Declaration was again invoked in 2004 on Nauru’s request in 
response to the economic crisis and the threats posed to its national security and 
stability. Both scenarios were different. For the Solomon Islands, it involved the 
restoration of law and order, economic recovery, governance rehabilitation with 
recovery projected to be achieved in the long-term. It also includes a rebuilding 
of trust, setting aside and reconciling differences and re-forging relationships 
between different communities and amongst the different ethnic groups. As has 
been witnessed from other conflicts, in Bougainville and more recently, riots in 
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Tonga, the wound and scars of internal conflicts need the benefit of time to heal. 
For Nauru, however, the problem was financial and economic mismanagement 
needing a long-term task of rebuilding and reforming its economy. The spirit of 
cooperation, consultations and partnership between RAMSI and the Solomon 
Islands has matured over the years leading to the conclusion of the Solomon 
Islands Government – RAMSI Partnership Framework in 2009. It has also 
attracted the interest from other governments to be part of the regional effort. 
The success of the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN) and the effort 
of the Nauru government has restored Nauru on a path to sustainable economic 
recovery and development. PRAN ended in 2009 although ongoing economic, 
social, infrastructure, and development challenges continue to receive the 
commitment of support from Forum members of its reform agenda.
The situation in Fiji however has presented the Biketawa Declaration with 
yet another test of its versatility and ability. Given recent comments that the 
Biketawa Declaration has failed with regard to Fiji, and is therefore ineffective 
and should be abandoned, it is imperative to shed light on the regional effort 
on Fiji, at least from the Forum’s perspective. At the request of Fiji, several 
consultative mechanisms were established to try and resolve the impasse 
between the Government and the military since 2007. These mechanisms 
included an Eminent Persons Group which reported to the Forum Foreign 
Affairs Ministers meeting in Port Vila, Vanuatu in 2007 and later in Auckland 
in 2008, the Ministerial Contact Group, and the dialogue process between Fiji 
and other Forum members through the Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group; and a 
Special Forum Leaders’ Meeting in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in 2009. 
The Fiji-Forum Joint Working Group under the Chair of Papua New Guinea, 
and comprising senior officials from Australia, Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, 
New Zealand, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, held a total of 35 meetings between 
2007 and early 2009. Aside from discussing the standing issues such as the 
restoration of civilian rule, upholding the 1997 Constitution, and the cessation 
of human rights abuses, the Fiji-Forum Joint Working Group had oversight 
over the report of the independent technical assessment of an election timetable 
for Fiji and of the coordination of donor assistance for the census and election 
process. Reporting to the Eminent Persons Group, the Ministerial Contact 
Group, the Forum Foreign Ministers through to Forum Leaders, this Fiji-Forum 
Joint Working Group maintained the “bridge” with Fiji and kept discussions 
alive and active for a return to parliamentary democracy. Essentially, an 
uncooperative and less politically discerning leadership remain a major barrier 
to early restoration of parliamentary democracy for Fiji, and thus deny the 
potential for conflict resolution in the Biketawa Declaration.4 
4 The independent technical assessment report of an election timetable for Fiji found that from a technical 
point of view, a parliamentary election was feasible in the first quarter of 2009, or earlier in November 2008.
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On 1 May 2009 Fiji was suspended from the Forum. Fiji briefly returned to 
re-engage with Forum members through the Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group 
but this has since fallen through although not officially abandoned. Seeking to 
remain engaged with Fiji on an ongoing basis has been of paramount importance 
to the Forum and the Biketawa Declaration. Essentially, it was the state of crisis 
in Fiji and the Solomon Islands in 2000, which led the Forum to adopt the 
Biketawa Declaration, mainly because the Forum needed a mechanism to deal 
with such a crisis, and more importantly, there was a political consensus in 
the region to create one. The Declaration also saw a clear shift in the region’s 
attitude to serious crises in the region, compared to its response to the 1987 
coups in Fiji. The Declaration contains guiding principles and provides measures 
for a regional response to help a Forum member, which is in need of urgent 
assistance. The Declaration should also be seen in the spirit of regionalism as 
promoted by the Pacific Plan but also mindful of and sensitive to sovereignty. 
Engagement through diplomacy underpins the Biketawa Declaration to build 
the bridges through ongoing dialogue – irrespective of time. 
It is therefore perhaps presumptuous to view the Biketawa Declaration to be 
endowed with the versatility and utility of application to all manner of conflict 
and crisis across the region. Further, it is also erroneous to visualise the Biketawa 
Declaration as having an unlimited reservoir of magical powers to resolve, to 
provide answers to and to fix (including offering successful regional responses) 
every national conflict and crisis. Such an observation is over-simplistic and 
reflects a poor understanding, as well as disregard and appreciation for the 
complex socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic environment from 
which the conflicts and crisis arise. To write-off and to discard the Biketawa 
Declaration because it is has been unable to assist Fiji through the challenges 
that it has encountered is both short-sighted and foolish. It is short-sighted 
because denies other Forum member states the opportunity to draw on members’ 
collective resources during their times of strife. It is foolish because its absence 
does not afford others in the region a mechanism for a collective regional 
response to problems. Rather, the Biketawa Declaration is only a mechanism, 
a guiding tool now available to the region with the capability to provide a 
collective regional response to crisis. It would however be more constructive to 
assess the strengths and limitations of the Biketawa Declaration and to suggest 
ways it could be made to be more effective. However out of three situations of 
crisis that the Biketawa Declaration was invoked; two have been constructive. 
One perhaps is complicated. 
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Regional Integration and Cooperation: 
Regionalism
The decision of Forum Leaders in 2004 to strengthen regional cooperation and 
integration and endorsed in 2005 through the Pacific Plan for Strengthening 
Regional Cooperation and Integration is an ambitious undertaking on 
regionalism in the region. The Plan which has a general timeframe of 10 years 
seeks to enhance and stimulate economic growth, sustainable development, 
good governance and security, by attempting to channel the development effort 
all regional organisations, donors and development partners through a single 
plan. 
The Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC) has oversight over the implementation 
of the Pacific Plan. In recent years, the decision-making process has been 
streamlined to bring CROP into the PPAC process to provide regional direction 
and collectively implement the decisions of Leaders. Key regional ministerial 
meetings comprising of relevant ministers from the Forum countries that deal 
with regional matters beyond the Pacific Plan and which also feed into the 
annual Forum Leaders’ meetings and which also implement Forum decisions 
include the Forum Economic Ministers Meetings5 and the Forum Trade Ministers 
Meetings. The Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting is activated to deal with crisis 
issues under the Biketawa Declaration with educational matters handled by the 
Forum Education Ministers. 
Strengthening regional cooperation and integration in the Pacific as it is 
proposed by Forum Leaders involves exploring three concepts of regionalism. 
The first is about cooperation and how this is allowed to happen. It involves 
setting up the process for dialogue and processes between governments. The 
second is provision of good and services at the regional level. This is about 
freeing governments from managing some service because it is economically 
advantageous to pool resources and expertise, and minimise wastage, reduce 
costs of services but increase the coverage of beneficiaries. Where diseconomies 
of isolation significantly affect logistical issues in service delivery, one solution 
would be to deliver the service through a sub-regional or a grouping of a few 
countries. If it added value to the national effort, even better! And where 
resource constraints are always going to be problem, consideration in favour for 
regionalism is sensible. 
5 Endorsed by the Forum in 1999 as integral to supporting national economic development strategies, FEMM 
advises the Forum on issues of economic management and development, structural adjustment, identifies 
sectoral opportunities for region-wide approach to development. Ad hoc Forum ministerial meetings such as 
trade, aviation and communication were sanctioned by FEMM.
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Regionalism is not about replacing or taking over national policies and 
programs. Rather, it seeks to support and complement them. For example, 
management of services under a regional initiative may be moved to a regional 
mechanism but not policy-making. This may seem contradictory, as many 
regional initiatives pool services into a regional body, away from the oversight 
of national governments. Sovereignty is enhanced as national governments have 
regional bodies implement their policy decisions (in effect, as service providers). 
Shifting service provision to regional mechanisms allows national governments 
to utilise national resources on core activities and priorities, thereby conserving 
resources on services that could otherwise be provided regionally.
The third is regional integration. This is about reducing market barriers. Physical 
barriers include land and sea borders and technical barriers include quarantine 
protocols, import taxes, immigration and border control. The general benefits 
include improved access to business and to consumers, increased economies of 
scale, competitive and affordable prices and increased choice of good and service. 
The examples of regionalism outlined above are currently being delivered by 
the regional governance architecture. It is already happening in the Pacific. 
In general, the existing regional governance infrastructure appears to support 
approaches that overcome capacity limitations in service delivery at the national 
level, and approaches that increase and expand economic opportunities through 
market integration.
For example, where Pacific states have existing ombudsman offices, the regional 
initiative is expected to add value to the work of the national ombudsman. 
It is not about replacing a national ombudsman with a regional ombudsman. 
Similarly, where audit services are under stress, a regional support mechanism 
would complement the national effort. Both ombudsman and audit initiatives 
are already providing support to the national effort. It is about mechanisms that 
also support and complement the national effort. In essence, a regional approach 
would be worthy of consideration where it strengthened, built and enhanced 
work at the national level.
Conclusions: What Do These Experiences 
Tell Us About the Prospects and Promise for 
Regionalism?
This paper is an attempt at putting together a large regional jigsaw puzzle that 
exists under the banner of regional integration and cooperation into manageable 
headings and perspectives. Obviously, if the question were posed to different 
stakeholders it would generate different perspectives given its complexity. 
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Certainly, the recipients or those for whom regionalism is intended such as 
the governments of the Pacific Islands and the people to whom initiatives and 
activities at the regional level are targeted, may paint a different picture.
However, the present regional governance architecture could be viewed as the 
building blocks upon which the experiences that are gained, the challenges 
that are confronted and tackled, the human and institutional capacity that is 
built and the knowledge that is acquired are laid. Such a foundation may later 
lead to a more ideal regionalism which some observers and commentators of 
regionalism want the Pacific to achieve; that is free movement of people, goods 
and services, common currency, shared economic policy, and a more coherent 
polity. 
The current experiences however seem to suggest a region working its own 
regional governance architecture, perhaps sometimes in isolation from each 
other but somehow connected, that is nonetheless relevant to its perceived 
needs. The Pacific Plan, while ambitious in timeframe and purpose, does attempt 
to harmonise regional effort under the ownership of one umbrella. It seems to 
caution against imitating or copying other models from elsewhere, including 
the leap forward to what the Plan aspires. Several possible explanations have 
been put forward with respect to the model’s limitations (Fong Toy 2006). One 
explanation is that the current forms and levels of regional cooperation are not 
really ready for the challenge of regionalism. Another is that the fundamental 
shift in thinking and approach to regionalism needs to be made. Yet another 
thought is an inability to really visualise the true enormity of regionalism – that 
is, the vision of Forum Leaders versus the ability of the officials to grapple with 
it. In response to regional and global challenges, the region is working within 
its current arrangements to service its people. Whatever the shortcomings, at 
least all of these regional governance infrastructures are well-founded and hold 
the potential to help the Pacific find its own authentic model. 
The region does not need to look for a better and wholesome articulation of the 
vision for the Pacific. It was endorsed in 2005 in Papua New Guinea when the 
Pacific Plan was launched. The Pacific leadership which initiated the development 
and establishment of some of the political and economic institutions to promote 
both sub-regionalism and regionalism, is not short of potential to drive better 
regionalism. 
Nonetheless, the experience from the region seems to suggest that delivery of 
services by service delivery organisations such as tertiary education, fisheries, 
and crisis interventions (such as RAMSI) appear to have greater credibility 
compared to areas of regional economic integration which seem to pit Pacific 
states against each other. Effort needs to be focused on arrangements that 
harness the diversity of the region in union. 
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15. How Relevant are European 
Models of Government to Pacific 
Island States?
Jon Fraenkel
Les modèles européens de gouvernance sont-ils pertinents pour les Etats du 
Pacifique insulaire? 
Dans tout le Pacifique insulaire, des modèles de gouvernance originaires 
d'autres parties du monde sont souvent présentés comme des solutions 
aux problèmes locaux, que la situation problématique soit réelle ou 
simplement perçue comme telle. Cependant, les enjeux autour de la 
construction de l'Etat ou de la nation ne sont plus, au 21e siècle, les 
mêmes que ceux posés aux 19e et 20e siècles. Si les modèles européens 
eurent une grande influence durant l'époque coloniale, leur héritage 
post-colonial fut mitigé: l'influence continua d'être forte pour le législatif 
et la gouvernance, mais la variation dans les adaptations fut plus grande 
que ce qu'on imagine souvent. Maintenant que les Etats insulaires 
abordent leur troisième, quatrième ou parfois cinquième décennie 
dans leur indépendance, l'influence des modèles européens s'est encore 
dissipée davantage, et de nouvelles influences sont apparues. Des 
modèles de gouvernance venus d'ailleurs et des institutions importées--
quand les circonstances sont inhabituelles-- ont joué un rôle significatif 
et positif, parfois de manière imprévue. Mais ceux qui appellent à ces 
changements feraient bien de ne pas se cantonner à de grands principes 
internationaux et devraient plutôt ancrer leurs arguments dans une 
prise en compte du contexte local, de façon détaillée et en profondeur.
Around the Pacific Islands region, one often hears models of government from 
elsewhere extolled as solutions to various perceived or real political problems. 
Models of institutions back home are frequently carried around in the back 
of the heads of diplomats, seconded advisors and well-paid consultants from 
overseas and depicted as solutions to every political difficulty in the Pacific.
I was at a workshop organised by Papua New Guinea’s Commission on the 
Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates a few weeks ago in Gaire, outside 
Port Moresby. This was aimed at discussing feasible alternatives in the wake of a 
July 2010 decision ruling unconstitutional a law aimed at tying MPs to particular 
Prime Ministers and lessening the incidence of ‘no confidence’ motions. As 
those of you who know the country well will be aware, the parliament has 
Politics, Development and Security in Oceania
196
been plagued by incessant ‘no confidence’ votes, long adjournments to avoid 
challenges to incumbent governments and usages of cash and ministerial 
portfolio handouts to hold together fragile coalitions. At that meeting, a 
UNDP representative insisted that a European (or Latin American)-style list 
proportional representation system would resolve all these difficulties of party 
loyalty, despite much contrary evidence. Despite the efforts of many with years 
of experience in the many twists and turns of Papua New Guinea politics, no 
one could convince her that these problems would not be resolved simply by 
tweaking the electoral rules. 
It is an all-too frequent kind of error: both in analysis and recommendation. One 
often hears Pacific chiefly systems described as ‘feudal’ drawing on the European 
historical experience, for example, without much attention to studying forms of 
tribute or labour service if these exist at all (and they usually don’t). At embassy 
or high commission garden parties, you regularly hear European, Australian 
or American history drawn upon to explain how islands should travel on the 
rocky road towards democracy. Interesting – perhaps sometimes, but usually 
misleading as regards the kind of issues faced by small island polities in the 21st 
century. 
This is certainly not an exclusively European penchant. More unofficially than 
officially, Australians in the Pacific regularly emphasise the virtues of preferential 
voting systems (as used both for federal and state level governments), and 
that regional influence has obviously been important in the adoption of such 
systems both in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. A few years ago, as Fiji wrestled 
with the problems of handling mandatory power-sharing between highly 
polarised political adversaries, I recall New Zealand advisors emphasising their 
own unique qualifications in handling coalition governments (heedless of the 
massive differences between voluntary and mandatory power-sharing).
On Europe day over the last decade around the islands, diplomats frequently 
point to the Treaty of Rome and the European Union as a viable model for Pacific 
regionalism. Yet the ‘German question” that loomed so large in late 19th and 
early 20th century European history, and so influenced the initial steps towards 
European unification, has no meaningful or likely parallel in the Pacific Islands. 
The Pacific Islands are, for the most part, separated by vast sea areas, and do 
not have a history of states forged through warfare that closely resembles the 
European experience. The recent spat between Tonga and Fiji over the Minerva 
Reef hardly resembles the controversies over Alsace-Lorraine in the 1870s or the 
1937-8 German Sudetenland. The gains from trade and capital flows witnessed 
by a Europe without borders are scarcely likely to be replicated in Oceania, 
where island countries have little to trade with each other and little capital to 
export. 
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If European regionalism provides an intriguing model of government, it would 
surely rather be inclusive of Australia and New Zealand, which dominate so 
much of the trade at least to the South Pacific island countries.  For here one 
might consider how European regionalism tied together stronger and weaker 
economies: Germany and northern Europe together with historically weaker 
economies like Ireland, Portugal and parts of the Southern Mediterranean. The 
cost of such arrangements, including permitting access for labour to Australasia, 
would probably be far less than that incurred by the stronger economies of 
northern Europe. After all, there is little likelihood that a bankrupt Tonga 
or Tuvalu (should that arise) will put as much pressure on the vitality of the 
financial system as Greece, Ireland or Portugal do on that of contemporary 
Europe.
Warning against unthinking transplantations, of course, is not an argument 
against all comparisons, or useful lessons drawn from different parts of the 
world. It is only to counsel against poorly thought-through recommendations, 
disregarding the vast differences between European, North American and Pacific 
settings. Even within the region, partly due to the experience of Christianisation, 
there is often a perception that Pacific peoples are fated to tread a similar path 
to Europeans, North Americans or Australasians. Amongst Europeans deployed 
on brief employment contracts in the Pacific Islands, there is an understandable 
urge to reach for the familiar, the known and the proven workable. 
In universities, also, states in other parts of the world are often understood 
through the European lens, or measured by their correspondence to European 
perceptions of what constitutes an effective or viable state. They are defined as 
something other than European states.  They are not Westphalian states. They 
are not Max Weber’s ‘rational-legal bureaucratic’ states. They are not states like 
those European institutions splendidly studied by Charles Tilly (1990), where 
war built revenues and peace built institutions of accountability and democracy, 
though such tax-raising states regularly figure in the donor literature as a 
suitable model for elsewhere. Jeffrey Herbst’s excellent study of the way the 
African experience of warfare and state-building differs from that in Europe 
provides a useful example of the kind of theorising about the state that might 
be attempted for the Pacific Islands (Herbst 2000).
Perhaps one way to address the question of the relevance of European models of 
governance in the present or future tense is to first consider their relevance in 
the past. In this paper, I focus mainly on the South Pacific, where the principle 
colonial influences were European, or by extension, Australasian, whereas in 
the northern Pacific the key influences (eventually) became American.
European models of government have influenced the past and still influence 
the present of many Pacific Island states. Most obviously, the French territories 
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of New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna not only have 
Francophone systems of law, but still participate in elections to the National 
Assembly in Paris and for the French President. In some cases, departures from 
French influences have proved critical for political settlements. For example, New 
Caledonia’s Noumea Accord entailed such a breach with French legal doctrine 
that it required a constitutional amendment and a referendum in France. 
While the former British territories are all de-colonised (bar tiny Pitcairn 
Island), the English system of common law remains in operation in varying 
ways in the former colonies. Westminster systems were left in both in former 
British territories, and in countries where the colonial power had been Australia 
or New Zealand – although often with more consultation about the shape of 
post-colonial arrangements than is commonly recognised by those who critique 
the ‘imposition’ of Westminster on island territories. In Solomon Islands, for 
example, the British experimented with a  ‘Governing Council’ system alleged 
to be more suitable for a ‘Melanesian’ context, but it was ambitious politician 
Solomon Mamaloni that urged adoption of a full-scale Westminster system with 
a ‘Prime Minister’ and ‘cabinet’, a Leader of the Opposition and, curiously, even 
a ‘leader’ of the independent members of parliament.  In Papua New Guinea 
and Kiribati too, there was more local-level discussion about the modification 
of inherited institutions than is commonly realised.  Too much is often blamed 
on the ‘Westminster’ legacy by Pacific commentators, partly due to rosy-eyed 
claims about a propensity to consensus inherent in Pacific cultures.  
In the New Hebrides (Vanuatu), the electoral system adopted at independence 
– the single non-transferable vote – was a compromise between the British 
and French authorities designed to ensure that the Anglophone majority did 
not win all the seats in parliament. That system exists nowhere in Europe, but 
today only for the lower house in Afghanistan (having been dropped in Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea and, recently, Jordan). The electoral system of Nauru 
also has no parallels to anything currently in use in Europe, but resembles the 
system invented by French 19th century mathematician Jean Charles De Borda. 
It is a preferential system, but with a second preference counted as worth 0.5, 
a third as 0.33 and so on, and all preferences immediately tallied to get a result. 
Known in Nauru as the Dowdell system, it is in fact named after the Irishman 
in government at independence who devised it.  In Kiribati (the former British 
Gilbert Islands), a unique presidential system was adopted at independence that 
bears no resemblance to anything elsewhere in the world (let alone Europe). 
The President is directly elected, but constrained to form a cabinet from within 
parliament. The nominees for a presidential election are decided by parliament, 
and, particularly unusually, the President can be ousted by a parliamentary 
‘no confidence’ vote, but in such cases there is an immediate dissolution of 
parliament. Designed to ensure presidential support in parliament, the system 
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has worked reasonably well since independence (as compared to neighbouring 
Tuvalu and Nauru, which have both experienced numerous no confidence votes 
and regular changes of government).      
Going back further, the Pacific Islands can count some very odd experiences 
with European models of government. It was Pope Leo XIII in Rome who was 
called upon to deliberate on the division of Micronesia in 1885 between Spain 
and Germany. Tonga’s monarchy has commonly been described as an ‘absolutist’ 
system typifying an extremely hierarchical variant of the Polynesian chiefly 
system. In fact, it was an adaptation to European styles of monarchic rule 
codified in the 1875 constitution in an effort to resist the influence of European 
colonisers. Samoa found itself under a tripartite ‘condominium’ or ‘Tridominium’ 
in 1889, run together by the United States, Germany and Britain, but with 
key appointments made, rather bizarrely, by the King of Sweden. The New 
Hebrides (Vanuatu) also found itself with a European ‘Condominium’ (agreed as 
part of the Anglo-French entente cordiale in 1906) – an arrangement much later 
famously described rather as rather more ‘pandemonium’ than ‘condominium’ 
by Vanuatu’s first post-independence Prime Minister Walter Lini. 
Of course, the models of government suitable for Pacific colonists were not at 
all those favoured, or conceded, back at home. Usually, there was initially no 
elected representation. In Fiji, for example, for the first 25 years of colonial 
rule Governor Sir Arthur Gordon and his successors ran the show, though 
with a native administration – a state within a state – sometimes described as 
a precursor to Lord Lugard’s ‘indirect rule’ arrangements in Nigeria.  Only in 
the early years of the 20th century were local Europeans and Fijians granted 
nominees on the Legislative Council. Only in 1929 were the descendants of 
Indian indentured labourers granted elected representation, and then only on 
communal rolls regarded as symptomatic of colonial oppression by Mahatma 
Ghandi and many amongst the Fiji Indian leaders. Ethnic Fijians did not get the 
vote until 1963, and by then stark divisions as regards what could be expected 
from constitutional democracy were well-ingrained. In Solomon Islands, it was 
only after the Maasina Ruru uprising of the 1940s that the British colonists 
experimented with local-level governments.  It was in the French territories 
– New Caledonia and French Polynesia – that extension of the franchise and 
territorial assembles emerged first, and with these political parties. In the British 
territories, democracy – after a fashion – emerged only very late in the colonial 
era, and even then at first under a continuing official majority. 
That said, the forms of colonial rule witnessed in the Pacific Islands, if we exclude 
the early Spanish adventures, were very different to those that would have been 
experienced if the Pacific had been carved up in the 17th or 18th centuries. By 
the second half of the 19th century, colonial adventures were characterised by 
what Jane Samson (1998) calls ‘imperial benevolence’. Fiji’s colonisation in 1874 
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was partly triggered by the activities of unruly white settlers in Levuka, and 
also by the desire to control the trade in indentured labourers that had reached 
the New Hebrides, Solomon Islands and even island New Guinea. Oddly, both 
British rule in Fiji and German rule in Samoa entailed a ‘protectionist’ apparatus 
that restricted employment on plantations and sought to control, minimise or 
abolish alienation of native lands.  Tonga’s monarchic system survived despite 
a very loose form of colonial control, while the monarchies in Hawaii and Tahiti 
(if monarchy that can be called) were abolished – the former as a result of the 
Pacific’s first coup d’êtat by American settlers in 1893. In most of the British 
territories, the most cost-effective forms of colonial government were thought 
to allow the continuation of local forms of government (where possible), even 
if – to raise money – much de facto control was conceded to big companies like 
the CSR, Lever Brothers, Carpenters, and Burns Philp among others. 
For much of the Pacific, the colonial influence remained small for the first half 
century or so. The location of colonial capitals on small offshore islands, like 
Tulagi in Solomon Islands, Jaluit in the German Marshall Islands or Ovalau 
(Levuka) in Fiji was testimony to restricted influence on the larger and more 
populous islands.  There was a problem of control. Most Pacific islanders, 
particularly in Melanesia, continued to reside in rural areas with little or no 
contact with threadbare colonial administrations, which were required to 
finance their own operations (there was usually no ‘aid’ and where there were 
loans these had to be raised on the private money markets).  The Edwardian era 
was a brief golden age for the colonial plantation economies, boosted by rising 
world prices and still favourable possibilities for importing indentured labour 
from India, China or Java, but by 1914 the world was plunged into a new era 
of economic uncertainty. Indentured labourers were no longer recruited from 
India for Fiji after 1916, and the troubled recruitment of Chinese for Samoan 
plantations had also halted. The global depression in commodity prices of 
the 1920s was reinforced by a broader collapse in the World economy during 
1929-32, although the forms of protection adopted in response paradoxically 
assisted Fiji’s sugar industry while the approach of war fuelled demand for New 
Caledonian nickel.  
The Pacific War, when it came, was not only a final nail in the coffin of the 
European-owned plantation system, but also damaged the political authority of 
European colonialism. Americans in unprecedented numbers – far greater than 
the pre-war number of European colonists – spread across that thick Oceanic line 
of resistance to the Japanese advance connecting Hawaii to Australia.  They paid 
higher wages, and brought numerous new influences. With the end of that war, 
forms of quasi-‘colonial’ rule also changed, with the advent of United Nations 
Trust territories in Micronesia (and building on the earlier arrangements under 
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the League of Nations for Western Samoa, Nauru and New Guinea). That notion 
of trusteeship, and administration oriented towards development and eventual 
independence, further undermined the moral certainties of the colonial era. 
Western Samoa was the first to de-colonise in 1962, and when it did so it adopted 
arrangements very different to those of its ‘trustee’ power, New Zealand. Only 
matai (chiefs or family heads) could vote or stand for parliament, an arrangement 
much criticised by some, but recognised by a visiting U.N. team as ‘democracy 
in two stages’, i.e., accommodating traditional methods of leadership selection 
through the matai-only franchise. That arrangement was partially changed in 
1991, when the franchise was opened to all citizens, although it remains the case 
that candidates must be matai. Those who criticise that system as ‘undemocratic’ 
are often unaware that there were already 35,000 matai titles in the early 1990s 
(according to the records at the Land and Titles office), and there will be many 
more now. Far from being a tradition-bound government, Samoa is probably one 
of the most reform-oriented countries in the world – few states could change 
what side of the road their cars drive on and shift the dateline eastwards so as 
to enter the same time-zone as its major trading partners. By most measures, 
Samoa probably has the most robust of the island governments – with a single 
party in office for nearly 30 years (with one brief exception) and is carefully 
(and healthily) resistant to the imposition of outside models. 
For Fiji, which became independent in 1970, the new arrangements bore the 
colonial imprint. There was a British-style Westminster parliamentary system, 
together with an upper house (called the Senate) and a first-past-the-post 
electoral system, but there were also communal electoral rolls that separated 
‘Fijians’, ‘Indians’ and ‘general’ voters, and the Great Council of Chiefs played 
an important role with regard to Senate selection. The dangers inherent in that 
deeply divided polity, and in those choices of institutional arrangements, were 
already evident before independence, and were highlighted again by the Street 
Commission report of 1975, which recommended the abolition of communal rolls 
and introduction of a system of proportional representation. A constitutional 
crisis in April 1977, and coups in 1987 and 2000, in each case followed the 
election of governments largely drawing on the votes of the Fiji Indian population 
(slightly larger than the indigenous Fijian population from 1944-1987). The 
extraordinary political settlement reached in 1997 between ethnic Fijian and 
Fiji Indian political leaders did not survive the pressures generated by the first 
election under the new arrangements in 1999 (when the country elected its first 
ever Prime Minister of Indian descent, Mahendra Chaudhry). The coup of 2000 
unleashed a new set of destabilising forces, with the military seizing power yet 
again in December 2006 but this time promising a ‘coup to end all coups’ in the 
name of multi-racialism, good governance and anti-corruption. Four and a half 
years later, military rule remains in place, but the promises of 2006-7 have been 
thoroughly breached.    
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None of the other Pacific countries was faced with the problem of designing 
political institutions capable of withstanding deep bipolar divisions like 
those in Fiji with the partial exception of New Caledonia. There the division 
between pro- and anti-independentists brought the territory to the brink of 
civil warfare in the mid-1980s, although ethnicity was never as coterminous 
with political party affiliation in the way that it was in Fiji. The 1988 Matignon 
and 1998 Noumea Accords, agreed between leaders of the largely Kanak-backed 
FLNKS and the largely (but not exclusively) settler backed RPCR entailed in 
the latter case (i) regional autonomy, (ii) power-sharing (or ‘collegial’) cabinet 
and (iii) an agreement to put off the vote on independence until 2014-19. As 
previously mentioned, much about the Noumea Accord entailed a departure 
from constitutional arrangements long deemed sacrosanct in France. As the 
deadline approaches, many are fearful of resorting to a polarising vote on 
independence. Others are canvassing further shifts in once unshakeable Gaullist 
doctrines for the French overseas territories, and considering the possibility of 
‘free association’ arrangements such as those between New Zealand and Niue 
and the Cook Islands, or between the USA and the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.   
Resolving secessionist disputes by agreement on a delayed vote on independence 
was also a critical element of the arrangements reached to bring to an end a 
decade of low intensity civil warfare on the island of Bougainville. [The only 
other country in the world to have agreed such arrangements is Sudan, now 
about to reach the point of separation]. In Bougainville, now an autonomous 
region of Papua New Guinea, a unique presidential system was adopted, with 
many constraints on cabinet formation designed to accommodate the demands 
of women, former militants and the different regions. A vote on independence 
is due between 2015-20, but with nothing resembling the buckets of French aid 
that have poured into largely Kanak areas in the northern and Loyalty Islands 
provinces of New Caledonia. Continuing trouble in the south of Bougainville, 
and the weak revenue stream of the government still located in the north, have 
encouraged politicians to consider re-opening the large Panguna copper mine.
New Caledonia’s mandatory power-sharing arrangements have so far proved 
much more successful than similar arrangements in Fiji. In New Caledonia, a 
‘collegial’ executive bringing together pro-independence and loyalist parties 
has been formed after elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009, although breakdowns 
have been frequent recently. Fiji’s arrangements, which were poorly grafted at 
the last moment onto a Westminster-based 1997 constitution, proved much less 
successful. The first government elected under those rules in 1999 successfully 
excluded the largest ethnic Fijian party (measured by share of the vote), while 
the second government elected in 2001 excluded the largest Indian backed party 
from cabinet (and consequently was judged to be in breach of the constitution). 
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When a government was finally forged that obeyed the power-sharing rules in 
May 2006, it was overthrown only seven months later by a military coup. Fiji’s 
arrangements were heavily influenced by the experience in South Africa during 
the transition from Apartheid. Power-sharing arrangements for deeply divided 
polities (including South Africa) have been heavily canvassed by University of 
California political scientist Professor Arend Lijphart (1977): the origins of his 
‘consociational’ model go back to continental European democracies like the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria.
In this chapter I have tried to answer the question of ‘how relevant are European 
models?’ largely in the past tense: ‘How relevant have European models been?’ 
Almost by definition, European models were highly influential during the 
colonial era, though Europeans rarely ruled subject peoples as they ruled their 
own peoples. The post-colonial legacy was mixed; influences were obvious on 
systems of law and government, but flexibility was greater than often imagined. 
As the island states enter their third, fourth or fifth decade since independence, 
that influence has waned further, while other influences have grown. In many 
ways, the Asian or African history may provide the more useful lessons, even if 
the Pacific Islands’ experience differs markedly also from those regions. Issues of 
state- and nation-building in the 21st century are not the same as those faced in 
the 19th or early 20th centuries, not least as the Melanesian experience clearly 
shows, due to the impact on state formation of large resource-extractive mining 
or logging interests.  
Nowadays, simple transplantations are usually the least successful. Lifting 
models of government from one part of the world to another is a hazardous 
exercise: institutions can operate very differently in different contexts. The 
problems are different, the issues often unfamiliar and the proposed solutions 
commonly half-baked. Even amongst the European models of government, 
the variety is extraordinary, and those from one European country are often 
unfamiliar with forms of government in another. 
Nevertheless, a comparative lens is often useful, but only on the basis of a rich 
understanding of the specific tensions witnessed within the Pacific region. 
When Tonga, as it did ahead of the first ever elections to a majority popularly 
elected parliament in November 2010, considers adopting a single transferable 
vote system, it helps to know something about the operation of that system 
in Ireland and Northern Ireland and Malta (even if only to reject that option, 
as the Tongan government –rightly I believe – did). When Papua New Guinea 
(or for that matter French Polynesia) struggles with floor-crossing and ‘no 
confidence’ votes, it helps to know something about how France dealt with 
those problems in the 1950s when a strong presidential system was adopted, 
even if a highly majoritarian presidential system would create major problems 
in a hyperfractionalised and extremely heterogeneous polity like PNG.  
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This is not to urge some rampant exceptionalism or resistance to foreign models. 
Fiji’s coup leader Frank Bainimarama oddly combines a perverse embrace of 
western models of ‘good governance’ in his struggle with Fijian traditionalists 
and a rejection of imported models of democracy as unsuitable. He urges that 
ethnic cleavages, weak development and corruption are to be resolved by 
military dictatorship, though we know from the experience in Africa, Latin 
America and even parts of Europe that this is false, and that such divisions are 
better handled by strengthening democratic institutions. 
Nor are transplantations always failures. The French law on parity, for example, 
aimed at increased women’s representation but has had a restricted impact on 
mainland France, where elections to the National Assembly use a single member 
district system. Transplanted to the Pacific territories of New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia, it has had a major impact because these use a list proportional 
representation system for elections to territorial assemblies, and because both 
have well-established party systems.  As a result, both New Caledonia and 
French Polynesia have close to 50 per cent women’s representation, uniquely 
across the Pacific Islands. The story of how local women’s organisations and 
aspiring female politicians handled these exported changes in law has yet to be 
fully told. 
Both models from elsewhere and imported institutions can thus – in unusual 
circumstances – play significant and positive roles, sometimes in unexpected 
ways, but in general those urging such reforms or changes would do wisely to 
avoid grandstanding on international principle, and instead to base arguments 
on a deep and rich appreciation of the local contexts.
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16. Regional Security and the Major 
Powers: An Overview
James Bunce
La sécurité régionale et les grandes puissances : vue d’ensemble
Depuis les années 1980, la région du Pacifique Sud a connu un niveau 
de plus en plus élevé d’instabilité. Cet article présente une vue 
d’ensemble de l’état actuel de la sécurité régionale dans le Pacifique 
Sud en examinant le rôle des grandes puissances extérieures dans la 
promotion de la stabilité à la fois au sein des Etats de la région et en 
promouvant la sécurité régionale de façon plus large (ou l’inverse, selon 
le cas). Plutôt que de présenter une vue d’ensemble complète de l’état de 
la stabilité de la région, l’article examine la crise actuelle à Fidji et le rôle 
de trois grandes puissances extérieures, à savoir la Chine, l’Australie et 
les Etats-Unis. Si d’autres grandes puissances extérieures jouent un rôle 
vraiment important en matière de sécurité régionale dans le Pacifique 
Sud, cet article met un accent particulier sur la Chine en tant qu’acteur 
relativement récent et sur l’Australie, dont l’approche vis-à-vis de la 
région a connu un changement important au cours de ces dernières 
années. On examinera également le rôle des Etats-Unis, qui se réduit, 
et l’on conclura sur le fait qu’en dépit de très nombreux exemples 
d’instabilité interne dans plusieurs Etats du Pacifique Sud, l’état actuel 
de la sécurité régionale permet quelque espoir.
Introduction
The South Pacific region has experienced an increasing level of instability in the 
years since the 1980s. This paper provides an overview of the current state of 
regional security in the South Pacific region. It does so by examining the role 
of the major external powers in fostering stability both within regional states, 
and in promoting security in a wider regional sense (or not, as the case may be). 
It does not seek to present a comprehensive overview of the state of regional 
stability though – that is significantly beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, 
this paper will examine the current crisis in the key state of Fiji, and the role 
of three major external powers; China, Australia and the United States.1 While 
1 Editors’ Note: For reasons of brevity Dr Bunce’s analysis of regional security in the South Pacific has 
focused on the roles of three of the major powers active in the Oceanic region – China, Australia and the United 
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other major external powers do play an important role in South Pacific regional 
security, this paper will place particular emphasis on China, as it is a relatively 
new regional player; and Australia, which has seen its approach to the region 
undergo significant change in the last several years. The US’s diminishing role 
will also be examined, as the perceived US withdrawal from the South Pacific 
deserves some attention. 
Before conducting this overview, it is necessary to discuss exactly what regional 
security is, and what has the potential to both diminish it. This paper will draw 
on both old and new conceptions of what enhances and diminishes regional 
security. Furthermore, it is assumed that there is no imminent threat to the 
territorial integrity or sovereignty of any South Pacific state. In the absence of 
such a threat, regional security in Oceania has two facets: internal instability and 
the effects of external actors’ activities. The following list presents a checklist 
of factors that diminish regional security in the South Pacific and is drawn from 
a checklist devised by David Hegarty (1987), with only minor adjustments. 
Diminished security results from:
•	 Increases in threats and use of force 
•	 Major power rivalry 
•	 Alterations in the balance of power
•	 Internal instability leading to increased influence for external non-state 
actors or potentially hostile state actors
•	 The discovery or placement of new strategic assets
To a degree, all of them are either possible, or are currently happening. Concerns 
about superpower rivalry escalating in the region may seem to have gone with 
the Cold War, but according to some commentators, major power contests 
may be returning. China’s increasing role in the region has led to some quite 
alarmist conclusions. Internal stability is another increasingly common factor 
that diminishes regional security, but this is offset somewhat by the recent 
Australian and New Zealand tendency to take a more proactive role in assisting 
the region to maintain stability. There are some issues with the reasoning behind 
this more proactive role, particularly the linking of failed states and terrorism, 
but nonetheless the result has largely enhanced regional security. The wider 
States. It is important to note that both France and New Zealand are also significant players with respect to 
the South Pacific’s international and regional security. While France’s legitimacy as a Pacific regional power 
had been contested for decades, that situation changed considerably in the 1990s following the cessation 
of French nuclear testing in French Polynesia and the settling of the political process in New Caledonia via 
the Matignon and Noumea Accords of 1988 and 1998 respectively. France is widely accepted as a regional 
defence and security player being a founding member of the FRANZ Agreement designed largely to assist in 
natural disaster emergencies in the South Pacific. It is also involved with the ANZUS members in a cooperative 
framework arrangement on Pacific security and stability issues known as the ‘Quadrilateral Defence Forum’. 
We thank Hélène Goiran for this additional information.
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balance of power in the Pacific has been shifting in recent years, and there is 
potential for major conflict inherent in this shift. As US power declines relative 
to that of China, there is a possibility it could result in increased major power 
competition for influence. This is also related to strategic assets in the region, 
as both China (in terms of strategic resources) and the US (in terms of its Pacific 
Fleet) have important strategic interests in the region. This paper begins with 
a discussion of the implications for regional security of the coup regime in Fiji, 
before moving on to discuss how Australia conceives of (and its role in support 
of) regional security. It then moves on to examine China’s growing role in the 
region, and its implications for regional security. The paper concludes with a 
brief discussion of the perceived US withdrawal from the region.
Fiji
Since December 2006 the Republic of Fiji has been under a military government. 
The details and events that led up to and occurred subsequent to the 6 December 
coup are dealt with elsewhere in this volume, and need not be discussed here. 
Suffice to say, the military leader Commodore Frank Bainimarama has exhibited 
no desire to back down and allow elections. After promising in 2007 to hold 
elections by March 2009, and when it became clear in early 2009 that no 
preparations were being made, Bainimarama’s reasons for the ‘Fijian military 
intervention’ switched from the earlier justifications to fixing Fiji’s ‘sick electoral 
process’ before any election is held. In January 2009, a leaders’ meeting of the 
Pacific Islands Forum was convened, with Bainimarama sending in his stead 
interim Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. An ultimatum was issued to 
Bainimarama’s government by the Forum leaders: announce an election to be 
held before the end of 2009 by 1 May or face suspension from the PIF (Toohey 
2009: 11).
In April 2009 a panel of judges found Bainimarama’s coup unconstitutional; 
Bainimarama’s response was to sack the judiciary, re-appoint himself prime 
minister, and abolish the constitution. He further announced that no elections 
would be held until September 2014 after significant constitutional and 
electoral reform had been carried out. Since, Fiji has been suspended from both 
the PIF and the Commonwealth. Currently, the military regime is censoring the 
local media, and after the arrest and expulsion of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s Sean Dorney, international reporting of events in Fiji has been 
minimal. Amnesty International has released a report on human rights in 
Fiji, which condemns the situation in Fiji, and claims that due to the actions 
of Bainimarama and President Iloilo, rule of law in Fiji has been effectively 
undermined (Amnesty International 2009).
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While there has been no significant violence, the situation in Fiji is still very 
serious. One of the largest states in the region, and traditionally one of the most 
stable, has been under the control of a military government for nearly three 
years, and it looks as though it will be for another five years yet. This is Fiji’s 
fourth coup in 20 years, and it can be argued that a ‘coup culture’ seems to be 
developing. This is a concern for the whole region, as well as Australia, and this 
concern has been reflected in Fiji’s suspension from multilateral institutions like 
the PIF. Jenny Hayward-Jones painted a pessimistic picture of the direction the 
economic situation in Fiji could take, arguing that an economic meltdown in Fiji 
could cause a ‘regional meltdown’ (Hayward-Jones 2009: 5). Needless to say, this 
kind of economic turmoil would have dire consequences for regional security.
The implications of the Fiji military regime for regional security go much further 
than the economic implications. It is significant that no initiative taken by 
regional or global organisations has had any real effect on the situation in Fiji. As 
mentioned, Fiji is currently suspended from the PIF and the Commonwealth, and 
Bainimarama has recently complained to the United Nations that unnamed ‘big 
powers of the South Pacific’ have ‘used their extensive diplomatic and financial 
resources to deny Fiji to participate in new peacekeeping operations’, which are 
a very important source of foreign exchange earnings for Fiji (Nicholson 2009: 6). 
Furthermore, if the extensive constitutional and electoral reform in Fiji is carried 
out under a military government, which it looks like it will, future stability 
in Fiji will be jeopardised. Any such reforms carried out under a military 
government will have legitimacy issues in the long term, and it sets a precedent 
that could potentially be followed by future Fijian military leaders: that is, if 
you do not like the constitution or the electoral system, stage a coup and fix it. 
This does not herald well for the future state of regional security, if one of the 
leading states of the region can fall under military control and remain so for 
nearly a decade. There is very little, if anything, that Australia and other major 
powers in the region can do about it either – so far no method has proven even 
partially successful. Fiji is the least aid dependent country in the South Pacific, 
so withholding aid would not seem to be an effective tool. In any case, China 
has provided substantial aid to the regime in Fiji since the coup, so even were 
the economic situation to get worse; there is an alternative source of funding 
for Bainimarama which places no political conditions on aid recipients. Military 
intervention is unthinkable – given that the regime is a military one, it is a 
reasonable assumption that any military intervention would be opposed, and 
it is impossible to imagine anything being worse for regional security than a 
war between two or more states in the region. This is not good for the regional 
security outlook, as it shows that there is very little that outside interests can 
do to influence the situation in Fiji, which is the least aid-reliant, and the least 
reliant on outside powers generally, of the South Pacific states. 
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Australia
In the 2000 Australian Defence White Paper, it states that, after the defence of 
the Australian continent itself:
[Australia’s] second strategic objective is to help foster the stability, 
integrity and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood, which we 
share with Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and 
the island countries of the Southwest Pacific. (Department of Defence 
2000: 30-31)
This statement came one year after the Australian-led intervention in East Timor 
to stop the violence that resulted after a vote in the former Indonesian province 
which resulted in almost 80 per cent of East Timorese choosing independence 
over continued association with Indonesia. This intervention was a significant 
break from the past in terms of Australian policy. Since this, and the Australian-
led RAMSI intervention of 2003, Australia has taken on a much more proactive 
role in the South Pacific region, and this role does not look like diminishing. This 
section of the paper will give a brief outline of Australia’s involvement in the 
region since 2006, as well as discussing the 2009 Defence White Paper, Force 2030.
In 2006 Australia made three deployments to neighbouring countries in support 
of regional security broadly defined. In April, it sent troops and police to boost 
the ability of RAMSI to deal with riots and unrest in Honiara. Then in late May, 
troops and police were sent to East Timor to assist in stopping riots, ethnic 
fighting, as well as a breakdown of law and order. In November, and along 
with New Zealand, troops and police were sent to Tonga, after pro-democracy 
protests turned violent. Along with its commitments to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, this was the highest operational tempo experienced by the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) since the Vietnam War. 
Force 2030 expresses the interest Australia holds in regional security in much 
the same, although much more focused, terms as the 2000 White Paper:
After ensuring the defence of Australia from direct attack, the second 
priority task for the ADF is to contribute to security and stability in 
the South Pacific and East Timor. This involves conducting military 
operations…providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, 
and on occasion by way of stabilisation interventions…(Department of 
Defence 2009: 54)
While all Australian Defence White Papers contemplate a degree of engagement, 
Force 2030 was the first to formalise this as a direct and sophisticated component 
of the calculation of strategic interests (Beazley interview). Prime Minister Kevin 
Rudd outlined why this was such an important task for Australia to undertake 
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in 2008. He talked about Australia having a long-term commitment to helping 
resolve conflict in East Timor and Solomon Islands, as there is a real risk of 
‘fragile states disrupting stability and prosperity’ in the region, not to mention 
the humanitarian implications. To ignore these kinds of problems ‘runs the risk 
of refugee outflows to neighbouring states’, and a ‘wide range of economic, 
diplomatic, and security initiatives’ should be put into play to achieve regional 
security (Rudd 2008).
It must be remembered that the only time Australian territory has been directly 
threatened by a hostile power was during World War Two, when Australia was 
(arguably) threatened with invasion by Japan, or at least enforced strategic 
isolation. During that time, Australian and US military forces defeated Japan in 
several key battles, which (again arguably) saved Australia from this threat. These 
battles occurred in the Coral Sea, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, and 
never on Australian soil. This has left a noticeable mark on the minds of those 
who study and make strategic and defence policy in Australia, and has meant 
that the South Pacific occupies a special place in Australian considerations of 
its own security. A central tenet of this is that other potentially hostile powers 
must be denied a foothold in South Pacific states – strategic denial. Essentially, 
strategic denial involves Australia seeking to deny other external players an 
influential role in key states in the South Pacific region (at least as far as they 
relate to Australian security interests) – namely Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu, as well as East Timor. This strategic denial reached 
its peak in the Cold War period, when fears over Soviet fishing fleet activities 
in the region verged on hysteria, and there was always a potential South Pacific 
Cuba lurking, just waiting to provide a springboard for nefarious influences 
in neighbouring states. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre 
and the Pentagon of 2001, non-state actors have come to dominate this list of 
potential threats. 
One of the central theses driving the new Australian interventionism since 
the 2003 RAMSI intervention has been what is generally called the Petri dish 
scenario. This was first developed in a paper authored by Australian academic 
Elsina Wainwright for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute about the 
crisis in Solomon Islands (Australian Strategic Policy Institute 2003). This was 
released shortly before Australian policy towards the crisis in Solomon Islands 
that simmered between 1998 and 2003 changed from one of non-intervention, 
to a so-called deep intervention, involving troops, police and public servants. 
The Petri dish scenario holds that, should instability in Australia’s neighbours 
lead to a situation where rule of law breaks down, and national governments 
are effectively unable to control their territory, the likely result would be a 
failed state. These potential failed states could then become a Petri dish, where 
all sorts of nasty things like transnational criminals and terrorist groups could 
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live and flourish, and pose threats to neighbouring states. Commentators 
like Kabutaulaka have linked this with the US-led war on terror, which led 
discussions of security within the US alliance framework to shift from inter- and 
intra-state conflicts to the threat posed by non-state organisations (Kabutaulaka 
2005). The links between the Petri dish thesis and Australian interventionism 
are also still characterised by the strategy of denial traditionally employed by 
Australia in its relationship with South Pacific states. 
It is important to note that all the interventions carried out by Australia have 
been at the request of regional government, approved by the main regional 
multilateral institution (the PIF), and thus have been entirely consensual. That 
has not prevented some commentators from seeing some overarching design 
in Australia’s activities in the South Pacific. Journalist John Pilger goes as far 
as to say that Australia is administering a ‘hidden empire’ that ‘stretches from 
the Aboriginal slums of Sydney to the South Pacific’ (Pilger 2008). While this 
may have been a more reasonable conclusion in the days of the ‘deputy sheriff’, 
where Australia was seen to act (and indeed saw itself) as the deputy of the US, 
events since 2003 have seen the Australian role shift. This paper argues that, in 
fact, commentators arguing that Australia is implementing some far-reaching 
plan are far too generous to Australia, and that events are controlling Australian 
policy, rather than the policy even attempting to control events. 
A very important facet of Australian policy towards regional security and 
capacity building in particular has been the increasingly large role in the various 
Australian interventions that has been played by the Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) through its International Deployment Group (IDG). The development of 
the IDG since its inception in February 2004 has been a valuable and useful 
policy tool for Australia in its attempts to enhance regional security. Its rationale 
is ‘to provide a formal capacity for the Commonwealth [federal] Government 
[of Australia] to deploy police offshore with the objective of contributing to 
regional and international stability and security through the delivery of law 
enforcement interventions and capacity building programs’ (McFarlane 2007: 
99). Currently, elements of the IDG are deployed in Solomon Islands, East Timor, 
Vanuatu, Tonga and Nauru. In Solomon Islands, the IDG personnel forms part 
of the Participating Police Force, itself a facet of RAMSI, and the focus of their 
efforts is improving the capacity of the Solomon Islands Police Force. In Vanuatu 
and Nauru, again the focus is on capacity building within local police forces 
(Australian Federal Police website). Interestingly, an AFP presence in Papua New 
Guinea was expelled by the government in May 2004 due to a legal challenge, 
but it seems that both Australia and Papua New Guinea are working towards 
establishing a new strategic agreement whereby the AFP could find itself 
deployed to Papua New Guinea again to strengthen ‘the institutional resilience 
of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary’ (Banham 2009).
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This role, combining peace operations with capacity building within regional 
police forces, is important, especially given the way that Australia defines its 
approach to regional security. As was discussed above, Australia’s approach to 
these issues is defined by two concepts – strategic denial and the Petri dish 
scenario. Thus its approach to regional security tends to focus on developing 
strong national states, so that these states can implement the rule of law, thus 
preventing non-state actors who profit from lawless environments, and rely on 
them to function effectively and project their activities into neighbouring states, 
a foothold in the region. What we are seeing from Australia is the development 
of a three-pronged regional security strategy. The first focuses on military 
deployments to establish a peaceful environment in which local governments can 
control their territory. The second builds the capacity of local law enforcement 
agencies to establish and maintain the rule of law. And the third, as witnessed in 
the RAMSI intervention, focuses on building other institutions of state, in the 
hope that instability can be avoided to begin with if regional governments are 
more effective economic and financial managers. Whether or not the strategy is 
effective remains to be seen.
The regional security guarantor role that Australia plays does still complement 
US policies in a wider regional sense, but it also brings significant benefits for 
regional states. In times of crisis, whether resulting from political instability or 
natural disaster, regional states can call on Australia to deploy its significant 
military and humanitarian capabilities to assist. Australia also provides 
substantial aid to the South Pacific region – it is the largest single donor. In 
2008-9, total aid to PIF member states was around A$1 billion, and this is set 
to increase in 2009-10. It also has the largest number of diplomatic missions 
in the region. Many Australian businesses hold significant investments in 
South Pacific countries, particularly in resource development and extraction. 
The security guarantor role does serve Australian interests primarily, but, 
while some states in the region may complain about Australia’s heavy-handed 
approach, or its desire to drive political and economic reform in key states like 
Papua New Guinea, there are no other real alternatives to Australia when it 
comes to this key security role. There is no other power with the military and 
economic capabilities to play this role, especially when one considers the relative 
withdrawal of the United States from the region.
China
In the last several years, the People’s Republic of China has been moving 
towards significantly increasing its role and profile in the South Pacific region. 
It has shown a genuine interest in the region, in terms of development aid 
and assistance, commercial engagement, and in the growing ethnic Chinese 
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community in the region. This section of the paper will examine these three 
areas of growing Chinese influence in the region, and their impact on regional 
security.
To begin this discussion however, it is necessary to look at China’s rise in the 
wider regional and global contexts, so as to put this discussion into perspective. 
Since undergoing economic reforms in the 1980s, China has experienced massive 
economic growth, and a commensurate increase in its national wealth. With 
this increase in wealth, has also come an increase in international influence, as 
China seeks to take its place as a responsible stakeholder in the international 
system. This has involved a normalisation of its international relations, which 
experienced considerable tension in the period from the Communist Party 
defeating the Nationalists and proclaiming the People’s Republic in 1949, to the 
late-1970s.
Accompanying this increase in Chinese power has been a debate amongst 
scholars as to whether a rising China constitutes a threat, or an opportunity. 
In other words, will China work towards using its power to upset or uphold 
the current international status quo? Which one it will choose depends on 
whether China decides that is has more to gain from challenging the United 
States’ military supremacy, or from peaceful coexistence. This has its inverse 
as well – it also depends on whether the United States decides to accommodate 
China’s rise, or to contest it.
Insofar as the threat/opportunity debate applies to the South Pacific region, 
there seem to be two contending schools of thought that broadly align with 
the positions outlined above. One side argues that Chinese engagement in the 
region provides a valuable development and economic opportunity (Zhang 
2007), while the other contends that China’s engagement is intended to serve the 
purpose of both sidelining Taiwan and undermining ‘ties between Pacific island 
nations and regional powers such as the United States, Australia and Japan’ 
(Windybank 2005; see also Henderson and Reilly 2003). Let us now assess these 
claims, so as to arrive at a conclusion about China’s role in the region.
China’s aid to some states in the region has been increasing over the last several 
years, an increase which has received much attention from academics and 
commentators in both Australia and the United States (see Lunn and Vaughan 
2007). In 2006, during a visit to Fiji, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told Pacific 
leaders that China was ‘ready to provide assistance without any political strings 
attached’ (Dobell 2007). During this visit, as part of the first China-Pacific 
Islands Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum, Premier Wen 
announced a new aid package worth US$375 million over three years, mostly 
in the form of concessional loans. Chinese development assistance is in fact 
administered by the Ministry of Commerce, and takes two main forms. Firstly 
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there are concessional loans, which are usually used for large infrastructure 
projects, and are offered with significant interest-free periods and low interest 
rates. This makes up the majority of the development aid administered over 
the last several years. Apart from this, China offers debt relief, grants, technical 
assistance and scholarships. The scale of the aid program is difficult to determine, 
but Fergus Hanson of the Lowy Institute has produced some excellent data. 
Firstly though it is important to note that China only offers aid to countries 
with a One China policy, and thus the states in the region that recognise Taiwan 
diplomatically cannot access Chinese assistance. 
In 2005, Hanson estimates that China’s aid program to the 14 Pacific Islands 
Forum members totalled around $US33 million. He estimated that this increased 
to $US78 million in 2006, and $US293 million in 2007. The figure for 2007 is 
somewhat inflated by a $160 million soft loan to Fiji, which is being disbursed 
over several years and which led to this spike in the figure (Hanson 2008: 11-
14). Hanson later revised the estimate for 2007 in light of this, with the revised 
figure of $100-150 million. Hanson’s figure for 2008 is $100 million, and this 
takes into account disbursements of the loan to Fiji (Hanson 2009: 3). This makes 
China a significant player in terms of development assistance to the region – 
again according to Hanson - one of the top three. So it seems that China is well 
on track to provide the US$375 million it announced in 2006, heralding the 
arrival of a new, and major, player in South Pacific politics. A large portion of 
the assistance has gone towards building some major infrastructure items, such 
as the new Parliament House in Vanuatu, and the Fiji National Stadium in Suva.
Much of this development aid has been aimed directly at reversing diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan. This competition has been going on since Taiwan lost its 
seat in the United Nations in 1971, and takes the form of vying with mainland 
China for diplomatic recognition by other countries. This is considered to be 
Taiwan’s ‘international space’ by the government in Taipei, and it has been 
shrinking since 2000, sharpening the contest. One of the main battlegrounds 
of this contest has been the South Pacific. Six South Pacific states currently 
recognise Taiwan: Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands and 
Tuvalu.
Three brief example of how this contest manifests itself can be found in Kiribati, 
Tuvalu and Solomon Islands. It was alleged during the 2003 elections in Kiribati 
that China and Taiwan were bankrolling candidates. Indeed, when the part-
ethnic Chinese Anote Tong subsequently won the election, he quickly switched 
diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, reversing a twenty year One China policy. In 
nearby Tuvalu, Chinese diplomats claimed that Taiwanese money was behind an 
August 2003 no-confidence vote in Prime Minister Saufatu Sopoanga, who had 
apparently flown to Beijing to switch recognition (Skehan 2004). The alleged role 
of Taiwanese money in the 2006 election in Solomon Islands and the subsequent 
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burning of Chinatown in Honiara is another example of the relationship this 
diplomatic contest has to regional security, but there is good news. Since the 
election in Taiwan of President Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008 there has been 
a diplomatic thaw, and a tacit understanding has developed between Taiwan 
and China that they would not attempt to encourage Pacific Island countries to 
change their diplomatic recognition (Callick 2009). Indeed, since Ma’s election 
in May 2008, of twenty-eight nations which recognise Taiwan, not a single one 
has changed recognition, despite several states in Central America apparently 
intending to do so. In the absence of this diplomatic competition, it seems more 
likely that China can play a positive role in fostering regional security, as most 
instances of instability relating to China and Taiwan’s respective aid programs 
eventuated because of the diplomatic rivalry.
Development assistance is not the only area in which China has significantly 
increased its role in the South Pacific. Its diplomatic influence is increasing, 
with some commentators saying that ‘it is now accepted routine that the first 
official overseas visit by a new head of government in the region is made to 
Beijing, not to Canberra’ (Henderson and Reilly 2003: 95). It has been estimated 
in Australia that China now has the most diplomats in the region as well as 
substantial economic investments. There are more than 3000 Chinese (both 
state and private) owned businesses registered, with investments estimated at 
US$ 1 billion (yang 2009). Chinese trade with the region has undergone a huge 
increase – between 2004 and 2005 alone it increased from US$530 million to 
$838 million – and has been largely focused on securing resources needed to 
drive China’s economic boom (Zhang 2007: 370). By 2006 this had increased to 
US$1.2 billion (Yang 2009: 3). Alongside this has been an increase in the number 
of ethnic Chinese living in the South Pacific, and while there are no reliable 
figures, Ron Crocombe estimates there are some 80,000 (Dobell 2007: 6-7). It is 
uncertain, however, just how many have arrived recently, and how many have 
been in the South Pacific for years, if not generations. This is because there 
has been a Chinese presence in the South Pacific since at least the 1800s, and 
Chinese traders may have been visiting the region for much longer still.
China has a strong interest in regional security, along with the other major external 
actors active in the South Pacific. China’s significant economic investments rely 
in internal stability, as the situation with the Ramu nickel mine in Papua New 
Guinea shows. In May 2009, fights between Papua New Guinean and Chinese 
workers at the Chinese-owned Ramu nickel refinery sparked riots and looting 
across Papua New Guinea, and resulted in the shooting of at least four looters, 
as well as calls by local activists to ‘celebrate 2010 New Year with bonfires of 
all Asian-owned shops all around the country’ (Roberts 2009). If China seeks 
to continue extracting resources necessary to fuel its economic growth from 
states in the South Pacific region, events such as this must be avoided wherever 
possible.
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However there are important differences between the perspective China holds 
on regional security and that of other actors like Australia. One difference can 
be found in China’s approach to the coup regime in Fiji. China’s interests are 
not really engaged by events such as this in the way that Australia’s interests 
are. While Australia has a strong interest in stable and democratic governments, 
China’s direct interest in internal stability is primarily engaged by events 
such as the riots in Papua New Guinea in 2009, rather than by the existence 
of non-democratic governments. Furthermore, given the scale of China’s 
aid and assistance to Fiji since the coup in 2006, it does not seem that China 
intends to avoid lending assistance to Bainimarama’s regime in the way that the 
Commonwealth, Australia, New Zealand, the PIF, the European Union and most 
of the other major regional actors have. Still, according to the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry, ‘China has maintained good coordination with the US, the European 
Union, Australia, New Zealand and other development partners in the region in 
safeguarding regional stability… We are willing to work jointly with all relevant 
parties to promote stability, development and prosperity in the region’ (Callick 
and Kerr 2009). Overall, the Chinese role is very similar to its role in other parts 
of the developing world: providing development aid with no strings attached, 
and investing heavily in both infrastructure and resource development. 
As China takes its rightful place as a legitimate international actor, it is only 
natural that it should play a greater role in world politics. China’s interests in 
commerce and resources in the South Pacific will lead it to become more involved 
in regional affairs, as will competition for diplomatic recognition with Taiwan, 
should the diplomatic truce break. In large measure, the China as a threat in 
the South Pacific thesis relies on the assessment that the region is strategically 
valuable to China, which is itself subject to dispute (Yang 2009). Should China 
continue to avoid challenging the US militarily, and should the US continue to 
accommodate China’s rise, there is no reason to see China as a serious threat in 
the South Pacific; indeed, from the perspective of many Pacific Island countries, 
China’s engagement in the region presents a significant opportunity – what is at 
question now is how to capitalise on the opportunities presented.
United States
The US has a special relationship with the Freely Associated States (FAS) – 
namely the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands and Palau – which 
are essentially politically independent, but allow the US to provide for their 
defence amongst other things. The FAS, together with Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands ‘have been regarded as a security border’ by the US, and their 
defence is considered vital to maintaining open sea lanes of communication 
(SLOCs) (Lunn and Vaughan 2007: 5). Much like Australia, the US remembers 
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well the Second World War, when its SLOCs with Australia were threatened 
by Japan, and Australia – vital to the US war effort in the Pacific – was nearly 
isolated from the US. Furthermore, the US presence in Oceania helped it to 
bolster its security posture during the Cold War.
The US has been winding down its role in the South Pacific steadily since 
the end of the Cold War. It has been closed embassies in Solomon Islands 
and Samoa, aid posts in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, and has wound back its 
provision of educational assistance in the form of scholarships. At the military 
level though, the US is looking to expand its presence. Secretary of Defence 
Robert Gates said in May 2009 that the US was ‘actually increasing our military 
presence [in the central and western Pacific], with new air, naval and marine 
assets based… in Guam’ (‘Gates Delivers Keynote Address to Open Asia Security 
Conference’ 2009). Indeed, over the next several years the US intends to spend 
A$18 billion on turning the island of Guam into what the generals are calling an 
‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ (‘Guam: Tip of the Spear’ 2007). This, however, is 
directed squarely at China, and is intended as a warning about China’s activities 
in the Taiwan Strait, rather than being directed towards South Pacific regional 
security. That task is left to Australia – to quote Gates again, ‘Australia remains 
a steadfast ally… we welcome Australia’s new Defence White Paper reaffirming 
its role regionally and globally, and continue to seek ways to advance common 
interests together’(‘Gates Delivers Keynote Address to Open Asia Security 
Conference’ 2009; author’s emphasis).
Conclusion
Despite considerable instances of internal instability in several South Pacific 
states, the current state of regional security offers some hope. More effective 
mechanisms to deal with these instances are being developed and implemented 
by regional powers like Australia and New Zealand, alongside programs to help 
in preventing their occurrence in the first place. The increased Australian role 
has both positive and negative elements, but overall Australian interests in 
regional security align well with the interests of states in the region. While 
there has been considerable angst displayed over China’s increasing role, and 
the relative withdrawal of the US from the region, it does not seem at this stage 
that it is a simple matter of China displacing or replacing the US as a major 
power in Oceania. Rather, it looks more likely that China is simply taking its 
place as a responsible stakeholder in the region, and that it is happy to work 
with countries in the region in pursuit of prosperity and development. Concerns 
about the development of a new Cold War in the region, with China and the 
US vying for influence has not developed, and looks unlikely to develop at 
this point, but this in turn depends on how China’s rise in a global sense is 
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managed by both the US, and China itself. Furthermore, China’s engagement 
offers considerable opportunities in terms of development assistance and aid, 
without the sometimes onerous strings attached by donors like Australia, and 
international economic institutions.
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